In Case of Juvenile Transfer for Adult Prosecution, the District Court’s Weighing of Transfer Factors Not Clearly Erroneous
In United States v. B.N.M., 107 F.4th 1152 (10th Cir. 2024), B.N.M., a male juvenile, challenged his transfer for adult prosecution through an interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. He appealed his transfer on three grounds: the misattribution of expert witness statements by the magistrate judge, the district court’s abuse of discretion when weighing two of the statutory transfer factors (nature of the offense and availability of treatment programs), and the constitutionality of adult transfer given the punishments he would face if convicted (life without parole or death). The Tenth Circuit rejected all three of B.N.M.’s arguments and affirmed the district court’s order for his transfer for adult prosecution.
Facts of the Case
In December 2020, B.N.M. was 15 years old and in a relationship with his 17-year-old girlfriend, A.M. A.M. falsely informed him that she was pregnant with his child, and because of her parents’ displeasure with him, they would be unable to continue their relationship. A.M also expressed to B.N.M. that her parents had “mistreated her” (B.N.M., p 1161) and that her father had sexually abused her. Because of these grievances, A.M. asked B.N.M. to kill her parents. B.N.M. recruited A.M.’s 18-year-old neighbor, C.V., to assist with the murders. The trio planned the crime, which included digging graves for A.M.’s parents. On two different days, B.N.M. and C.V. attacked A.M.’s mother and father, resulting in their deaths.
In violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111(a) (2003) and 1151-1152 (1948), B.N.M. was charged with “murdering an Indian [A.M.’s father was a member of the Choctaw Nation] in Indian Country” (B.N.M., p 1165). Under 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2021), the government authorities filed a certification to prosecute the case under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA), which requires “special procedures for the prosecution of persons who are juveniles at the time a federal crime is committed” (United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1990)). In addition, they filed a motion to transfer B.N.M. for adult prosecution, which was referred by the district court to a United States magistrate judge. During the hearing, two forensic psychologists (one for the defense and one for the prosecution) testified regarding B.N.M.’s treatment needs and risk for recidivism.
The magistrate judge, following JJDPA guidelines, weighed six transfer factors: B.N.M.’s age and social background; the nature of the alleged offense; the extent and nature of B.N.M.’s prior delinquency record; B.N.M.’s present intellectual development and psychological maturity; the nature of past treatment efforts and B.N.M.’s response to such efforts; and the availability of programs designed to treat B.N.M.’s behavioral problems. Ultimately, the magistrate judge asserted adult transfer was warranted “in light of the gross severity of the crime [factor 2], along with the low potential for rehabilitation to be accomplished by the time the Defendant [B.N.M.] reaches age twenty-one [factor 6]” (B.N.M., p 1165). The district court affirmed the recommendation.
B.N.M. appealed the ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, arguing the district court weighed the nature of the offense too heavily and did not appropriately consider the availability of treatment programs for his behavioral problems, which included the court’s failure to consider the magistrate judge’s misattribution of expert witness testimony. The magistrate judge incorrectly attributed part of the opinion on ability for rehabilitation to B.N.M.’s expert, when it had actually been the testimony of the prosecution’s expert. In his appeal, B.N.M. asserted the role that a juvenile plays in an offense should be considered when considering the second transfer factor and “the district court did not account for its own finding that B.N.M. was only a follower” (B.N.M., p 1174) to the directions of his girlfriend and her neighbor. In addition, B.N.M. argued the potential penalties (life without parole or death) he faced if transferred for adult prosecution and convicted were unconstitutional because of his age at the time of the alleged offenses.
Ruling and Reasoning
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to transfer B.N.M. for adult prosecution, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in assigning significant weight to the violent and premeditated nature of the offense (second JJDPA factor). The court found that B.N.M.’s role as a follower, as opposed to the primary aggressor, did not prevent the district court from heavily weighing the seriousness of the offense. To this end, the court states, “there is nothing contradictory about concluding that the role that B.N.M. played was more akin to a follower than a leader and also that even being a mere follower in such a shocking, meticulously planned crime was worthy of substantial weight in the transfer analysis” (B.N.M., p 1174). The court ruled the magistrate judge’s misattribution of the prosecution’s expert witness did not affect the ultimate transfer decision, as the statements of both witnesses in regards to treatment were accurately summarized in the judge’s final recommendation.
Additionally, the court found that the district court properly considered the availability and adequacy of juvenile rehabilitation programs. It found that the district court’s determination that B.N.M. was unlikely to be rehabilitated before the age of 21 was supported by the expert testimony of the forensic psychologists. Specifically, the court relied on testimony regarding B.N.M.’s delayed intellectual abilities and the relatively short time period before he would be required to be released from juvenile detention at the age of 21 and “by extension, could no longer avail himself of the programs available in those juvenile detention facilities” (B.N.M., p 1177). Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court acted within its discretion in determining public interest would be best served by prosecuting B.N.M. as an adult.
In closing, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected B.N.M.’s argument that the penalties for first-degree murder (life without parole or death) would render the transfer to adult status unconstitutional. The court referenced its ruling in United States v. Doe, 58 F.4th 1148 (10th Cir. 2023), where A.M. “raised precisely the same argument” (B.N.M., p 1163). In United States v. Doe, the Tenth Circuit held that the petitioner’s argument was unripe. Citing Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296 (1998), the court emphasized that the penalties, if any, for first-degree murder would be dependent on future events.
Discussion
In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court established due process for juvenile transfers to adult court. In its ruling, the Court highlighted the importance of due process in transfer hearings, stating, “There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children” (Kent, p 556).
Courts have also recognized the distinction between children and adults when considering sentencing. Through a legal lens, when compared with adults, children are viewed as “less deserving of the most severe punishments” because of their “diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform” (Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), p 471). In B.N.M., the court referenced prior opinions that “juvenile adjudication is presumed appropriate” (United States v. McQuade, 403 F.3d 717 (10th Cir. 2005), p 719) and transfer to adult prosecution is only permitted “when the government establishes that prosecution as an adult” serves “in the interest of justice” (B.N.M., p 1159 (quoting Doe, p 1156 and U.S. v. Leon D.M., 132 F.3d 583 (10th Cir. 1997), p 589). In other words, the transfer of a juvenile to adult prosecution is a limited occurrence governed by legal requirements and due process.
B.N.M. further elucidates the process of transferring a juvenile to adult prosecution under the JJDPA. When considering a motion to transfer to adult prosecution, courts must balance the interests of the federal delinquency system (treatment and rehabilitation) “against the need to protect the public from dangerous individuals” (McQuade, p 719). In transfer hearings, the government must meet its burden of preponderance of the evidence by presenting evidence to the court on each of the aforementioned six factors. Although the court must consider each factor, it has wide discretion on how it chooses to weigh each factor and is not required to find that a majority of the six transfer factors weigh in favor of either party. Abuse of discretion must be proved in an interlocutory appeal to overturn a court’s decision to transfer a juvenile to adult prosecution.
Forensic psychiatrists and psychologists play an important role in educating the legal system when opining on this nuanced area of juvenile justice and, as a result, should ensure courts understand the science regarding child and adolescent development and the potential for treatment to assist in rehabilitation. Given courts’ reliance on this expert opinion when considering juvenile transfer to adult prosecution, it is also prudent for experts to carefully consider the JJDPA statutory factors as they pertain to development, maturity, and rehabilitation potential when evaluating juveniles, writing reports, and delivering testimony.
- © 2025 American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law
