Confrontation Clause Bars Surrogate Testimony on Forensic Laboratory Data Prepared by Others
In State v. Hall-Haught, 569 P.3d 315 (Wash. 2025), the Washington Supreme Court ruled that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is violated when a laboratory supervisor provides surrogate testimony regarding a forensic report prepared by a nontestifying analyst.
Facts of the Case
Samantha Hall-Haught was involved in a head-on auto collision, and the impact caused drug paraphernalia inside the trunk of her vehicle to be ejected onto the road. At the hospital, a Washington State Patrol Trooper observed that Ms. Hall-Haught displayed signs of cannabis intoxication. Based on these factors, as well as Ms. Hall-Haught’s reported admission of regular cannabis use, the trooper sought and was granted a warrant to obtain a blood test for tetrahydrocannabinol (THC). The lab test results were positive for THC, and Ms. Hall-Haught was charged with vehicular assault.
During the trial, the prosecution did not call the forensic analyst who performed the laboratory analysis and authored the toxicology report to testify. Instead, the prosecution called the forensic analyst’s supervisor, who “relied on her review of the file prepared by [the analyst] to confirm the positive THC results” (Hall-Haught, p 322). Ms. Hall-Haught objected on the grounds that she had the right to cross-examine the analyst who performed the testing. The trial court overruled the objection, the test results were admitted, and Ms. Hall-Haught was ultimately convicted.
Ms. Hall-Haught appealed the conviction, asserting that her Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated when the toxicology results were admitted without giving her an opportunity to cross-examine the analyst who performed the test. On review, the Washington Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the trial court based on the prevailing Washington precedent set by State v. Lui, 315 P.3d 493 (Wash. 2014). In Lui, the Washington Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause was not violated when an expert witness relied on “technical data prepared by others when reaching their own conclusions.” (Lui, p 505). Applying this precedent to Ms. Hall-Haught’s appeal, the court argued that the supervisor’s testimony was permissible because she had personally reviewed the testing and formed her own opinion regarding the results. Ms. Hall-Haught petitioned for discretionary review by the Washington Supreme Court.
The Washington Supreme Court stayed Ms. Hall-Haught’s petition for review pending the U.S. Supreme Court’s anticipated decision in Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 (2024). The Smith case was set to resolve prior U.S. Supreme Court inconsistencies regarding the constitutionality of admitting this type of surrogate testimony. Following the Court’s decision in Smith, the Washington Supreme Court lifted the stay and granted review.
Ruling and Reasoning
The court began by explaining the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial statements, a framework first established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). A statement is considered testimonial if its purpose is to “establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution” (Hall-Haught, p 318, quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), p 822). In contrast, nontestimonial statements are made for any other purpose that is unrelated to the investigation or prosecution of a crime. Applying this framework, the court determined that the toxicology report was a testimonial statement because the blood test was performed under a criminal warrant and analyzed by a state crime lab specifically for Ms. Hall-Haught’s prosecution. The court reasoned that this “would lead an objective witness to reasonably believe the statement would be available for use at a later trial” (Hall-Haught, p 320).
The court then addressed the long-standing ambiguity regarding the admissibility of forensic evidence through surrogate testimony. This matter was addressed and clarified by the U.S. Supreme Court in Smith, which considered the admissibility of forensic drug testing that was introduced through an unaffiliated surrogate expert. The prosecution in that case argued that the expert, who had not performed the analysis, offered an “independent opinion” that relied on data from the original analyst’s report. The Court rejected this argument, ruling that it violated the Confrontation Clause. The Court reasoned that “when an expert conveys an absent analyst’s statements in support of his opinion, and the statements provide that support only if true, then the statements come into evidence for their truth” (Smith, p 783) and would therefore not be admissible.
The Washington Supreme Court applied this new precedent to the facts of Ms. Hall-Haught’s case. The court found that the supervisor’s “independent opinion” that Ms. Hall-Haught’s blood test was positive for THC relied on the validity of the nontestifying analyst’s data. It reasoned that the jury could not accept the supervisor’s opinion without first accepting the truth of the original report. Therefore, the court concluded that admitting the supervisor’s testimony without providing Ms. Hall-Haught an opportunity to confront the analyst who performed the test was unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment.
Discussion
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Crawford reshaped the landscape of the Confrontation Clause, splitting out-of-court statements into two categories: testimonial and nontestimonial. In the two decades that followed, it was unclear whether forensic evidence collected for evidentiary purposes was admissible if introduced through surrogate testimony. The Smith ruling established a clear guideline for answering this question, and Hall-Haught applied it specifically to toxicology results that are collected during a criminal investigation and presented by the analyst’s supervisor.
Although the holding in Hall-Haught was unanimous, Justice González’s concurring opinion highlighted the tension between this strict constitutional protection and the practical realities of the legal system. He questioned the “logical endpoint” of the Smith ruling, asking what else might be considered a testimonial statement requiring confrontation. For example, if an analyst’s report is testimonial, are the underlying results generated by a laboratory machine also testimonial hearsay? If so, “must the designer of the machine that generated the test result testify as to the proper design and accurate functioning of the machine?” (Hall-Haught, p 324). These questions suggest that the precedent set by Smith and Hall-Haught may place undue burdens on forensic laboratories and make trials increasingly procedurally complex.
The outcomes of the Smith and Hall-Haught cases are likely to have further implications for forensic psychiatrists. Testifying experts, including forensic psychiatrists, must carefully consider the context in which data were created and their original purpose, even if they are using them to form an independent conclusion. Any statements or information generated specifically for litigation purposes, such as psychological testing or court-ordered laboratory results, may fall under the purview of these rulings. A testifying forensic psychiatrist should now anticipate that the court will require the presence and testimony of the individual who generated these types of information, as the person may be considered a witness whom the defendant has a constitutional right to cross-examine.
- © 2026 American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law
