Constitutional Rights of Individuals Committed as Sexually Violent Predators Outlined
In Hydrick v. Hunter, 449 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2006), civilly committed inmates and those awaiting commitment pursuant to California's Sexually Violent Predators (SVP) Act brought a class action against public officials alleging violation of their constitutional rights. The district court denied the officials' motion to dismiss. The court of appeals held that the officials had qualified immunity from suit on ex post facto, double jeopardy, and Eighth Amendment claims. On all other claims, the denial of dismissal was affirmed.
Facts of the Case
California's SVP Act defines an SVP as an individual who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against at least two victims, has received a determinate sentence, and has a mental disorder that makes the person a danger to others. Before completing the sentence, the person is evaluated by the Department of Corrections and Department of Mental Health. If they agree that the person may be an SVP, a petition for commitment may be filed. If a jury finds the person to be a danger, he or she is civilly committed. This commitment commences after the criminal sentence is fulfilled. Each year, the person has a right to a hearing to determine whether commitment should be continued. Once committed, the person undergoes a five-phase treatment program. During Phase 1, the SVP is required to participate in treatment sessions or his or her access level is reduced. Failure to participate is used against the SVP in future hearings, and the SVP cannot advance to Phase 2. The SVP cannot advance beyond Phase 1 unless he or she signs a statement acknowledging an illness that requires treatment.
On September 2, 1998, the plaintiffs filed a pro se class action on the grounds that the policies and procedures governing their confinement and treatment violated their constitutional rights. In March 1999, the district court appointed counsel who later filed an amended complaint. The defendants' motion to dismiss was denied. The plaintiffs later filed a second amended complaint. Both amended complaints alleged that the defendants violated the plaintiffs' rights by forcibly medicating them in nonemergency situations; reducing their privileges as a form of punishment for refusing to participate in treatment sessions or as retaliation for filing lawsuits; putting them in restraints for nonthreatening and/or nondisruptive conduct; subjecting them to public strip searches; failing to protect them from abuse of other patients or employees; failing to provide constitutionally satisfactory conditions of confinement; forcing them to participate in treatment; and denying adequate treatment, thereby converting the civil confinement to a de facto extension of the prison sentence. Again, the defendants' motion to dismiss was denied. They appealed, arguing that the district court erred by failing to rule that the Eleventh Amendment, state abstention doctrine, or qualified immunity barred the suit.
Ruling and Reasoning
The Ninth Circuit noted that, in its review, all allegations of material fact were accepted as true and should be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. The court noted difficulty in deciding a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds at this stage, explaining that they must evaluate the merits of the qualified immunity defense before knowing the full extent of the alleged abuses, the reason behind the policy, or the involvement of the defendants in creating the conditions. The court agreed that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for monetary damages against state officials in their official capacity, but noted that it does not bar such suits against officials in their personal capacities. Qualified immunity provides immunity from a suit for damages, not from a suit for declarative or injunctive relief. To withstand the defendants' claim, the plaintiffs must allege violation of a right that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. The defendants argued that damages were not appropriate, as the laws applicable to SVPs are still evolving. While the court agreed that the suit was unique, the majority held that the claims could not be dismissed at this stage.
The court noted that civilly detained individuals must be afforded more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than are criminals detained under conditions designed to punish. The ruling held that it followed that rights afforded to prisoners set a floor for the rights that must be provided to SVPs. Therefore, if the defendants have violated a right clearly established in the prison context, then it must be established for SVPs. The court noted that SVPs are civilly committed after a criminal conviction and have been found to represent a danger to others, and so their rights might not be coextensive with those of other civilly committed individuals. After having framed the analysis, the court found that the plaintiffs might be able to prove that they had been punished in retaliation for exercise of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to file grievances about confinement. However, the defendants had qualified immunity to the extent that the claims relied on a First Amendment right to refuse to participate in treatment sessions, since the law was not clearly established on this point. The court held that plaintiffs might be able to prove violations of Fourth Amendment rights to protection from unreasonable searches, seizures, and unnecessary use of force. The ruling noted that this right had been extended to prisoners and thus held that it extended to SVPs. It found that the ex post facto and double jeopardy claims were foreclosed by other rulings and that the Eighth Amendment was not the proper means of challenging conditions of civil commitment.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the court held that SVPs may be deprived of certain privileges, but this may not occur without notice and a chance to be heard. The decision held that, “at a minimum,” an SVP has a right to due process before being forcibly medicated in nonemergency situations. The court held that the plaintiffs might have a liberty interest in the access levels and classifications affecting their privileges; that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that civilly committed individuals not be placed under conditions that amount to punishment; and that the plaintiffs raised questionable classifications and the court could not dismiss equal protection claims. The plaintiffs claimed that they were unable to correspond privately or have telephone conversations with counsel and were hindered in their ability to prepare for hearings. The court held that the plaintiffs might be able to state a violation in this context and with regard to a Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy. The court did not believe that the defendants could claim that their conduct was objectively reasonable, explaining that SVPs are not entirely dissimilar to other civilly committed people and that the plaintiffs had made allegations of treatment that would be unconstitutional if directed at any prisoner.
Discussion
Aside from the questions of qualified immunity, this case raises concerns important to forensic psychiatrists. The Ninth Circuit analyzed rights established for individuals detained in other contexts and attempted to determine which would apply to individuals committed pursuant to the California SVP scheme. Thus, the court took a step toward delineating the constitutional rights of such individuals. The majority opinion made clear that individuals committed as SVPs are civilly committed and that individuals detained civilly should not to be held in conditions that amount to punishment. In examining the rights of SVPs, the court used the rights of prisoners as a floor level for the rights of SVPs. The court clearly attempted to balance the needs for preserving individual liberty, for protecting society, for treatment, and for institutional control. As this case and others like it proceed, psychiatrists should take an active role in helping the courts understand the rationale for treatment of individuals committed as SVPs as well as helping the courts understand the policies governing the conditions of confinement. By doing so, psychiatrists can help courts arrive at a better balance in considering these concerns.
- American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law