Federal Firearm Prohibitions Following Civil Commitment Withstand Second Amendment Challenge
In United States v. Gould, 146 F.4th 421 (4th Cir. 2025), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4)(1968), which prohibits individuals previously involuntarily committed to a mental health facility from possessing firearms, was constitutional after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). Under Bruen, courts must assess whether modern firearm regulations are consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm control. Mr. Gould was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), which prohibits firearm possession by individuals who have been involuntarily committed to a mental institution. Mr. Gould argued that the statute was incompatible with Bruen’s framework because there was no historical equivalent to disarming individuals who had been involuntarily committed to mental health facilities. In a unanimous decision, the court disagreed and upheld the statute as constitutional, affirming Mr. Gould’s conviction.
Facts of the Case
James Gould was involuntarily committed to psychiatric facilities four times between May 2016 and July 2019 for undisclosed reasons. As a result of his involuntary commitments, he was prohibited from possessing firearms under U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). In February 2022, law enforcement officers encountered Mr. Gould and discovered he was in possession of a 12-gauge shotgun at his home. A federal grand jury indicted him on one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a person previously involuntarily committed to a mental institution in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).
While the case was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the Bruen case and changed the framework for courts to use when analyzing Second Amendment challenges, instructing courts to determine whether modern firearm regulations are consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Following this decision, Mr. Gould moved to dismiss the indictment against him, arguing that it was facially unconstitutional because there was no historical tradition of firearm dispossession for individuals who had been involuntarily committed to mental health facilities. The district court denied the motion, stating there was a historical basis for disarming individuals determined to be a danger to themselves or others. Mr. Gould subsequently entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to time served followed by supervised release. He appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Ruling and Reasoning
Chief Judge Diaz authored the unanimous opinion affirming Mr. Gould’s conviction. The court noted Mr. Gould had challenged the conviction as facially unconstitutional under the newly adopted Bruen framework. The court stated Mr. Gould was therefore required to demonstrate that the statute had no constitutionally valid applications. The court applied Bruen’s two-step framework: first, they examined Mr. Gould’s conduct and concluded that it fell within the scope of the Second Amendment. Second, they considered whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) was consistent with the historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court rejected Mr. Gould’s argument that a lack of historical statutes barring individuals released from mental health facilities from possessing firearms rendered the statute unconstitutional. The court identified two relevant historical traditions: practices of mitigating violence risk from individuals with severe mental illness deemed a danger to themselves or others (often via confinement) and the historical authority of legislatures to disarm groups of people deemed to pose a risk to public safety.
The court emphasized that involuntary commitment, historically and in modern law, requires a judicial determination that an individual poses a danger to self or others. It is also accompanied by procedural protections. Under West Virginia law, where the proceedings under consideration originated, involuntary commitment requires clear and convincing evidence that an individual is mentally ill, poses a risk to self or others, and there is no less restrictive alternatives for treatment. The dangerousness requirement aligned 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) with historical practices of the state disarming individuals belonging to groups that are deemed potentially violent or dangerous.
The court acknowledged that, although 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) does not provide a time limit for disarmament, it is not categorically permanent. The court highlighted that the statute permits individuals to petition for restoration of firearm rights once they are no longer deemed to be dangerous. The court further stated this is analogous to historical procedures in which disarmed individuals may regain rights by demonstrating lack of dangerousness. On this basis, the court concluded the statute is consistent with the historical tradition of disarming dangerous individuals and is therefore constitutional. In his petition, Mr. Gould additionally argued that release from a mental health facility means an individual is no longer dangerous. The court disagreed, reasoning that West Virginia law does not require an individual to no longer be dangerous to be released from involuntary commitment. According to the court, the decision to discharge a patient is multifactorial, based on the determination of whether ongoing hospitalization is justified and beneficial to the patient. Of note, this case was subsequently granted a rehearing (U.S. v. Gould, 163 F.4th 795 (4th Cir. 2026)).
Discussion
This opinion clarifies that dangerousness, rather than mental illness, is the constitutionally relevant framework for justifying firearm restrictions in individuals following civil commitment. The court rejected the notion that having a mental illness is sufficient to justify disarmament, explaining that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) does not refer to “the mentally ill” and that a finding of mental illness and history of civil commitment are not synonymous. The court further concluded that the presence of mental illness cannot be used as a proxy measure of dangerousness. Therefore, the opinion frames the statute as a targeted response to a legal determination of risk. The constitutional justification of disarmament is not based on diagnosis but rather the state’s historically recognized power to disarm individuals who are deemed to pose a danger to society. Ultimately, the determination of dangerousness is essential to justify disarmament under the Second Amendment.
The court drew a distinction between clinical decision-making and legal determinations of dangerousness. They noted, for instance, that discharge from a mental health facility is a multifactorial decision that hospitalization is no longer necessary or beneficial for the patient. This decision does not invalidate a prior judicial finding of dangerousness, which supports a prohibition of firearm ownership after discharge. For forensic psychiatrists, this distinction carries practical implications. Determinations of dangerousness made during civil commitment proceedings may function as an enduring legal basis for firearm prohibition. Although the court upheld the statute on its face, it did not rule out the possibility that the law could be determined to be unconstitutional as applied to a particular individual under different circumstances.
In future challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), courts may focus on whether dangerousness was meaningfully assessed during civil commitment proceedings. Therefore, forensic psychiatrists must pay careful attention to the basis, scope, and limitations of dangerousness determinations during evaluations. These conclusions may ultimately support or undermine the constitutional basis for firearm prohibitions if challenged. This has particular relevance in firearm right restoration proceedings. If the constitutional justification for disarmament rests on a judicial finding of dangerousness, subsequent evaluations must address whether that risk remains. Courts reviewing challenges to firearm prohibitions may look to the quality of both the original dangerousness determination and any subsequent evaluations purporting to show that risk has abated. A structured and well-documented risk assessment is therefore significant, as it can help to inform courts whether continued firearm restriction is justified under the state’s authority to maintain public safety.
- © 2026 American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law
