Qualified Immunity Permits Dismissal of Some Excessive Force Claims at the Pleading Stage While Allowing Others to Proceed Where Material Facts Remain Disputed
In Conlon v. Scaltreto, 158 F.4th 211 (1st Cir. 2025), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the dismissal of multiple federal and state claims arising from the fatal police shooting of a man experiencing a mental health crisis. The court addressed whether police officers were entitled to qualified immunity at the pleading stage and whether related municipal and disability-based claims could proceed. The court ruled that, although some claims were barred as a matter of law, the excessive force claim related to the fatal shooting required further factual development and could not be dismissed at this stage.
Facts of the Case
On January 5, 2021, Newton Police responded to a report of an ongoing armed robbery at a candy store adjacent to an apartment building in Newton, Massachusetts. Upon arrival, the first responding officer observed Michael Conlon, a 28-year-old man, standing outside the store holding a small kitchen knife. When ordered to drop the knife, Mr. Conlon fled into the adjacent apartment building, ascended to the third floor, and turned toward the pursuing officer while holding the knife to his own neck and threatening to cut his throat if the officer advanced. The officer retreated and awaited backup.
As additional officers arrived, Mr. Conlon exhibited behaviors including spitting and drooling, expressing the belief that he was participating in a “simulation,” questioning whether the officers were real, and repeatedly asking to speak with his father. Supervising officers recognized the encounter as a mental health matter, summoned a police social worker, and requested assistance from a regional crisis negotiation team that was expected to arrive in approximately 30 minutes. Officers established containment on the third floor, used a neighboring apartment as a staging area, and barricaded exits to prevent escape.
Officer Francis Scaltreto assumed primary responsibility for negotiating with Mr. Conlon from approximately 12 feet away in a narrow hallway. During negotiations, Mr. Conlon held the knife and a fire extinguisher but made no threats toward officers or others aside from threats of self-harm. After approximately 20 minutes of negotiation, during which officers told him they would contact his father and engaged with his belief that the situation was a simulation, Mr. Conlon dropped both the knife and the fire extinguisher.
Immediately thereafter, Officer Scaltreto communicated to other officers that there was an “opening,” which command officers interpreted as an opportunity to act. A sergeant was ordered to deploy a beanbag shotgun aimed at Mr. Conlon’s upper body from close range; however, the weapon misfired, producing a loud clicking noise. What occurred next is disputed. Some officers reported that Mr. Conlon picked up the knife and moved toward them, whereas the plaintiffs alleged that officer accounts were inconsistent and that it is unclear whether Mr. Conlon was armed, advancing, or posing an immediate threat at that moment. An officer deployed a taser and, nearly simultaneously, two officers fired their service weapons, striking Mr. Conlon in the head, neck, and torso and causing fatal injuries. The regional crisis negotiation team arrived approximately six minutes after Mr. Conlon was shot and killed.
Mr. Conlon’s estate filed a claim against the city and police officers, citing excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, which protects individuals from unreasonable seizures, along with wrongful death and violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), arguing that officers failed to reasonably accommodate the decedent’s mental illness during the encounter. They also brought a claim against the municipality based on Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996), which permits suits against local governments when constitutional violations result from an official policy, custom, or practice rather than an isolated act by an officer. They additionally asserted claims under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA), which requires interference with constitutional rights through threats, intimidation, or coercion and is generally narrower than §1983 claims. The district court dismissed the claims, and an appeal was filed.
Ruling and Reasoning
The First Circuit issued a per curiam opinion affirming in part and vacating in part the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims. With respect to the attempted use of the beanbag shotgun, the court found that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because there was no clearly established law placing officers on notice that attempting to deploy a beanbag shotgun under the circumstances alleged violated the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, that claim was dismissed as a matter of law.
In contrast, the court ruled that dismissal of the excessive force claim arising from the fatal shooting was improper at the pleading stage. The court emphasized that qualified immunity depends on whether a reasonable officer would have perceived an immediate threat at the moment deadly force was used and that this determination turned on disputed material facts, including whether Mr. Conlon was armed, whether he advanced toward officers, the timing between the beanbag misfire and the gunshots, and whether warnings were given. Because the court was required at this stage to assume the plaintiffs’ version of events and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, the court concluded that the fatal shooting claim must proceed to discovery.
The court also affirmed dismissal of the municipal liability claim, concluding that the complaint failed to plausibly allege a municipal policy, custom, or training deficiency sufficient to establish municipal liability under Monell. Finally, the court dismissed the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act claims, finding no plausible allegation that officers acted by reason of Mr. Conlon’s disability, denied him access to services, or failed to provide a known reasonable accommodation.
Dissent
Judge Aframe dissented in part, arguing that the beanbag shotgun claim should have been permitted to proceed to discovery, particularly in light of the alleged de-escalation and Mr. Conlon’s dropping of the knife immediately prior to the attempted use of force.
Discussion
This case highlights the distinction between clinical reasoning and constitutional analysis in police encounters involving individuals experiencing mental illness. Although courts recognize mental illness as a relevant context, use-of-force claims are evaluated under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard rather than a psychiatric or therapeutic framework. Mental illness alone does not establish excessive force, disability discrimination, or municipal liability. Instead, courts focus on whether a reasonable officer would have perceived an immediate threat at the precise moment force was used.
The decision illustrates that successful clinical de-escalation does not legally foreclose the subsequent use of force. Even when officers calm an individual, build rapport, and secure voluntary compliance, the Fourth Amendment inquiry remains moment-specific and centers on perceived immediacy of threat rather than therapeutic success or optimal clinical practice. Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment inquiry does not function as a clinical test; it does not assess diagnosis, insight, or the quality of de-escalation but rather evaluates reasonableness from the perspective of officers making split-second decisions in rapidly evolving circumstances.
The case further demonstrates why postincident factual reconstruction is critical in expert testimony. Because qualified immunity and constitutional reasonableness turn on fine-grained factual distinctions, such as whether an individual was armed, advancing, or stationary, expert opinions must be anchored to carefully reconstructed timelines and clearly stated factual assumptions. Small differences in reconstructed facts may lead to substantially different legal and clinical conclusions. Experts who fail to distinguish between disputed allegations and established facts risk conflating clinical judgment with legal standards and offering opinions that are misaligned with the constitutional framework.
Finally, the court’s decision is procedural rather than a final merits determination. Although some claims were dismissed as a matter of law, the excessive force claim related to the fatal shooting was permitted to proceed because unresolved factual disputes precluded a determination of qualified immunity at the pleading stage. The opinion leaves open broader questions regarding the constitutional role of de-escalation, the limits of less-than-lethal force following compliance, and the evidentiary demands placed on expert witnesses in police-mental health encounters.
- © American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law
