Expert Testimony in Cult-Related Litigation

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The work of forensic psychiatrists has expanded into the controversial area of cases involving new religious movements. Challenges to the expert witness in such cases include new questions and a large body of relevant literature. Published appeals decisions have appeared with judicial comments on the conduct of the involved experts. This article presents the comments about expert witnesses from judges who decided cases involving the major new issues of coercion both in recruitment into and forcible abduction from cults, and competency to join and make donations to these groups. The judicial comments are evaluated using relevant literature from the fields of law, psychiatry, and religion. This provides a basis for general observations and suggestions regarding the involvement of psychiatric experts in cult-related cases.

Mental health experts work in several conventional areas of the civil and criminal law. However, some experts offer their opinions in less familiar kinds of disputes. Among these are cases that arise from the controversy surrounding unconventional religious groups, whose recruitment practices have generated the largest family of such cases. These judicial conflicts confront the expert with two broad issues:

1. Coercion: attributed to both the cults’ recruitment of members and relatives’ efforts to remove them.

2. Competency: questioned in regard to joining a cult and in regard to making donations.

Another notable subject of controversy not treated in this paper is the authenticity of claims made by such groups as the Church of Scientology and the transcendental meditation movement.

In general, psychiatrists and psychologists must consider the limits of their expert testimony, the appropriateness of areas they address, and the requirement that their testimony be well-grounded in the knowledge base of their mental health discipline. In the specialized area of cult-related litigation, meeting these standards is difficult because the extant literature on cults is uneven and often
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difficult to evaluate. It is also vast, appearing in the publications of religious studies as well as those of psychiatry and the law.

We have identified cult-related cases in which appellate judges commented, in their published decisions, on the expert testimony. This judicial commentary offers experts a comprehensive sample of how their colleagues’ testimony has been evaluated, and the reasons it was either helpful or found wanting. These courts clearly intended for subsequent expert witnesses to profit from their observations, but so far the commentary from these judges has not been systematically explored.

We will summarize each case under one of the two headings, coercion or competency. We will report and discuss the appeal court’s comments on expert testimony at the trial court level and survey the useful literature bearing on each heading. We conclude with a discussion of general issues raised by the cases.

The Question of Coercion

Parents and former cult members have alleged the use of coercive force on new candidates for membership. Most have claimed that psychological force was used, as well as deception or the withholding of information. They have employed such labels as coercive persuasion, brainwashing, or programming. In turn, some cult members have accused those who attempted to remove them from the cults of physical and psychological coercion, popularly called deprogramming.

Coercive Joining  A 1977 case, People v. Murphy, arose in response to charges, against the Hare Krishna group, of unlawful imprisonment. The defendants moved for dismissal of the grand jury indictments on the ground of insufficient evidence. Granting the motion for dismissal, the judge reviewed the grand jury’s minutes, including testimony from numerous expert witnesses in psychiatry, medicine, social work, and religion. He acknowledged that their evidence on the use of indoctrination for mind control was devastating and accepted a statement that it could affect ability to think logically and even “may destroy healthy brain cells.”

However, the judge’s reading of all the evidence made it clear that the Hare Krishna members had voluntarily accepted the discipline and regimentation of the group. Their freedom to do so, he added, was protected by the First Amendment. Further, in his view there was no coercion since the cult’s behavior did not involve the force, intimidation, or deception required by the statutory definition of false imprisonment.

In another 1977 case, Schuppin v. Unification Church, argued in the U.S. District Court of Vermont, parents sought their 18-year-old daughter’s removal from the church. Among their 12 counts was the assertion that the church was using techniques of mind control to hold their daughter in a state of involuntary servitude and inability to make competent decisions. She refused to see their psychiatric expert, who had previously examined 10 members of the same church. Therefore, he testified on the
basis of interviews with the parents and after having reviewed letters from their daughter and tapes of their telephone conversations with her. For reasons not stated in the decision, he testified that the daughter was "presently incompetent to make important decisions in the manner of a normal adult person."

The judge was more impressed by the daughter's clear desire to remain in the church than by the expert's testimony. The judge concluded that in the absence of an examination, the daughter's choice rendered the expert's testimony invalid; the judge found no basis for ordering an examination against the young woman's clearly stated wishes. Thus, all the parents' counts were dismissed.

