Murder Conviction of Minor Reversed Due to Illegally Obtained Confession

Facts of the Case

In 1993, the state charged 16-year-old Leif Taylor with first-degree felony murder and second-degree robbery. Mr. Taylor was named as one of two defendants who attempted to steal a bicycle from William Shadden in Long Beach, California, on May 31, 1993. Mr. Shadden resisted their efforts, causing the two would-be robbers to flee. Regrettably, he chose to pursue his assailants and was shot and killed by one of them. Three months later, Detectives Craig Remine and William MacLyman had developed Mr. Taylor as a key suspect. They obtained search and arrest warrants.

Detectives Remine and MacLyman and at least two other officers entered Mr. Taylor’s home on September 1, 1993, at approximately 11:30 p.m. With their flashlights on and guns drawn, they found Mr. Taylor home alone sleeping on the sofa. His mother, the only residential parent, was not home at the time. The boy was arrested and transported to the police station for questioning. He was first placed alone in a small interrogation room for 30 minutes. Detectives MacLyman and Remine then entered and interrogated him for over three hours.

Neither his mother nor his attorney was present during the interrogation, and no offer of food or a break was given. Detective MacLyman reportedly thrust his “187” ring, the police code for murder, in Mr. Taylor’s face and insisted that the youth knew why he was there. He also diagrammed Mr. Taylor’s future by drawing two lines of uneven length on a piece of paper. The longer of the two lines symbolized the rest of his life in prison, whereas the shorter one represented the time he would spend in prison if he would tell them what they wanted to hear. One of the detectives told Mr. Taylor he knew he didn’t “deliberately” kill the victim and that it must have been done “unintentionally.” The boy nevertheless denied involvement for over two-and-one-half hours.

According to Mr. Taylor, he repeatedly asked for permission to call his mother and an attorney, Arthur Close, beginning just after he arrived at the station. In fact, he knew Mr. Close’s phone number by heart because they each had been involved in neighborhood activities, including community clean-ups and a gang baseball team, and he had also worked for Mr. Close doing chores.

At 3:02 a.m., after nearly three hours of interrogation, Mr. Taylor broke down and provided the detectives with an 11-minute confession. This was the only portion of the interrogation that was tape recorded, despite there having been recording equipment installed and available in the room. Detective Remine took notes during the questioning but discarded them prior to the trial. Besides the 11-minute tape, no other record existed of what transpired in the interrogation room.

After the interrogation ended and Mr. Taylor was booked, he was given the chance to use a phone and called Mr. Close at approximately 4:00 a.m. Mr. Close would later recall at the suppression hearing that the youth was “in tears and highly agitated.” Mr. Taylor explained to Mr. Close that he had asked to be allowed to call him while being escorted to the interview room, again had asked to call him four or more times during the interrogation, and also had requested that both his attorney and his mother be present. He finally confessed to the murder to end the interrogation so he could use the phone, believing he could “get it straightened out” later, since he was innocent.

Mr. Taylor’s attorney moved to have an evidentiary hearing before trial to suppress the defendant’s inculpatory statements. Testimony was heard from Mr. Taylor, Detective Remine, and Arthur Close (there is no mention in the record of why Detective MacLyman or the officer who escorted Mr. Taylor did not testify). Mr. Taylor testified that he repeatedly asked to call both his attorney and his mother, before and during the interrogation, but his requests were denied. Mr. Close’s testimony of his telephone conversation with Mr. Taylor corroborated the boy’s recollection of events. Detective Remine’s testimony was in stark contrast to Mr. Taylor’s testimony. He stated the youth had never asked for counsel prior to questioning or to speak to his mother and that he had indeed been advised of his Miranda rights. He could not recall if Mr. Taylor had asked for an attorney or his mother during the questioning. The state court was not persuaded by the defense testimony. Ruling from the bench, Judge Sheldon simply declared that he believed the testimony of Detective Remine versus that of Mr. Taylor and denied the suppression motion: I am the fact finder first, and I have to decide and say who I believe. I conclude, in this case, that I clearly believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, Officer Ramine [sic] and not the testimony of the defendant… (Record, p 5899 (Taylor, no. 02-55560)).At trial, the jury heard the taped confession, the only substantial evidence in the case and not the testimony of Mr. Close. They convicted Mr. Taylor of first‐degree felony murder and second‐degree robbery, and he was sentenced to life without parole. No physical evidence linking him to the crime existed.Mr. Taylor appealed, and the California Court of Appeals, Second District, in an unpublished opinion, merely noted that “the evidence found credible by the trial court supports the determination that the waiver and confession were voluntary,” and affirmed. Mr. Taylor petitioned the verdict of the appellate court. The California Supreme Court denied his petition for review without comment or citation. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit subsequently granted a certificate of appealability as to “whether appellant’s Miranda rights were violated, and whether his confession was voluntary.”

