- posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
- workers’ compensation
- expert testimony
- occupational disease statutory presumption
Workers’ Compensation Judge’s Determination of Credibility and Persuasiveness of Competing Expert Testimony Upheld by the Minnesota Supreme Court
In Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, 23 N.W.3d 582 (Minn. 2025), the Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether Lucas Peterson, a police officer, was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) under a statutory presumption. Two experts offered differing interpretations of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-5-TR), and the compensation court determined which expert’s testimony was more credible and persuasive. The supreme court upheld the compensation judge’s ability to determine which expert’s testimony was to be relied upon in awarding disability benefits.
Facts of the Case
Lucas Peterson worked as a Minneapolis police officer for 22 years, beginning in 1999. Before starting, and again about one year later, Mr. Peterson underwent pre-employment psychological evaluations that found no significant emotional or personality problems. In 2003, he joined the Minneapolis Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team, later becoming a sergeant and supervisor. During his employment, Mr. Peterson responded to between 30 and 50 homicide calls, including several involving child deaths. He was present for between 10 and 15 officer-involved shootings and responded to a mass shooting.
In March 2021, Mr. Peterson began twice weekly psychotherapy and was diagnosed with work-related anxiety by a physician. He retained counsel to assist with a workers’ compensation claim. In June 2021, he underwent a forensic evaluation by psychologist Dr. John Cronin, who diagnosed PTSD and advised him to discontinue police work. Mr. Peterson stopped working and sought workers’ compensation benefits in 2021. Minnesota’s workers’ compensation statute provides a presumption that PTSD in police officers is an occupational disease unless rebutted by substantial evidence (Minn. Stat. § 176.01115(e) (2024)).
The city denied liability in September 2021, maintaining that Mr. Peterson did not meet the criteria for compensation, alleging he had pre-employment mental health conditions. Subsequently, in November 2021, Mr. Peterson filed a claim petition. In March 2022, the city retained psychologist Dr. Kenneth Young to perform an evaluation. Dr. Young concluded that Mr. Peterson did not meet diagnostic criteria for PTSD or any other disorder under the DSM-5-TR. A second evaluation commissioned by Mr. Peterson’s attorney was completed in May 2022 by psychologist Dr. Kasey Aleknavicius. She concluded that Mr. Peterson had previously met full criteria for PTSD but that treatment had reduced symptom severity. Dr. Aleknavicius diagnosed other specified trauma- and stressor-related disorder (OSTD), describing it as “subthreshold PTSD.” Dr. Aleknavicius attributed this to Mr. Peterson’s work-related traumatic exposures and noted that he continued to experience significant occupational and social impairment.
At a workers’ compensation hearing in March and April 2023, Mr. Peterson testified that he repeatedly feared for his own life and that of fellow officers. He testified that he developed “poor concentration, negative thoughts, loss of empathy, sleep disturbance, anxiety, depression, feelings of isolation, and unregulated anger and emotions” (Peterson, p 588). His wife testified regarding his personality and behavioral changes. Dr. Aleknavicius testified that Mr. Peterson did not meet diagnostic criteria for PTSD according to the DSM-5 at the time of her evaluation but that she revised her diagnosis after the publication of the DSM-5-TR. She stated that the text revision allowed for a present PTSD diagnosis provided full symptom criteria had previously been met for at least one month. She testified that based on the “lifetime diagnosis” provision in the text revision, Mr. Peterson carried a present diagnosis of PTSD despite his symptomatic improvement. Dr. Young testified that Mr. Peterson did not meet criteria for any mental health disorder at the time of his evaluation. He criticized the methodology and conclusions of both Dr. Cronin and Dr. Aleknavicius. Dr. Young disagreed with Dr. Aleknavicius’s testimony about the presence of a “lifetime PTSD” provision, testifying that “lifetime PTSD” is not a diagnosis. Rather, the term referred to “looking at…lifetime prevalence of PTSD or if someone has ever met criteria for PTSD over the course of their lifetime” (Peterson, p 590).
