Rehabilitation Potential in Juvenile Sentencing

Facts of the Case

In July 1994, at the age of 17, Mr. Haag killed his 7-year-old neighbor, Rachel Dillard. In 1995, he was convicted of aggravated first-degree murder and sentenced to mandatory life without parole. In 2018, a resentencing hearing was conducted in accordance with Washington’s Miller-fix statutes (Wash. Rev. Code. § 10.95.030(3) (2015) and Wash. Rev. Code. § 10.95.035 (2015)) following Miller v. Alabama. At resentencing, Mr. Haag was 27 years old and sentenced to a term of 46 years to life, meaning the earliest he could be released was at the age of 63. At the resentencing hearing, two expert witnesses testified on Mr. Haag’s behalf. They had both administered the Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth test and both opined that he would have been at low risk of reoffending at the time of the offense. Additional testing by one of the experts further supported the opinion that he was considered low risk for reoffending. Mr. Haag also presented evidence from other witnesses that he had matured while in prison. The record reveals that he had only one infraction while in prison and had earned a high school diploma. Mr. Haag also held work positions during his incarceration and became a Jehovah’s Witness. Mr. Haag himself testified to situations that occurred in prison in which he could have responded with violence, but he refrained.

The state produced no expert testimony and did not offer testimony to rebut the experts’ opinions about his low risk of reoffending. The state produced victim impact statements. The resentencing court said that it had a daunting task of weighing multiple factors and, on balance, imposed a minimum sentence of 46 years and a maximum sentence of life in prison. Mr. Haag appealed the decision of the resentencing court, arguing that the court “failed to meaningfully weigh the mitigating factors and that his sentence amounted to an unconstitutional de facto life sentence” (Haag, p 245). The Court of Appeals upheld the sentence. On further petition, the Washington Supreme Court granted review.

Ruling and Reasoning

Mr. Haag argued that the lower court erred in sentencing him to 46 years because it emphasized retributive factors over mitigating factors and that his sentence amounted to an unconstitutional de facto life sentence. The state supreme court agreed.

The Washington Supreme Court summarized a line of cases from the U.S. Supreme Court and Washington State on juvenile sentencing. Referencing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), and Miller v. Alabama, the court reiterated the point from these Supreme Court cases that children differ from adult offenders for the purpose of sentencing. The Miller decision prohibited mandatory life without parole for persons who commit offenses before the age of 18. The Miller decision also said that a life sentence without parole should be limited to rare circumstances where the juvenile offense constitutes irreparable corruption. In response to Miller, the Washington legislature enacted a Miller-fix statute, such that juveniles convicted of murder no longer face mandatory life sentences without parole and that a resentencing hearing must be conducted. The Miller-fix statute requires the court to “take into account mitigating factors that account for the diminished culpability of youth” (Wash. Rev. Code. § 10.95.030(3)(b) (2015)). The court stated that, in Washington, resentencing courts must also consider what rehabilitation has occurred since the juvenile was originally sentenced. Resentencing hearings, then, must focus on rehabilitation rather than the past events. Mr. Haag argued that the resentencing court erred in its over-reliance on retribution.

The Washington Supreme Court agreed with Mr. Haag that the sentencing court erred in its emphasis on retribution over mitigation. The court found that the resentencing court focused on Rachel Dillard’s lost future and should have looked more at Mr. Haag’s rehabilitation, citing the evidence of Mr. Haag’s rehabilitation as voluminous and uncontroverted by the state. The court mentioned that the ruling does not prevent future courts from use of discretion in determining whether and to what extent the juvenile has, in fact, rehabilitated, as well as in weighting whether youthfulness contributed to the crime and whether the juvenile is likely to reoffend.

The court also agreed with Mr. Haag that the 46-year minimum sentence amounted to de facto life in prison, which is an unconstitutional violation of the Eighth Amendment. As other states have noted, such long sentences leave incarcerated individuals without opportunity for a meaningful life outside of prison. The court stated that sister states have come to the same result for similar reasons and the court finds the other decisions to be instructive. For these reasons, the Washington Supreme court reversed and remanded for a new sentencing hearing in accordance with the rulings in this case.

Concurring Opinion

Justice Johnson wrote a concurring opinion, in which he agreed with the majority’s conclusion regarding the resentencing court’s abuse of discretion. He proffered that vacating and remanding for resentencing was appropriate, and that further consideration of whether the now vacated sentence amounted to de facto life sentence was no longer necessary.

Dissenting Opinion

Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Stephens said that he agreed with the majority’s conclusion that the resentencing court failed to emphasize mitigating over retributive qualities in the sentencing of Mr. Haag. Judge Stephens wrote a separate opinion to explain that Mr. Haag’s 46-year minimum term does not amount to an unconstitutional de facto life without parole sentence as concluded by the majority. She stated that the U.S. Supreme Court did not categorically bar sentences of life without parole for any class of juvenile offender.

Justice Stephens relied on Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021), which was decided while Mr. Haag’s case was pending before the Washington State Supreme Court. Under Jones, the Court ruled that a sentencer is to consider youth as a mitigating factor when determining whether to impose sentence of life without parole, but is not required to make a finding of “permanent incorrigibility.” Accordingly, according to Justice Stephens, a court is not prohibited from delivering sentences of life without parole to juvenile offenders who demonstrate a capacity for rehabilitation.

Discussion

At the base of the Washington State Supreme Court’s majority opinion in the Haag case lies the idea that “children are different,” and different factors should be considered for juveniles who commit a crime before age 18 compared to adult offenders. Courts have increasingly taken into consideration the advancing neuroscientific research on brain development, including what we now know about the prefrontal cortex (which influences attention, impulse inhibition, and cognitive flexibility) and maturation of the adolescent brain. Further subcortical brain areas, including the limbic system responsible for reward feedback, develop earlier, and this maturation differential may account for increased risk-taking behaviors seen in adolescents. Given the high plasticity of the brain in childhood and adolescence, environmental influences are thought to have a great impact on brain development during these periods. An example of difficult life circumstances and influences can be seen in the Haag case. The court records reflect that, at a young age, Mr. Haag experienced abandonment by his father, bullying, poverty, mistreatment by his stepfather, the death of his best friend, and anxiety related to the discovery of his sexual orientation in a small community. Juveniles are also more likely to be affected by positive influences and have a greater capacity for reform. The court in Haag made it clear that evidence of rehabilitation behind bars must be considered by the sentencing court.

Courts are recognizing that juvenile criminal offenders should be given a chance to capitalize on this difference from their adult counterparts by limiting the length and severity of sentences delivered. Additionally, introducing earlier or more frequent sentence reviews may further motivate these individuals to engage in rehabilitation services offered in prison, including schooling, employment, volunteer positions, and psychiatric care (Piel J. Term-of-years sentences since Miller v. Alabama. J Am Acad Psychiatry Law. 2020; 48(1): 98-104), and afford them some opportunity for a meaningful life after expiration of their prison term.