Ruling

The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, based on their “independent review of the record,” concluded that the district court had erred and reversed its decision. The state courts were “objectively unreasonable” in finding that the defendant’s confession was voluntarily and lawfully obtained. Taylor was entitled to habeas relief and a conditional writ of habeas corpus was granted. On remand, the district court was ordered to release Taylor unless the State of California notified the district court that it would commence a retrial of Taylor, on evidence other than the illegally obtained confession, within 70 days of the issue of the mandate.

Reasoning

The Ninth Circuit cited several factors supporting their determination that the district court had erred and that Mr. Taylor was entitled to habeas relief:

1. The court found clear and convincing evidence that the confession was taken in violation of Miranda. Specifically, Mr. Taylor asked to speak to his attorney prior to entering the interrogation room, and therefore the interrogation should never have started. The prosecution offered no witnesses or evidence to refute this claim. This superseded the issue of his repeated requests for counsel in the interview room. Although Detective Remine weakly disputed the latter, he was the only state witness, his recall was ambiguous, and he was not present for the entirety of the interrogation. As the Ninth Circuit noted, it would be fair to infer that the state presented neither of the other officers as corroborating witnesses because their testimonies would have been unfavorable to the state’s case. Regardless, Mr. Taylor’s original invocation of Miranda rights to the escorting officer should have precluded any interrogation, and these rights were not validly waived because he continued to respond to questioning. The admission of the interrogation violated the youth’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

2. The confession was inadmissible because it was involuntary. The detectives’ conduct was found to be “coercive and constitutionally unacceptable,” which rendered the confession involuntary. The Ninth Circuit considered the inherently coercive nature of the totality of the circumstances, including the length of the interrogation; its location; its continuity; the absence of an attorney or parent; the defendant’s maturity and age, education, physical condition (he was allowed no food or rest), and mental health; denial of requests to speak with his mother or attorney; and the threatening activities of Detective MacLyman. Mr. Taylor’s account of the intimidating nature of the environment was consistent with the detectives’ choice, without compelling rationale, to execute the arrest and interrogation at hours during which the defendant’s mental defenses and clarity were likely to be compromised.

3. By virtually omitting relevant evidence (i.e., Mr. Close’s testimony), the state court tainted its fact‐finding process. The resultant factual determination was therefore “unreasonable,” and a presumption of correctness could not follow. The decision to undermine a state’s fact‐finding process necessarily includes that the overlooked evidence be central to the petitioner’s claim and highly probative. In this case, the state court judge’s choice to believe Detective Remine rather than Mr. Taylor at the suppression hearing, without further investigation, resulted in Attorney Close’s testimony being essentially ignored by both the state and appellate courts. The major error was the failure to consider and weigh relevant evidence that was part of the state court record. This violates the “unreasonable determination” standard of section 2254(d)(2) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).

4. In disregarding the existence of a key aspect of the record, Attorney Close’s testimony, the quality of this piece of evidence was left unscrutinized. Whereas the testimony of Detective Remine was at times ambiguous and inaccurate, the Ninth Circuit found the testimony of Mr. Close reliable, highly probative, internally consistent, and plausible. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit, like the state courts, found no motive for Attorney Close to perjure himself. They subsequently dismissed the possibility of fabrication: We think it highly improbable that a 16‐year‐old boy, of limited mental acuity and with a minimal police record…had the wherewithal to concoct a tale of police intimidation, filled with graphic details, in the short span between the end of his interrogation and his phone call to Close. Taylor was a teenager without a parent, attorney or friend, taken from his home at gunpoint in the dead of night and then questioned at length by two police officers, and thus was particularly vulnerable to the inherently coercive environment in which he found himself [Record, p 5921-2 (Taylor, no. 02–55560)].

5. Admission of the confession was not harmless. It was the only solid evidence against Mr. Taylor and also the most damaging. There was neither eyewitness identification nor physical evidence. The jury did not hear Mr. Close’s testimony, which closely corroborated many details of Mr. Taylor’s account of events. The admission of the confession arose from disbelief of the defendant. The court’s decision not to lend credibility to Mr. Taylor precluded a consideration of defense testimony, which in turn constituted trial error and therefore probably had a “substantial and injurious” impact on the outcome of the case.

Discussion

Taylor v. Maddox demonstrates the complexity that exists when certain adult legal standards are routinely applied to juveniles without consideration of accompanying developmental issues. Many states do not allow minor suspects to be questioned without permission from a parent. While persons of all ages are vulnerable to coercive interrogation tactics, coercion is of even greater concern with child suspects. Developmental considerations should inform the decision as to whether a child can understand, much less invoke or waive, his or her Miranda rights. Parents are arguably in the best position to help with this determination. The safest course to ensure protection of Miranda rights for child suspects and to minimize the specter of false confessions would be to have all states (1) obtain parental authorization prior to a child’s being interrogated or provide documentation of reasonable efforts to contact the legal guardians if they are unavailable and (2) create and preserve adequate documentation (i.e., videotaping) of the entire law enforcement interview process.