Judges May Impose Nontreatment Conditions upon Sexually Dangerous Persons Being Conditionally Released and Make Them Bear the Costs
In U.S. v. Volungus, 134 F.4th 637 (1st Cir. 2025), a man committed as a sexually dangerous person under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 challenged the district court’s authority to impose certain conditions upon his release from civil commitment. As a matter of first impression, nontreatment conditions are allowed in conditional release orders.
Facts of the Case
John Voungus has had convictions for sex crimes. He was sent to federal prison in 1999. After being on supervised release, he broke the conditions of release and was sent back to prison. In 2006, the government moved to civilly confine him according to the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (hereinafter The Act) on the basis that he remained sexually violent.
Passed by Congress in July 2006, the law created a national system of assessment, classification, reporting, and monitoring of persons with federal child sex offenses to “protect children from sexual exploitation …violent crime …child abuse and child pornography, [and] to promote [i]nternet safety” (Adam Walsh Act, Pub. L. No 109-248; 120 Stat. 587 (2006)). The law authorizes end-of-sentence civil commitment of persons deemed sexually dangerous by criteria under 18 U.S.C. § 4247 and 4248 (2006).
In 2012, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted the petition and declared Mr. Volungus a sexually dangerous person. The district ordered him to be civilly committed to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. He remained there until 2022.
In 2022, a warden with the Federal Bureau of Prisons certified that Mr. Volungus would no longer be sexually dangerous to others if released under “a prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment” (Volungus, p 640, citing 18 U.S.C. § 4248(e)(2) (2018)). The district court ordered his conditional release with a list of 46 conditions. After his release, he filed a motion to dismiss all but five conditions, arguing that the others fell outside the statutory scope of 18 U.S.C. § 4248(e)(2)). Mr. Volungus maintained that conditions that do not “constitute the regimen of treatment and care” cannot “be fairly characterized as a treatment regimen” (Volungus, p 643–4). He further challenged the judge’s authority to require him to cover costs for certain release conditions, including polygraph exams, electronic monitoring, substance testing, and computer surveillance. The district court denied the motion, and Mr. Volungus appealed.
Ruling and Reasoning
The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling and upheld the conditional release order as written, without changes to the conditions or cost responsibilities.
Regarding Mr. Volungus’s constitutional challenge to The Act’s imposition of nontreatment conditions, the court acknowledged that the semantics of what constitutes “treatment” creates ambiguity. Therefore, following precedent, the court interpreted the statute according to purpose and context: “to protect people from persons with mental maladies that make them sexually dangerous” (Volungus, p 644), while also ensuring such individuals receive appropriate treatment. The court joined other circuit courts that had permitted nontreatment conditions under older, analogous statutes containing language similar to that in 18 U.S.C. § 4248, provided those conditions serve public safety or treatment objectives.
Concerning cost obligations, Mr. Volungus argued that he should not be classified as an offender liable for supervision or rehabilitation expenses covered under 18 U.S.C. § 3672 because he was being released from civil commitment under mental health statutes. The court rejected this argument, noting that The Act is covered in the U.S.C. chapter titled Offenders with Mental Disease or Defect. Additionally, the court emphasized that Mr. Volungus is a sex offender, as evidenced by his past convictions.
Discussion
This case prompts reflection on multiple challenges related to the adjudication, treatment, and management of persons with sexual offenses against children.
It highlights the ethics implications involved in balancing individual civil liberty and public safety, identifying and delivering effective treatment beyond behavioral control, and the impact and stigma of labeling and confinement. Tamara Rice Lave, JD, PhD, a law professor, argues that The Act significantly reduces standards for civil commitment for persons deemed sexually dangerous and limits due process protections (Lave TR. Throwing away the key: Has the Adam Walsh Act lowered the threshold for sexually violent predator commitments too far? U Pa J Const L. 2011; 14:391–429). A civil commitment petition under The Act does not require a formal sexual offense charge or conviction; a documented history or an attempt of sexually dangerous behavior with evidence of a qualifying mental disorder is sufficient. Additionally, under The Act, civil commitment has no time limit and release occurs only when the risk has lessened. Other critics of The Act note the resemblance between civil commitment and incarceration, viewing it as a veiled extension of a prison sentence without a new criminal conviction. The key distinction lies in whether the approach to treatment is genuinely rehabilitative or effectively punitive in practice.
Rehabilitation encompasses a range of goals, including risk reduction, improved impulse control, psychiatric intervention, and community reintegration. The absence of biomarkers directly related to sexual dangerousness and the complex nature of behavior mean that treatment often ignores the drivers of the behavior. The designation of sexual dangerousness based on behavior, without adequate consideration for specific etiology, minimizes a complicated biopsychosocial process and shrinks opportunity for treatment and recovery. Additionally, prolonged commitments may limit access to treatment options that might be more relevant, effective, and available in community settings.
Protecting the public, especially children who are particularly vulnerable, is a worthy goal for psychiatry and the courts. Toward that goal, in 2006, Congress followed 20 state legislatures and appropriated civil commitment, a procedure that psychiatry and the courts have painstakingly studied, honed, monitored, and limited since the 1960s. Throughout the last two decades, the recovery movement, along with community and peer-based programs, has emphasized the risks associated with labeling, stigma, and social ostracism, particularly as barriers to rehabilitation. Civil commitment without individualized treatment plans grounded in best practices and positive engagement does little to support successful community reintegration. In Mr. Volungus’s case, with appropriate context and implementation, nontreatment conditions may be seen as therapeutic tools that support both his transition and long-term stability in the community.
This case underscores the important role of forensic psychiatry in offering valuable contributions to treatment design, assessment strategies, risk management, and community reintegration. The knowledge, compassion, and nuanced understanding of abnormal behavior that forensic psychiatrists bring to evaluations comprise the expertise needed in addressing the unique challenges associated with problem sexual behaviors and violence. Such expertise is relevant not only to assessment and treatment but also to legislative and policy decisions. Forensic psychiatrists are well-suited to take a leading role in shaping what rehabilitation should entail for this population, consulting with both psychiatric treatment providers and the courts to determine effective, evidence-based interventions.
- © 2026 American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law
