Decisions on Intellectual Disability and the Death Penalty before Fuston v. State
| Case | Decision |
|---|---|
| Penry v. Lynaugh (1989)1 | Defendants with intellectual disability eligible for execution |
| McCarver v. North Carolina (2001)3 | Defendants with intellectual disability not eligible for execution |
| Atkins v. Virginia (2002)4 | Defendants with intellectual disability not eligible for execution, consistent with states' decisions; indicated reasons why defendants with intellectual disability are not eligible for the death penalty (e.g., increased danger of false confessions, increased difficulty presenting mitigating evidence) |
| Hall v. Florida (2014)7 | Accounted for the SEM in determining the FSIQ for intellectual disability in capital cases |
| Brumfield v. Cain (2015)10 | Considered the upper limits of the SEM of FSIQ scores in Atkins' determinations |
| Moore v. Texas I (2017)13 | Defined current medical manuals as the medical standards that states are required to use for the determination of intellectual disability; states determined intellectual disability if criteria were consistent with medical consensus |
| Moore v. Texas II (2019)19 | Inclusion of adaptive functioning for the determination of intellectual disability in capital cases; considered adaptive deficits reported outside of a controlled setting (e.g., prison) |
SEM = standard error of measurement.
FSIQ = Full-Scale IQ.