Feasibility of Violent Plans Not Relevant for Criminal Intent to Solicit Violence and Standards to Assess Pro Se Competency Remain Unsettled
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Walthall, 130 F.4th 791 (9th Cir. 2025), affirmed the conviction of a man who was found guilty of soliciting the murder and assault of federal officials. The court indicated that soliciting violence is a crime even if the person being asked to perpetrate the violence does not exist. The Ninth Circuit also held that Mr. Walthall was appropriately denied the right to represent himself at trial, providing no further guidance on how judges or evaluators should assess this competency.
Facts of the Case
John Walthall was arrested in 2009 after reportedly deceiving an older couple out of 5.5 million dollars. He was indicted and convicted of wire fraud because of allegedly spending their money on personal matters, like debts and school tuition, after informing this couple he would be investing in gold mining. While awaiting sentencing, Mr. Walthall allegedly asked another incarcerated individual “if he knew anyone in a prison gang who would be willing to commit murder for hire” (Walthall, p 794). This individual informed the authorities, which led the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to investigate after Mr. Walthall was moved to federal prison. An informant met with Mr. Walthall and indicated that a relative could facilitate Mr. Walthall’s desired plan to harm the judge, two prosecutors, and two FBI agents involved with his wire fraud conviction. Upon connecting with the designated intermediary, who in fact was an FBI agent, Mr. Walthall stated that he contacted Colombian “hit men” to harm these targets and that he could pay “a million bucks a year of income” to this informant (Walthall, p 795). Mr. Walthall was subsequently indicted for solicitation to commit a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 373(a) (2014).
Mr. Walthall requested to represent himself against this new charge because of tensions with his attorney. He also detailed in 1,664 pages why the trial judge should withdraw from the case and asserted that federal officials retained “Gangsters, Serial-Murderers, and Professional Terrorists” to threaten him while in prison (Walthall, p 795). A hearing was held regarding his capacity to stand trial and represent himself, per Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Psychologists from the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) opined that Mr. Walthall was competent to stand trial but had differing opinions about whether he could adequately litigate pro se. After considering this testimony and Mr. Walthall’s courtroom behavior, the judge determined he could not represent himself and appointed an attorney. Mr. Walthall was convicted after two trials and appealed, citing a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. In July 2019, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case, stating that “the district court erred by not making further inquiry to support findings concerning [his] ability to represent himself” (United States v. Walthall, 782 F. App’x 578 (9th Cir. 2019), p 580).
The trial court ordered new evaluations to assess Mr. Walthall’s competency to stand trial and represent himself at trial, but he declined to meet again with BOP psychologists. After reviewing medical and phone records, the evaluators opined he was competent in both regards. The court disagreed about his competency to litigate pro se after hearing testimony from Mr. Walthall’s past attorneys and observing his behavior in court. Again, he underwent trial with counsel and was found guilty of soliciting the murder and assault of one judge, two prosecutors, and two FBI agents. He received the maximum sentence of 240 months. Mr. Walthall once again appealed, arguing there was “insufficient” evidence of the charge, faulty execution of the court’s directive from his last appeal to review his ability to represent himself, and error with the jury instructions and sentencing calculation.
Ruling and Reasoning
A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court affirmed all decisions made by the district court. Mr. Walthall argued that the solicitation charge under 18 U.S.C. § 373(a) was invalid because his plan to use Colombian mercenaries for murder were just “fantastical musings,” and he never directly asked anyone to commit violent crimes. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, noting that intent to solicit violence applies “even if the fulfillment of [this] intent is impossible” (Walthall, p 798), because the statute does not necessitate that the solicited person exists. The court highlighted precedent from the Third Circuit and its own ruling in United States v. Stewart, 420 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2005) to emphasize this point. Separately, the court asserted that solicitation can occur without direct contact and invoked United States v. White, 610 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2010) to support this claim. The court determined that the statute had been appropriately applied and that enough evidence was present for a jury to convict.
Regarding his right to self-representation, Mr. Walthall claimed that the district court deviated from the Ninth Circuit’s 2019 decision to remand his case for further inquiry into his competency to litigate pro se. The court concluded that the lower court appropriately conducted this inquiry by ordering an evaluation with BOP psychologists, reviewing the testimony of experts and prior attorneys, and considering their interactions with him over many years. This information helped the court determine that he lived with “severe mental illness” and that limits on his right to self-representation could be imposed in accordance with Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008). The Ninth Circuit found no abuse of discretion by the district court, stating that Edwards can be applied in federal cases (United States v. Berry, 565 F.3d 386 (7th Cir. 2009)) and emphasizing the court’s authority to set rules on how legal proceedings are conducted.
Finally, the court addressed challenges Mr. Walthall raised about the instructions given to the jury and how his sentence was calculated. He argued that the jury instructions used different language than the statute, were not clearly defined, and incorrectly referenced solicitation of attempted murder. Upon review, the court conceded that some language could “[be] clearer” but found no errors that affected Mr. Walthall’s conviction and no plain error in his calculated sentence.
Discussion
This case raises interesting questions for forensic evaluators about violence risk assessment and competency to represent oneself in court. It also elucidates the challenge of maintaining justice while respecting individual autonomy within the legal system.
Laws represent an important framework for how individuals agree to behave in shared societies but can also lack nuance when considering the realities of those living with mental illness. In this case, for example, Mr. Walthall was organized enough at times to assist his appellate attorneys, yet he also exhibited paranoid ideations that influenced his reported plan to harm those involved with his wire fraud conviction. The Ninth Circuit rejected Mr. Walthall’s claim that solicitation cannot occur if the induced party is not an “actual person” because 18 U.S.C. § 373(a) does not make this distinction and applies even if the solicited act is “impossible.” This differs from how a forensic evaluator might approach violence risk assessment, considering that Mr. Walthall’s inability to pay “a million bucks a year” for the services of unnamed Colombian mercenaries would likely reduce his risk of perpetrating harm. Walthall raises whether punishment and imprisonment are just outcomes for inquiring about something that will never occur, especially if caused by mental illness. This precedent, then, could unfairly affect individuals living with severe mental illness and further contribute to their institutionalization in carceral facilities.
Another important tension point highlighted by this case and still debated by forensic scholars pertains to the right to self-representation and the threshold for demonstrating competence to do so. Since first articulated as a constitutional right by the Faretta court, clearly defining when to impose restrictions on a person’s ability to litigate pro se has remained a challenge. Even though Edwards made clear that the courts can insist upon attorney representation at trial for defendants impaired by “severe mental illness,” the Faretta dissenters recognized how complex it can be for anyone to self-represent. Contemporary judges appear to agree. In a 2010 survey, 62 percent of judges observed “worse” outcomes for pro se litigants (Im DS, Witherell JS. How experts advise evaluating pro se competence 15 years post-Edwards. J Am Acad Psychiatry Law. 2023 Sep; 51:529–41). One could argue that individuals living with mental illness should have the right to make similar mistakes to those living without a recognized illness, but this raises whether fairness and self-determination can be actualized in a highly specialized legal system. Until future court decisions and scholarship can clarify guidelines for competence to represent oneself at trial, this will remain an ethics and legal gray area.
- © 2026 American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law
