Insanity Acquittees Are Not Similarly Situated to Civilly Committed Prison Inmates for Equal Protection Purposes
In a case of first impression, the Connecticut Supreme Court in State v. Foster, 339 A.3d 1093 (Conn. 2025) concluded that differential treatment of insanity acquittees and civilly committed prison inmates is allowed because of fundamental differences between these groups.
Facts of the Case
In 2001, Franklin Foster, age 24, entered a middle school armed with two knives and assaulted two students. He punched, slapped, and kicked a male student and lifted a female student over his head. At the time, Mr. Foster was responding to command auditory hallucinations instructing him to assault a minor. He was diagnosed with schizophrenia, or “bipolar schizoaffective disorder,” and borderline intellectual functioning. Mr. Foster was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect on charges including burglary in the first degree, risk of injury to a child, assault in the third degree, and possession of a weapon on school grounds.
Following his insanity acquittal, Mr. Foster was committed in 2003 to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board (PSRB) for up to 10 years. He was admitted to a maximum-security forensic hospital and was transferred to a less restrictive facility in 2007. Between 2012 and 2013, he began day treatment services but returned to the hospital because of inappropriate behavior. Neuropsychological testing during this period revealed poor frustration tolerance and impulsivity. From 2013 to 2016, Mr. Foster exhibited medication noncompliance and behavioral incidents, including assaulting another patient and threatening female staff members. Beginning in 2014, Mr. Foster’s commitment was extended several times, with his agreement. Mr. Foster eventually demonstrated clinical progress and was granted temporary leave to attend a residential transitional program in 2017. His progress was attributed to the high degree of supervision and support available to him in the transitional program. In 2018, Mr. Foster was granted conditional release to the community.
In 2019, the state petitioned for Mr. Foster’s continued commitment under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-593 (2007). This law allows the state to petition the court for an order of continued commitment if the acquittee has a psychiatric disability and the acquittee’s discharge would constitute a danger to the acquittee or others. The PSRB recommended an extension, emphasizing Mr. Foster’s limited time on conditional release and the risk of noncompliance in the absence of mandated treatment. The trial court found Mr. Foster to be mentally ill and dangerous by clear and convincing evidence demonstrated by his psychiatric diagnoses, impulsivity, and poor frustration tolerance and extended his commitment.
Mr. Foster appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in finding that the state had proven dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence. He also argued that § 17a-593 violated his constitutional right to equal protection, because insanity acquittees are similarly situated to civilly committed prison inmates and should not be subject to “stricter” recommitment procedures. The appellate court disagreed with Mr. Foster and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Mr. Foster subsequently appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court.
Ruling and Reasoning
Mr. Foster first argued that he was entitled to certain constitutional protections afforded to other classes of involuntarily committed individuals, as described in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) and Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). The Connecticut Supreme Court rejected Mr. Foster’s argument, relying on Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983). The court noted that Jackson and Baxstrom did not involve insanity acquittees and that statutory commitment schemes governing insanity acquittees can be more restrictive because acquittees and other civilly committed individuals are not similarly situated for equal protection purposes.
Relying on Jones, State v. Dyous, 53 A.3d 153 (Conn. 2012), and other federal and state court decisions, the court concluded that insanity acquittees are fundamentally different, because there is a “judicially determined link” between the acquittee’s mental illness and the index offense. On the other hand, there is no connection between a prison inmate’s crime and civil commitment at the end of the inmate’s sentence. In addition, the primary purpose of the insanity commitment system is to protect the public, whereas civil commitment schemes prioritize protecting the committee’s liberty.
Regarding dangerousness, Mr. Foster argued that the trial court failed to find him “imminently” dangerous by the clear and convincing evidence standard outlined in State v. Metz, 645 A.2d 965 (Conn. 1994). Mr. Foster emphasized the remoteness of his index offenses and the progress he had recently made on conditional release. The court determined that the trial court was not clearly erroneous in finding Mr. Foster dangerous. The court emphasized that dangerousness is a legal judgment that is vague and difficult to predict. The court stated that “imminent” dangerousness did not mean immediate but rather “what may readily happen when an insanity acquittee is no longer required to take medication, to attend counseling, or to have other restrictions in place that may remove potential stressors or triggers” (Foster, p 1116).
The court acknowledged that Mr. Foster’s index offenses had occurred more than 18 years ago and that he had made good progress on conditional release. The court stressed that Mr. Foster’s improvement and compliance were attributable to the structure and support of conditional release and that it was not until 2018 that he was sufficiently compliant with treatment to be granted conditional release. In addition, Mr. Foster remained at risk of psychotic decompensation if he stopped medications. The court agreed with the trial court that Mr. Foster had demonstrated progress over only a “relatively short” period with the “significant support and conditions” of release, which supported the trial court’s finding of ongoing dangerousness. Ultimately, the court affirmed the appellate court’s judgment.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Ecker highlighted the challenges of predicting future dangerousness and the need for clear, evidence-based standards. He emphasized that dangerousness must be causally related to the acquittee’s psychiatric illness and not attributable to immaturity, personality traits, moral judgments, or iatrogenic effects of institutionalization. Justice Ecker stressed that dangerousness should be assessed via medication adherence and treatment engagement outside of supervised care, whether symptoms would reemerge through nonadherence, and if said symptoms would realistically lead to dangerous behavior.
Discussion
Foster highlights the complex relationship among individual rights, public safety, and insanity commitments. The court in this case reaffirmed principles espoused in landmark cases, such as Jones, and other state and federal court decisions holding that insanity acquittees are not entitled to the same constitutional protections as other classes of committed individuals. This is because an insanity acquittee has been legally determined to be mentally ill and, because of the acquittee’s mental illness, to have committed a criminal act. Thus, the acquittee is not guaranteed the same liberties as civil committees, such as a right to the least restrictive treatment setting. Because of the emphasis on public safety, an insanity acquittee might be deemed dangerous and remain under a commitment longer than a civilly committed individual in similar circumstances, which is constitutionally permissible.
Foster is also relevant to forensic psychiatry because it contributes to the ongoing debate about the complexity of violence risk assessment and legal determinations of dangerousness. Legislative definitions of dangerousness may vary by jurisdiction and can be vague and ill-defined. Further clarification of these definitions may come from judicial decisions, such as in this case.
In Foster, the court further clarified the temporal scope of “dangerousness.” It agreed with the trial court and the PSRB’s finding that Mr. Foster posed a continued risk of imminent danger to himself or others. The court defined “imminent” as dangerous behaviors that would be “ready to take place” if Mr. Foster were no longer mandated to treatment and supervision. The court also emphasized relevant clinical and temporal factors to consider when determining dangerousness. These included an acquittee’s time on community supervision, adherence to treatment and conditions of release, the acquittee’s insight, the stability of the acquittee’s mental illness, and risk for decompensation. Research analyzing acquittees’ risk factors for re-offense lends further weight to this framework (Norko MA, Wasser T, Magro H, et al. Assessing insanity acquittee recidivism in Connecticut. Behav Sci & L. 2016 Mar;34(2-3):423–43).
Ultimately, when drafting or interpreting laws governing the commitment and release of insanity acquittees, courts and legislatures must strike an appropriate balance between public safety and the insanity acquittee’s rights. Forensic experts conducting violence risk assessments and readiness for release evaluations should be familiar with the jurisdiction’s case law regarding the definition of dangerousness and offer informed opinions, based on sound methodology and existing research, that emphasize the evaluee’s specific clinical risk factors for violence, including the link between the evaluee’s mental illness, dangerousness, and the risk of relapse if not mandated to treatment.
- © 2026 American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law