The judge found Mr. Peterson and his wife credible, accepted Dr. Aleknavicius’ opinion over Dr. Young’s, and concluded that Mr. Peterson met diagnostic criteria for having a current diagnosis of PTSD as described in the recently published DSM-5-TR. The city appealed the compensation judge’s finding that Mr. Peterson had a present PTSD diagnosis. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirmed and additionally held that Mr. Peterson’s diagnosis of OSTD was a compensable “consequential injury” because it was a substantial result of the original PTSD diagnosis. The city petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the Minnesota Supreme Court.
Ruling and Reasoning
The city argued that the WCCA committed errors of law in affirming the compensation judge’s determination that Mr. Peterson was entitled to workers’ compensation for a present diagnosis of PTSD. The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the opinion of the compensation court. The court noted that it was the compensation judge’s role to decide which expert’s testimony was more credible and persuasive. The court noted that the applicable standard of review does not allow for substitution of the compensation court’s judgment except when a finding is “manifestly contrary to the evidence” (Peterson, p 593). The compensation court’s determination that the opinion of Dr. Aleknavicius was more credible and persuasive was not manifestly contrary to the evidence. The court underscored that it did not endorse any specific interpretation of the DSM.
The city additionally argued that the WCCA erred in finding that OSTD was compensable. The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed with the city’s argument and reversed in part. The court reasoned that this concern was moot, as Mr. Peterson did have a current diagnosis of PTSD, which was already compensable. The city also argued that the compensation judge’s determination that OSTD is a consequential injury of PTSD was an error of law. The supreme court found that the matter of whether OSTD is a consequential injury of PTSD was also moot, as Mr. Peterson’s current diagnosis of PTSD was already accepted.
Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Moore argued that the lower court erred in finding a present diagnosis of PTSD for Mr. Peterson and disagreed that a PTSD diagnosis, according to the DSM-5-TR, is a “perpetual” lifetime diagnosis once diagnosed. He agreed with Dr. Young’s testimony that PTSD must be continually reassessed and based on current symptoms. Justice Moore expressed “serious doubts” about Dr. Aleknavicius’s interpretation of the DSM-5-TR. He added that it “defies logic” that any person diagnosed with PTSD would have a lifetime diagnosis, regardless of the person’s current symptoms. Justice Moore cited the Minnesota Supreme Court’s precedent in Chrz v. Mower County, 986 N.W.2d 481 (Minn. 2023), where the court had determined a former police officer was no longer entitled to workers’ compensation benefits after his diagnosis of PTSD was changed to OSTD and argued that neither should Mr. Peterson. Justice Thissen joined the opinion of Justice Moore, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Discussion
A thorough understanding of granular DSM text revisions and their legal implications is vital to forensic practice. Even more critical is the skill required to clearly and effectively deliver that information to the court. In Minnesota, PTSD is a presumptive occupational illness for police officers. The employer bears the burden of rebutting, by “substantial factors,” that employment was not the cause of PTSD. In order for the city to rebut Mr. Peterson’s diagnosis of PTSD, it would require an expert to effectively explain to the court how Mr. Peterson either did not have a present diagnosis of PTSD or that his PTSD was caused by non-work-related traumatic exposure. As evident in this case, the compensation judge concluded that the city’s expert did not provide the more “credible and persuasive” opinion.
The compensation judge concluded that both experts’ opinions were adequately founded. The expert witnesses disagreed about whether Mr. Peterson had a present diagnosis of PTSD. It was then the compensation judge’s role to determine which opinion was more credible and persuasive based on the experts’ courtroom testimony.
Core competence in forensic psychiatry, therefore, not only encompasses a skilled examination and a well written report but also the ability to effectively present an opinion in a manner that is both credible and persuasive to the fact-finder. It requires the expert to possess more than just knowledge of theoretical principles of psychiatry. The expert must also consider the audience and the legal context of the opinion to best tailor the testimony. Principles of ethical practice of forensic psychiatry additionally require that experts avoid the slippery slope of distorting the facts to create convincing, albeit misleading, testimony.
- © 2026 American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law