*Katz v. Superior Court* was brought before the First District Court of Appeal by five young adult members of the Unification Church. They sought relief after their parents obtained temporary conservatorships in order to remove them from the group. The judge in this case reviewed the work of several experts. A psychiatrist interviewed the parents and examined each of the petitioners for approximately an hour and a quarter. His testimony described constriction of thought and affect, defects of memory, attention, and concentration, limited abstracting ability, confabulation under pressure, defensiveness, and paranoia regarding past relationships. He added that these abnormalities resulted from "coercive persuasion" akin to the experience of prisoners of war. A collaborating psychologist added testimony that figures drawn by the five individuals resembled those from such prisoners. The psychologist stated that she could make no diagnosis using standard categories but that there was an emergency situation requiring treatment in the form of "reality therapy."

A psychiatrist-psychologist team also examined and testified for the petitioners. The psychiatrist stated that "coercive persuasion" without physical or chemical means was speculative theory and that the experiences invoked by the opposing experts were normal manifestations of religious devotion. They gave the five a clean bill of mental health, the psychologist specifying that he looked for and did not find symptoms like those associated with prison camp exposure.

The judge saw the experts' disagreement as understandable and saw no basis for the conservatorships requested by the parents. He then addressed the issue of whether the changes in the subjects' behavior that distressed their parents had resulted from coercive persuasion or from their religious faith. He stated that a decision on this issue would involve questioning the validity of their faith, thus intruding on freedom of religion. The implication was quite clear that the experts had so intruded. Finally, the court added that granting the conservatorships would also violate freedom of association.

A current case, *Molko v. Holy Spirit Association for Unification* involved disaffected former members attempting to sue the church, which won a summary judgment from the trial court. Before the California Appeals Court, the former members alleged fraud and deceit, based in large part on their assertion that the
church had gained control of their minds. In support of this, they produced two experts. The first was a psychologist who testified on the basis of interviews with some 260 church members and exmembers that the church’s methods strikingly resembled those used on American Korean War prisoners whom she had also interviewed. Examining the plaintiffs themselves, she found that they had lost the exercise of their own will and judgment from the church’s use of its methods, adding that they had suffered emotional distress from this and subsequent experiences. The plaintiffs’ other witness was a psychiatrist who compared his interviews with them to past experience evaluating cult members. His testimony drew parallels between the methods of Mao Tse-tung’s followers and those of the church, and found both loss of judgmental capacity and suffering of emotional distress.

The appellate judge pointed out that neither expert had indicated what factual information obtained from their examinations led to their conclusions. In a footnote, he quoted the trial court’s impression that the experts seemed to reason backward from their own disapproval of the church to the conclusion that since their interviewees were persuaded by it they must not have been thinking clearly. Both courts saw the experts’ opinions as “veiled value judgments concerning the entire outlook of the Unification Church.”

The Appeals Court added that the plaintiffs’ experts worked from a scientific perspective that “ignored the religious aspect of the church’s teachings and the spiritual nature of its hold on its members.” If a court were to accept their testimony that the church’s psychological techniques deprived the plaintiffs of the ability to reason critically, it would be “questioning the authenticity and force of the Unification Church’s religious teachings” (emphasis in original). Because religious experiences are protected by the First Amendment from court scrutiny, the judge added, expert opinions about them are neither true nor false from the law’s point of view. Going further, he suggested in a footnote that the issue was close enough to common experience to exclude the need for experts. At the same time, he made clear his personal disapproval of the church’s methods.

The California Supreme Court did not agree. It saw no challenge to the church’s teachings, but only to its practices in the recruitment of members. It regarded the burden imposed by its decision as a real one, but minimal, nondiscriminatory, and more than balanced by interests of the state. This court did not address the scientific validity of the plaintiff’s experts’ brainwashing theory. It simply found that the individuals’ own descriptions of their experiences with the church sufficed to state a triable issue of fact, all that was needed to overturn a summary judgment. As of this writing, the church is preparing an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.

In the psychiatric literature, Lifton’s work on ideological totalism provided the foundation for the concept of coercion as applied to cults. Although it arises from his study of Chinese thought
reform, Lifton has applied his concept of totalism to fundamentalistic cults, adding that deprogramming is also coercive. Lifton eschewed the term brainwashing as lacking precision, a point which Reich has amplified. A forensic psychologist has warned that accepting the application of a brainwashing label to religious indoctrination could lead logically to doing the same with psychotherapy, and two responding authors have pointed out other similar difficulties. A detailed critical history of the brainwashing concept is also available.

