Eleventh Circuit Holds That the Dusky Standard Does Not Extend to a Defendant’s Ability to Make Rational Legal Decisions
In United States v. Marks, 156 F.4th 1169 (11th Cir. 2025), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered whether competency to stand trial requires a defendant to possess decisional competency in addition to the abilities required under Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). Steven Michael Marks, the defendant-appellant in this case, argued that his diagnosed autism spectrum disorder impaired his ability to rationally weigh legal options in his own best interest, including whether to accept a plea agreement. The court rejected this argument, holding that “whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceeding against him” is the test for competency, therefore reaffirming the district court’s determination that Mr. Marks was competent to proceed (Marks, p 1174, brackets in original).
Facts of the Case
Mr. Marks was indicted in 2017 in the U.S. District Court for the Middle of Florida on charges of enticement of a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing visual depictions of that conduct and receipt and possession of child pornography after he targeted young children in online chat rooms. He had an established diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder, and because of concerns about the severity of his symptoms, both the defense and the government jointly requested a competency evaluation. At the first competency hearing in 2019, three experts testified. The court-appointed forensic psychologist, Dr. Otto, opined that Mr. Marks was competent, whereas the two defense-retained clinicians, Dr. Geller and Dr. Danziger, opined that he was incompetent. The magistrate judge gave greater weight to the defense experts’ testimonies, finding that Mr. Marks had significant difficulty understanding the nature and purpose of court proceedings, his charges, the facts of the case, and the roles of his attorneys, and therefore recommended finding him incompetent. The district court, however, disagreed and concluded that Mr. Marks had a layperson’s understanding of the legal process, could consult with counsel, and could make an informed decision regarding the trial or pleas and thus found him competent.
After the district court’s ruling, Mr. Marks signed a plea agreement to one count of enticement of a minor, but his attorneys requested a second competency hearing before entry of the guilty plea, citing their ongoing concerns about his ability to proceed. At the second hearing, a Bureau of Prisons forensic psychologist, Dr. Jenkins, testified supporting Mr. Marks’ competence. He opined that Mr. Marks retained a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings and could engage with counsel. A speech-language pathologist (Ms. Bennett), a forensic psychiatrist (Dr. Negrón-Muñoz), and a residential program psychologist (Dr. Baird-Hepworth) described markedly limited language skills, decision-making, and adaptive functioning more consistent with those of a child. Specifically, Ms. Bennet and Dr. Negrón-Muñoz testified as expert witnesses, and their opinions supported a finding of incompetency. Dr. Baird-Hepworth testified as a lay witness, discussing her observations of Mr. Marks while he lived in the residential program. Considering the mixed accounts of the experts’ opinions, the magistrate judge ultimately concluded that Mr. Marks nonetheless met the Dusky standard for competence, which focuses on present ability to understand proceedings and consult with counsel. The district court rejected Mr. Marks’s argument that the government should bear the burden of proof, which he based on the absence of explicit statutory language and his reliance on prior precedent. Ultimately, the court accepted Mr. Mark’s guilty plea, and he was sentenced to 156 months’ imprisonment followed by 10 years of supervised release.
Ruling and Reasoning
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that Mr. Marks was competent to stand trial and upheld his conviction. The court ultimately rejected Mr. Marks’s presented arguments that the lower court applied the incorrect competency standard (i.e., that it should be broadened to include decisional competency) and that the burden of proof was improperly placed on him.
First, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the district court correctly applied the constitutional standard for competency from Dusky. Under the Dusky standard, a defendant is competent if possessing “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and both a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings (Dusky, p 402-403). But Mr. Marks argued that this standard should also include “decisional competency,” meaning the ability to rationally weigh legal choices, such as whether to plead guilty or testify. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument, noting that precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court, including Godinez, confirms that the competency standard for pleading guilty or waiving counsel is the same as the standard for standing trial. The court concluded that the Dusky framework does not incorporate a separate requirement that defendants demonstrate advanced decision-making abilities.
Secondly, the Eleventh Circuit addressed Mr. Marks’s claim that the district court operated in error by placing the burden on him to prove incompetence under 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (1996). The court declined to resolve which party generally bears the burden of proof in federal competency proceedings because the allocation of the burden matters only when the evidence is balanced. In this case, the evidence was not evenly balanced, and the district court did not indicate that it was unable to determine which testimony to credit. Therefore, even if the burden had been placed on the government, this would not have changed the outcome.
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding Mr. Marks competent. Appellate courts review competency determinations for clear error and give substantial deference to the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations. The district court considered extensive expert testimony from both sides, including conflicting opinions from forensic clinicians regarding the effects of Mr. Marks’s autism spectrum disorder on his functional abilities. Ultimately, the court credited the testimony of the government’s expert, who concluded that Mr. Marks had a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings and was capable of assisting counsel, which follows the current standard. Because this determination was plausible in light of the full record, the Eleventh Circuit declined to overturn it on appeal. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that Mr. Marks was competent to proceed and upheld his previous conviction.
Discussion
The ruling in Marks sheds light on the full breath of competency to stand trial and affirms the continued application of the Dusky standard. When the Eleventh Circuit rejected Mr. Marks’s argument for an expanded concept of “decisional competency,” it confirmed that competency is restricted to a defendant’s ability to comprehend the proceedings and assist counsel rationally. The court stressed that competency does not innately require optimal judgment or advanced legal reasoning. This important distinction is significant in the work of forensic psychiatrists, as it notes that impaired judgment or decision-making does not necessarily indicate incompetence under the legal standard. This should be at the forefront in the evaluations of forensic psychiatrists, especially with particularly complex cases that may involve various factors.
Further, this case holds particular significance for forensic psychiatric practice, as it underscores the possible diagnostic complexities encountered when defendants present with neurodevelopmental conditions, such as autism spectrum disorder. Generally, individuals with this condition may experience challenges with abstract reasoning, social communication, or hypothetical thinking, potentially negatively interfering with legal strategies or plea decisions. Even so, the court in Marks determined that these limitations, although clinically relevant, do not automatically preclude competency if the defendant retains the essential abilities outlined in Dusky. This emphasizes that forensic evaluators must differentiate between deficits affecting higher level reasoning and those that genuinely impair a defendant’s fundamental capacity to comprehend proceedings and collaborate with counsel.
This case emphasizes the central role of expert testimony in competency determinations and the potential for varying clinical opinions. In Marks, experts offered differing assessments of the defendant’s functional abilities. The appellate court ultimately deferred to the trial court’s evaluation of the evidence and expert credibility. This outcome highlights the necessity for forensic opinions to be grounded in specific functional observations and to clearly articulate how psychiatric symptoms affect legally relevant abilities. It also underscores how an expert’s evaluations and overall methodology can be scrutinized to assist the trier of fact when deciding on a ruling, especially when there are multiple opinions given by different experts, as seen in this case.
Finally, the decision affirms that federal competency evaluations continue to rely on the Dusky framework, emphasizing functional understanding and the capacity to assist counsel rather than the quality of a defendant’s decisions. Although some commentators contend that meaningful participation necessitates the ability to weigh options and make reasoned choices, the Eleventh Circuit declined to broaden the constitutional standard. Ultimately, Marks adds to the continuing discussion in forensic psychiatry about whether competency to stand trial should also include broader concepts about decision-making capacity, similar to those considered in medical decision-making.
- © American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law
