Failure to Demonstrate an Intentional and Knowing Waiver of Rights in Civil Commitment Proceedings

Facts of the Case

The State of Montana petitioned the Eighth Judicial District Court in February 2024 for P.G.J. to undergo an evaluation to determine whether she had a “serious mental disorder” requiring involuntary commitment under § 53-21 et seq. The state’s petition noted that 70-year-old P.G.J. was experiencing bipolar I disorder with features of mania and psychosis. According to the state’s petition, P.G.J.’s symptoms emerged at age 60 and “began to significantly interfere” with her functioning and “the safety of others” in the year prior to the commitment petition. Between October 2023 and February 2024, P.G.J. had 35 separate interactions with law enforcement and was detained at the Cascade County Detention Center six times for various criminal charges, including aggravated assault, disorderly conduct, and criminal possession of dangerous drugs. Among the incidents underlying her criminal charges, the state’s petition stated P.G.J. once “destroyed machinery with an ax” at a ranch she and her ex-husband shared (P.G.J., p 117). The petition also requested that the court authorize the state to locate a friend of P.G.J. who could be appointed to oversee her interests. The court appointed a public defender to represent P.G.J. at the initial hearing held the day after the state’s petition was filed.

The purpose of the initial hearing, which lasted eight minutes in total, was to notify P.G.J. of her rights under § 53-21-115 and to determine whether she contested probable cause for the petition’s filing. P.G.J.’s attorney informed the court that she would not contest probable cause, explaining that he discussed the matter with her at the jail that morning and she indicated that she did “not want a trial” and instead either wanted to remain in jail or be hospitalized. P.G.J.’s attorney asked her at the hearing whether his representation of their conversation was true, and she responded “[y]es, it is.” The court asked P.G.J.’s attorney whether she understood the petition’s allegations, and her attorney again reiterated “she does not want a trial”, with P.G.J. responding “[t]hat’s true” when asked by her attorney for confirmation. The court did not pose any questions to P.G.J. before immediately finding “based on the parties’ representations,” (P.G.J., p 118) that she had waived her rights intelligently, she was severely mentally ill, and that civil commitment not exceeding 90 days at the Montana State Hospital was the least restrictive placement for her. The court issued its written decision and order for commitment that same day, finding that P.G.J. “understands all procedural rights and that she waives those rights knowingly” (P.G.J., p 118).

P.G.J. appealed to the Supreme Court of Montana, arguing the issuance of a commitment order was an error without the district court first developing a record demonstrating she knowingly and intelligently waived her rights. The state countered that the testimony by P.G.J. and her attorney was sufficient as a waiver of her rights. The Supreme Court of Montana granted a review of the civil commitment order to determine whether the district court’s facts were clearly erroneous and whether the court’s conclusions of law were correct.

Ruling and Reasoning

The Supreme Court of Montana delivered a unanimous decision reversing P.G.J.’s civil commitment order. In its review of the district court’s commitment order, the Supreme Court of Montana emphasized a requirement of “strict adherence to the statutory scheme regarding involuntary commitments because of the critical importance of the constitutional rights at stake” (P.G.J., p 119). The court considered § 53-21-119(1), which offers two routes for a permissible waiver of procedural rights. The statute’s first clause allows a respondent to waive the respondent’s procedural rights if the respondent does so intentionally and knowingly. The statute’s second clause allows for a waiver of the respondent’s rights by the respondent’s attorney and an appointed friend if a record is established that the respondent is incapable of intentionally and knowingly waiving the respondent’s rights. The Montana Supreme Court emphasized its prior holdings that district courts “must inquire” whether the subject of an involuntary commitment petition “is capable of making an intentional and knowing decision” regarding such waivers (In re A.M., 332 P.3d 263 (Mont. 2014), p 266, citing In re P.A.C., 298 P.3d 1166 (Mont. 2013)).

Although § 53-21-119(1) offers no specific instruction for the necessary inquiry, the court held that “at a minimum, the record must demonstrate that counsel discussed the waiver with the respondent, that the respondent desired to waive her rights, and that counsel was satisfied that the respondent understood her rights and the nature of the proceeding” (P.G.J., p 120). The court emphasized that its precedent had clearly established that it is “improper” to find a waiver of rights “without conducting a diligent inquiry” if the respondent is able to do so “knowingly and intentionally” (P.G.J., p 120). Counsel and courts “[m]erely informing” a respondent of the respondent’s rights is insufficient for finding a waiver. The Supreme Court of Montana determined there was no record establishing that P.G.J. made a knowing and intentional waiver, as the district court did not question her directly and instead relied upon the representations of her attorney. P.G.J.’s attorney informed the district court that he “discussed this matter” generally with her, although he offered no statements to suggest he discussed her procedural rights, whether she understood her rights, whether she understood the nature of the proceeding, or whether she sought to waive her rights.