Utilizing the diagnostic category of atypical dissociative disorder, some authors have explicitly defined a syndrome associated with cult joining. Others have opposed this trend. Delgado has described a nuanced approach to the demonstration of coercion in the recruitment practices of cults. He argued that the groups have segmented the process of joining in such a way that their recruits’ learning about beliefs and practices increased in proportion to their decreasing ability to make a reasoned choice about joining. This conclusion appeared to be based primarily on comments from disaffected recruits. On the other hand, Galanter, following 104 recruits through the Unification Church’s sequence of workshops, found that the small minority who persevered had experienced markedly stronger ties with church members and weaker links to outsiders than did those who left. He concluded that development of social cohesiveness, rather than manipulation, was important for acceptance of the group’s beliefs. Likewise, Wright interviewed 45 voluntary defectors from three cults and reported that the overwhelming majority felt that they had made their own choice when joining, had not been brainwashed, and were wiser for the experience.

**Coercive Removal** Weiss v. Patrick, in the U.S. District Court of Rhode Island in 1978, exemplifies the allegation of coercion in the process of being removed from a cult. The 23-year-old Weiss brought criminal charges of conspiracy against her civil rights, assault and battery, and false imprisonment against those who had abducted her from the Unification Church and unsuccessfully attempted to dissuade her from her religious commitment through a process popularly known as “deprogramming.” She presented a fellow church member as a medical witness in support of her claim that she had been emotionally disturbed by the experience. He testified that the experience had caused severe agitation and an acute anxiety reaction. His opinion, in the judge’s view, was marred by limited training in psychiatry and failure to take into account the plaintiff’s 10-year history of psychiatric treatment. In finding for the defendants, the judge commented that the testimony fell far short of proving the defendant’s claim of emotional disturbance.

Eilers v. Coy, a 1984 Minnesota case in the U.S. District Court, Fourth Division, also involved false imprisonment and civil rights charges against deprogrammers. Here the judge noted that the relatives’ attempt at civil commitment had failed when a psychiatric social...
worker interviewed the cult member and found no evidence of danger to self or others. His decision points out that the relatives then made no effort to find a qualified expert who thought the plaintiff was dangerous. Even after granting their assumption of dangerousness, the judge ruled against the deprogrammers because they failed in their attempt to demonstrate that their conduct was necessary to prevent the plaintiff from harming himself or others.

The outcome was similar in Colom-brito v. Kelly, a 1985 case in the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. The mother of a 27-year-old Unification Church member won temporary guardianship at an ex parte hearing and hired deprogrammers. Their process was interrupted by police acting on a tip from the church, and the son then sued the deprogrammers.

The decision mentions how religious and medical professionals testifying for the defendants stated that the church was involved in deceptive recruitment, brainwashing, exploitation, and mind control. Not to be outdone, the plaintiff called experts from the fields of religion, physics, psychology, and theology, as well as an experienced psychiatrist who testified that the church did not exercise mind control. The judge trenchantly observed that even assuming the worst of what their experts portrayed, the defendants’ alleged behavior during the abduction was unjustifiable.

Forceful abduction and intensive dissuasion of cult members has been described as far more coercive than the cults’ recruitment methods. One author also described the diverse kidnapping statutes used to prosecute deprogrammers and the defenses used in such cases. Tort actions brought against deprogrammers, and the use of conservatorships to authorize abductions from cults. Included with each type of case is discussion of the evidence involved. The material is relevant for experts, whether or not they agree with the author’s clear stance against deprogramming. Similarly, Greene offered excellent and familiar advice for testimony at conservatorship hearings. He suggested the physician ought to set aside personal religious opinion and fully address current mental status in the light of all relevant history.

**The Question of Competency**

**To Join** The issue of competency is familiar to forensic mental health experts who have traditionally been called upon to address the relationship of an individual’s mental condition to his capacity to make decisions at trial, about treatment and parenting, and in regard to making a will. A 1983 Oklahoma case, In re Polin, involved an attempt to relate expert testimony to an individual’s decision to join an unconventional religious group.

