Appropriate Use of a Defense of Extreme Emotional Distress

Facts of the Case

Brenda and Jon White were married for 11 years. According to Ms. White, Mr. White was addicted to pornography and suggested that Ms. White participate in sexual threesomes with him and his coworker. Ms. White alleged that, during their marriage, Mr. White was having an affair with another woman. His behavior caused Ms. White to experience feelings of great anxiety, anger, and agitation, and eventually led to the couple's divorce.

Following the divorce, Ms. White struggled financially to support her two daughters; she had to work more hours and, as a result, saw less of her children. Throughout this period, Ms. White claims that Mr. White began to withdraw from the children and failed to pay child support. Mr. White canceled Ms. White's medical insurance. As part of the divorce settlement, she was awarded the couple's house. She attempted to refinance the home, but learned that she would not be able to complete the refinancing process without his assistance and signatures.

On April 26, 2006, Ms. White went to Mr. White's office to speak to him about refinancing the house. He told her that the matter would have to be resolved at a later time when the attorneys and accountants could agree on the terms. The conversation escalated in intensity and she became extremely upset. She climbed into her vehicle and turned on music with the lyrics, “I want to kill you; I want to blow you away.” During the song, she joined her hands together to mimic a gun and pointed her fingers at him. She then told him that he was a “parasite” and that she was going to “wipe him off the earth.”

Later that afternoon, Ms. White returned to Mr. White's workplace, again to discuss refinancing the home. When she arrived, he was leaving the office building. She observed him talking on a cell phone; a cell phone that she claims he had repeatedly denied owning.

As she watched Mr. White talk on his cell phone, Ms. White drove her vehicle toward him. He heard the vehicle approaching and headed back into his office building. She continued to follow him, driving her car through the building's double glass doors. After entering the lobby, she struck him twice with her vehicle. He flew over the hood of the car and landed on the floor, injuring his left leg.

Ms. White was arrested and charged with attempted murder and criminal mischief. In preparation for trial, she filed a motion in limine requesting the court to instruct the jury on the defense of extreme emotional distress found in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (2008). In her motion, she argued that, under this section, she was entitled to a jury instruction that would give members of the jury the option of considering that she was acting “under the influence of extreme emotional distress” for which there was a “reasonable explanation or excuse.”

The state opposed her motion. After the trial court heard argument, it denied Ms. White's pretrial motion and declined to give the affirmative defense jury instruction. She filed a petition for an interlocutory appeal to challenge the trial court's decision. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. She filed a petition for certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court, which was granted.

Ruling and Reasoning

The Utah Supreme Court remanded to the district court with instructions to reevaluate evidence in support of the extreme-emotional-distress defense, to determine whether Ms. White was entitled to such a jury instruction. The Utah Supreme Court analyzed the definition of extreme emotional distress used by the appellate court. The supreme court held that the appellate court was incorrect in requiring a more exacting standard to the definition of extreme emotional distress than was required by statute at the time of the offense. In State v. Bishop 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988), the court developed the requirements of the extreme emotional distress defense. In State v. Bishop, the state supreme court expressed its intent to distance itself from the heat-of-passion analysis previously used in extreme-emotional-distress defenses and to expand the class of cases where the defense could be available. The court concluded that the appellate court erred by narrowing the scope and use of the defense in Ms. White's case. In the appeals court decision, that court introduced the qualifiers “contemporaneous” and a “highly provocative triggering event” as necessary aspects of extreme emotional distress, resulting in Ms. White's loss of self-control. While acknowledging that some sort of triggering event may be necessary, in an earlier case, State v. Shumway, 63 P.3d 94 (Utah 2002), the state supreme court determined that the “triggering event” does not have to be close in time to the behavior at issue or be “highly provocative” as it was in a heat-of-passion defense. In Ms. White's case, the Utah Supreme Court was clear that a “contemporaneous” and “highly provocative triggering event” represented “an improper retreat into the realm of ‘heat of passion’ manslaughter.”

Finally, the court disagreed with Ms. White's petition on the question of the point of view by which the circumstances of the crime must be considered for this defense. Ms. White argued that her subjective point of view was most important in answering the question of whether she was under extreme emotional distress. The court disagreed and made clear that a “reasonable person under the existing circumstances” is the proper standard. For this portion of the opinion, the state supreme court agreed with the appeals court.