Solitary Confinement and the Eighth Amendment

Facts of the Case

In May 2016, Mr. Finley, an inmate with a history of severe mental illness and repeated misconduct, could not be managed in a lower level prison and was transferred to a high-security facility. In August 2016, after reporting repeated thoughts of self-harm, he was placed in a suicide observation cell. While there, he refused prescribed medications, smuggled a razor into his cell, and proceeded to cut himself and then swallow the razor. Mr. Finley was subsequently brought to the hospital on two occasions where attempts to extract the razor failed. On September 6, 2016, while on suicide watch, Mr. Finley’s prison psychiatrist and resident unit manager recommended transfer to the residential treatment program, a more intensive treatment setting. His assigned mental health professional, Mandy Salmi, RN, denied this transfer. In her judgment, the transfer was not clinically indicated. Mr. Finley then requested transfer to the interim care program. This was also denied.

The next day, Mr. Finley returned to the general population. The following day, an officer searched Mr. Finley’s cell and discovered improvised metal tools intended for television repair. He was charged with possession of a weapon and placed in temporary solitary confinement, pending the outcome of a disciplinary hearing. While confined, he cut himself with another razor and wrote “death” on the walls with his blood. This prompted a nine-day transfer to a suicide observation cell, where he continued to self-harm by cutting himself, overdosing, and swallowing razors.

On September 14, 2016, Deputy Warden Erica Huss, chair of the prison’s Security Classification Committee, decided not to return Mr. Finley to solitary confinement because of concerns that his mental health would deteriorate. On September 17, he was placed in the general population. The following day, he once again obtained a razor and refused to return it, leading to another placement in the suicide observation cell. While in the cell, he swallowed the razor and was transferred to the hospital for emergency surgery. On returning to the prison, he was placed in a suicide observation cell and faced misconduct charges. At the hearing for these charges, Mr. Finley asserted he should not be held responsible because his behavior was the result of his mental illness. He was found guilty of the misconduct charges and placed in solitary confinement, where, the following day, he again swallowed a razor requiring hospital treatment.

Following his return to the prison, he reported he was suicidal and was placed in a suicide observation cell. Within a week, Mr. Finley was charged with misconduct for refusing to follow procedure and disobeying a direct order. The Security Classification Committee met later in October 2016 to determine whether Mr. Finley should be placed in solitary. Despite warnings from Nurse Salmi about his deteriorating mental health, Deputy Sarah Schroeder reinstated solitary confinement without exploring alternatives or completing a mandated mental health assessment. He remained in solitary confinement for three months.

In solitary, Mr. Finley filed a pro se lawsuit alleging Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations and disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act against Deputy Warden Huss and Acting Deputy Warden Schroeder. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. Mr. Finley appealed this decision to the Sixth Circuit.

Ruling and Reasoning

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgments on Mr. Finley’s due process and ADA claims, finding adequate procedural protections and that his confinement was not discriminatory but related to his misconduct. But it reversed the grant of summary judgment on his Eighth Amendment claims, highlighting the officials’ failure to consult mental health professionals or follow policy when placing Mr. Finley in solitary confinement, despite the known risk. This failure potentially breached Mr. Finley’s Eighth Amendment right prohibiting “cruel and unusual punishment” by overlooking his serious mental health concerns and history of self-mutilation.

Mr. Finley’s Eighth Amendment claim of the prison officials’ “deliberate indifference” to a substantial risk of harm required analysis of both the objective and subjective prongs of this allegation. Objectively, Mr. Finley’s prior mental health decompensation while in solitary confinement demonstrated a serious risk of further harm to his mental health. For the subjective prong, courts look to whether the officials were aware of the risk and proceeded despite it. The court found that Mr. Finley adequately pleaded sufficient evidence for both parts of his claim, citing precedents including Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), which established that prison officials must be aware of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health and safety, and Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), which emphasized the obligation to address serious health risks to prisoners and the illegality of willfully ignoring them.

The court noted that qualified immunity protects officials unless they violate “clearly established” constitutional rights. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the U.S. Supreme Court defined the qualified immunity doctrine, establishing a two-part test: determining whether a constitutional right was violated and whether that right was clearly established at the time of the conduct. In this case, it was deemed reasonable to expect prison officials to recognize the potential Eighth Amendment violation in placing a person with severe mental illness under harmful conditions. The court ruled that Ms. Huss and Ms. Schroeder were not entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Finely’s Eighth Amendment claim. The court ultimately remanded the case for further proceedings to address the material facts related to the Eighth Amendment claims.