The subject was Robin Andrea Polin, an 18-year-old deaf mute Jewish woman who had joined a fundamentalist group of independent Baptists called the Kingdom Come Ministry. Her parents reacted by petitioning the District Court of Tulsa County for guardianship of their daughter’s person and estate. The five-day trial included expert testimony from both sides. The trial judge chose to base his award of guardianship on the
"unbiased, professional and competent testimony" of one physician whose qualifications and demeanor he had found impressive. The decisive testimony was that Robin's interpersonal and decision making skills were on the level of a nine-year-old child.

The judge went on to combine his finding of judgmental immaturity based on the expert testimony with his own direct observation of Robin herself that she could not manage her affairs or "provide for even the minimal necessities of life." The judge stated explicitly that he was not considering religious choice as a factor. Further, he emphasized protection for Robin's religious freedom by assigning the guardianship to her sister rather than to either of her parents.

However, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed, despite the lower court's effort to separate the expert's testimony it accepted from Ms. Polin's religious choice. The higher court rejected the use of judgmental immaturity as too broad a basis for finding incompetency to manage one's person or property, with a chilling effect on the right to free exercise of religious belief.

**To Donate** Two other cases involved expert testimony on the question of whether substantial contributions to unconventional religious groups were competently made. In a 1977 New York Supreme Court case, *Kraft v. Ziskind,* Daniel R. Ziskind, a 29-year-old man with a bachelor's degree in economics had lent some $150,000 to the meditation-oriented Arica Institute, prompting his sister to petition successfully for a conservatorship appointment. Despite Ziskind's objections, his psychiatrist of nine years testified that his patient had made several improvident business transactions. Another psychiatrist disagreed. In overturning the appointment, the appeals court judges cited factual evidence of the young man's sound approach to his business transactions, including two loans to the Arica Institute that had been repaid with interest. The Court ruled that the burden of clear and convincing evidence for appointment of a conservator had not been met.

The other case, *Matter of Estate of Langford,* in the Illinois Appellate Court in 1977, involved a young lawyer and heir who had been unable to work after a head injury. He terminated psychiatric care and became involved with the "Christ is the Answer" ministry to which he gave substantial donations and planned to give his whole estate and only source of income. One psychiatrist examined Langford twice and testified to findings of expressionlessness, obsession, and delusion, and diagnosed him as having schizophrenia and possible mild organic brain syndrome. However, a psychologist also saw the young man twice and found improvement enough to support testimony that he was stable and without psychosis, neurosis, or personality disorder, and in touch with reality enough to make coherent decisions, but was suggestible. A second psychiatrist agreed that no psychosis was present, but found neurosis, suspiciousness, a schizoid personality, and questionable judgment. The judge also questioned the proposed conservatee and, overturning the lower court, concluded that the weight of the evidence revealed him as incapable of managing his estate.
Ungerleider and Wellisch\textsuperscript{37} have reported information relevant to competency to join or give donations. Responding to requests, they assessed 33 cult members including 11 who had returned after attempted deprogramming and 17 former members who had left either on their own or after being deprogrammed. The study included history and mental status interviews along with intelligence and personality testing. The authors found no data to suggest that their subjects lacked capacity to make sound judgments or decisions about their persons or property.

Galanter\textsuperscript{38} has explored cult membership, reviewing his own and others' observations of behavior associated with joining. Integrating these findings with the characteristics of large groups understood as open systems, he concluded that in most cases individual deficits or pathology was insufficient to explain conversion. He also cautioned that observers' attitudes towards cults influence the behavior they report. Shapiro\textsuperscript{39} has thoughtfully analyzed the relationships between legal claims and conversion experiences. Distinguishing precisely among graded degrees of personal change, volition, deception, coercion, and belief, he focused his conclusions using a matrix with types of change involved in a religious conversion on one axis and causes of that change on the other.

The sociological and psychological study of conversion has produced material of value to the expert addressing this phenomenon. A recent review\textsuperscript{40} documented that, particularly in regard to new religions, the view of the converting individual as a volitional agent rather than a passive recipient is gaining favor.

More recently, a psychiatrist-pastor\textsuperscript{41} has formulated a conflict resolution model of conversion. From his direct observations, he suggested that people as they undergo conversion face two strong and exclusive alternatives as equivalent until they reject one of them in a crisis. Outcome was initially uncertain, and a progression through three stages labeled "noisy," "quiet," and "radiant" could be discerned. Also, in a study of 17 women who had voluntarily left a cult, Jacobs\textsuperscript{42} has made the case that their conversion experiences took place in a process of receiving acceptance and affection in return for submission to social systems dominated by men. The women had decided to leave upon realization that their expectations were not met and could not be satisfied without an unreasonable sacrifice of autonomy.

