

settings. The FIT contains 28 items, each rated on a six-point "degree of incapacity" scale. They address both legal and mental status issues, such as item 6, "capacity to disclose to lawyer pertinent facts surrounding the alleged offense," and item 25, "intrusion of delusions." This monograph also includes two studies that measure the reliability and validity of the instrument. The reliability study used psychiatrists, attorneys, social workers, and psychiatric nurses to rate eight video-taped interviews of patient-defendants. Good overall agreement was found with respect to fitness, but the possibility of a high false positive rate suggested that future evaluators should carefully question their determinations of fitness to stand trial.

The second study measured concurrent validity by comparing the competency findings of two independent raters using the FIT with forensic psychiatrists in the Metropolitan Toronto Forensic Service. After evaluating 270 patient-defendants, the two raters were in 83 percent agreement and were in "highly significant accord" with the psychiatrists. The probability of being found incompetent increased if the defendant was unemployed at the time of arrest, was living on welfare, and had a history of psychiatric disorder. Factor analysis of the FIT statistically confirmed the obvious: the one factor that accounted for 70 percent of the variance was the defendant's comprehension of the court process. The monograph concludes with a training manual for the FIT.

The importance of this monograph is its place within the growing body of substantial research by Drs. Ronald Roesch and Stephen Golding. Their current work on the interdisciplinary fitness interview, a model competency assessment instrument that is more ambitious in scope than the FIT, will most likely play a major role in standardizing the assessment of competency to stand trial in the United States. Interested readers are referred to *Law and Human Behavior*, 8, 3/4, 1984, for an article on its conceptualization and design.

LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND MORALITY. By Alan A. Stone. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press, 1984. xiv + 277 pp. \$27.50.

Reviewed by Helen L. Morrison, MD

Whether or not one agrees with the points of view expounded by Stone, this collection of essays from previously presented essays, including the not forgotten presentation at the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law Meetings in New York, entitled "The Ethics of Forensic Psychiatry: A View

## **Book Reviews**

from the Ivory Tower," is worth reading. With several readings of this volume, this reviewer refers to a statement made that "psychiatrists are immediately over the boundary when they go from psychiatry to law."

In the preface, the presented essays are defined as "attempts to think through some of the major problems in law and psychiatry as I now understand them." This, combined with his self-description of being a "transplant" from psychoanalytic psychiatrist to member of the law faculty, will provide the reader with a clearer understanding of the author's position. That the essays are provocative is not in dispute; that the reader "should feel entitled to disagree" is not in dispute. The major concern about this book appears to be that it is about neither forensic psychiatry nor the practice of clinical psychiatry. It is, instead, a philosophical venture based on the ageless question of whether or not a psychiatrist can or cannot make judgments concerning morality. That the "human experience" is noted to require morality for any "coherent theory" to be developed is of philosophical interest. Whether it does apply in a clinical or forensic sense is not answered by this volume. Read in the context of the intellectual content, the reader will not be disappointed. If read for answers to an age old conflict as to the role of a psychiatrist, no matter the arena, one can expect to be left in a rather ambiguous position.