Adjudicating Dangerous and Incompetent Defendants: Civil or Criminal?

Facts of the Case

In 2005, Theonex Williams was indicted for rape. The trial court found him incompetent and committed him to a hospital for competency restoration. After a year of treatment, his mental health providers opined that he was not likely to be restored to competency within the statute of limitations. The state moved for the trial court to retain jurisdiction under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.39, thus extending involuntary commitment. Mr. Williams moved for dismissal of his indictment, arguing that further commitment violated due process and equal protection.

The trial court denied his motion, and, per statute, held a special hearing to determine whether Mr. Williams had committed the alleged offenses. It found clear and convincing evidence that he had, permitting continued commitment under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.39. Mr. Williams appealed, again claiming violations of equal protection and due process and asserting that he was not afforded the level of procedural due process normally given to criminal defendants. The Ohio court of appeals reviewed his case and sustained all three of Mr. Williams' arguments. The state appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court.

On October 20, 2009, the supreme court accepted the appeal to consider three questions: 1) Is involuntary commitment under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.39 civil or criminal? 2) Do such commitments violate equal protection? and 3) Do such commitments violate due process? On June 8, 2010, the court reversed the appellate court's ruling, determining that proceedings under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.39 are civil and do not violate equal protection or due process rights.

Ruling and Reasoning

In addressing the question of whether Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.39 is civil or criminal, the court invoked the intent-effects test used in State v. Cook, 700 N.E.2d 570 (Ohio 1998) and Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). This two-pronged test first considers whether the legislation's intent is criminal (penal) or civil (remedial). If criminal, the test ends; if civil, the next step is to examine the legislation's actual effects. A civilly intended statute “may still be determined to be punitive and criminal if its effects negate a remedial intention.”

Using this test, the court determined that Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.39 is a civil and not a criminal statute. First, the court noted that the statute explicitly states that its predominant intent is to protect public safety. Second, the court reasoned that the statute implicates neither retribution nor deterrence, the primary goals of criminal punishment. Retribution is not implied, because culpability is not an issue in any of the proceedings, none of which require a finding of scienter. Although the statute directs a hearing to determine whether the defendant committed the accused offenses, the hearing is not conducted to affix culpability, but to determine whether the defendant meets the statute's dangerousness criterion. Deterrence is not implied, because the persons to whom Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.39 would apply, “mentally ill persons in need of hospitalization,” are not considered rational agents able to tailor their own behavior when threatened with punishment. The court found that further evidence for the statute's nonpunitive intent could be seen in its provisions for least restrictive confinement conditions and early release if the committee was found no longer to be dangerous.

The second prong of the intent-effects test examined whether the effects of the statute provide evidence of punitive outcomes, despite nonpunitive intent. The court did not find any such evidence, thereby concluding that Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.39 is a civil statute.

Next, the court considered the question of whether Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.39 violated Mr. Williams' constitutional right of equal protection. The court applied a “rational basis” standard of review, that “a statute that does not implicate a fundamental right or a suspect classification does not violate equal protection principles if it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest” (Williams, p 778).

The court determined that the requirement of a hearing under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.39 was not an equal-protections violation, as this requirement actually confers additional protection to the defendant against involuntary commitment by excluding defendants determined not to have committed criminal acts. In addition, the court determined that other differences between Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.39 and civil commitment under the probate code were justified by a rational basis. Defendants committed under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.39 have been determined to have recently committed a violent felony and thus are considered particularly dangerous and justly subject to more restrictive conditions.

Next, the court turned to the question of whether commitment under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.39 violated Mr. Williams' due process rights. Mr. Williams argued that under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.39, he was being held involuntarily beyond the statute of limitations for competency restoration. This commitment appeared to violate principles of due process set forth in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), which limited the duration of commitment to a “reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is substantial probability” to regain competency. Mr. Williams also invoked State v. Sullivan (739 N.E.2d 788 (Ohio 2001)), which explicitly noted that there was no “rational basis” to continue involuntary commitment for purposes of competency restoration, once the committee was deemed not restorable, as was Mr. Williams.

The court dismissed this line of reasoning by noting that the primary purpose for Mr. Williams' commitment under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.39 was not treatment to restore competency, but public protection. Thus, with public safety in mind, there was a “rational basis” to continue involuntary commitment, even though competency restoration was unlikely.