The issue of making contributions is, of course, less often discussed. A large study of born-again Christians\textsuperscript{43} found no significant difference in amounts contributed between those born into the tradition and converts to it.

Discussion

Although the cases discussed here abound with critical comments about experts, none of the judges even suggested that the experts' testimony was unwelcome. Rather, they praised some of the expert testimony, and a few called for more of it. All, we submit, intended their comments to guide psychiatric experts working in the area of cult-related cases.
Several comments dealt with issues of quality that apply in all cases whether or not they involve cults. These included the need for proper credentials and adequate preparation as well as appropriate subject matter. Another general point emphasized was the rejection of the idiosyncratic label, “judgmental immaturity,” not included among recognized diagnostic categories or criteria. Also of interest was the admonition to litigants that they should keep looking if the first expert disagrees with them.

A more substantive general issue was the importance of stating the facts on which an opinion is based and establishing the connection between those facts and the opinion derived from them. This expectation that experts explain the reasoning that underlies their conclusions is currently increasing. This trend is very much in keeping with the basic workings of the legal process. It also appears to be consistent with the development of scientific knowledge and the evolution of its clinical application.

Other comments from the judges had specific bearing on the religious content of the cases. Most notable was the stress on observance of the First Amendment, taking into account the 1940 Supreme Court distinction between the freedom to believe, which is absolute, and the freedom to act, which can be restricted. Our series of cases included four judicial warnings: against taking the content of a subject’s religious beliefs as evidence of mental illness, against supporting treatment that directly attacked its subject’s beliefs, against contradicting a church’s beliefs, and even against suggesting that objectionable changes in thinking or behavior were brought about by religious faith. Despite these warnings, experts can assist a court to distinguish unfounded scientific claims from protected religious ones.

No expert can expect to justify outrageous conduct in the name of religion. Commentators have offered detailed suggestions for structuring restraints on freedom to act in the name of religion. These have proven difficult to justify, however, when the issue is psychological coercion, since demonstrating the justification tends to encroach upon matters of belief. Also, efforts to question a group’s status as a religion have generally been unsuccessful.

A recurring theme in the judicial commentary was the importance of clarity about the legal context of any issue the expert is asked to address. Examples included testimony that fell short of meeting the legal definition of false imprisonment or satisfying the criteria for a necessity defense, superfluous support of a conclusion that was automatically assumed in view of a motion for directed verdict, and a feckless attempt to counter a subject’s clear and competent choice. Experts working on cases involving cults need to address the legal context carefully with their clients in order to avoid difficulty of this type. Here there is no substitute for careful and rigorous exploration, in advance, of the legal consequences of each possible answer to the predictable questions.

We suggest that mental health experts interested in cult-related cases consider collaboration with specialists in religion. Their consultation would be helpful in distinguishing religious belief from de-
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clusion, in understanding religious ritual as opposed to pathological behavior, in clarifying which beliefs and attitudes are essential to a given faith group, and in evaluating alleged conversions. A legal scholar well-known for his work on cults has sketched in broad strokes the forensic role of experts in morality. In turn, the experience of working with a forensic psychiatrist could assist the expert in religion preparing to offer testimony in the courtroom. The proceedings of a recent colloquium illustrate the value of experts in different fields working together on questions raised by new religious movements.

The role of experts continues to be in active ferment. A recent case has underlined the forensic psychiatrist's consultative function, and regulatory changes in the use of expert testimony have been proposed and actively considered at high levels. Monahan and Walker have suggested that social science expertise might best be presented through briefs rather than in testimony, and that for purposes of evaluating research judges might utilize experts directly. They pointed out that a clearing house for this purpose was proposed in the 1930s. Such proposals may have appeal because they involve a more congenial setting for work than the witness stand, and may allow a fuller exposition of what the expert offers.

References

6. People v. Murphy, 98 Misc 2d 235 (1977)
7. Ibid., p. 243
11. Ibid., p. 826
12. 252 Cal. Rptr. 122 (Cal. 1988)
47. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)