Limitations on the Use of Evidence From Evaluations of Competence to Stand Trial in the Penalty Phase

Natalie M. Anumba; Kenneth L. Appelbaum

The Admission During the Penalty Phase of Mental Health Expert Testimony Concerning Competence to Stand Trial Constituted a Harmful Error

The Florida Supreme Court overturned a defendant's death sentence and remanded the case for a new penalty phase in Caraballo v. State, 39 So. 3d 1234 (Fla. 2010). At issue was the penalty phase, during which the state used the testimony of a mental health expert who had evaluated the defendant's competence to stand trial. The defendant appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in admitting this testimony.

Facts of the Case

Victor Caraballo, along with four other men, was indicted for charges related to the April 2002 kidnapping of two Miami, Florida, high school students that left one severely injured and the other dead. Mr. Caraballo was scheduled to stand trial in April 2007. In the months before the trial, the defense hired two mental health experts to evaluate Mr. Caraballo's intellectual functioning. The defense then filed a motion requesting that he be found mentally retarded. During a status hearing in October 2006, the state raised questions about his competence to proceed with his case. The court, agreeing that there were concerns, appointed Dr. Lazaro Garcia, a mental health expert, to evaluate his competence. Dr. Garcia, who was hired only for the competence evaluation, eventually concluded that Mr. Caraballo was competent to proceed.

The state indicated its intention to use Dr. Garcia's testimony in a mental retardation hearing to demonstrate that Mr. Caraballo did not have mental retardation and was in fact malingering. Mr. Caraballo filed a motion to preclude Dr. Garcia's testimony from being used for any other purpose than to determine his competence to stand trial; he argued that because Dr. Garcia was hired to evaluate only his competence to proceed, testifying in other proceedings violated confidentiality protections offered by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.211(e) (2010). Dr. Garcia was then precluded from testifying during the hearing.

Following a jury trial, Mr. Caraballo was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, sexual battery, two counts of kidnapping, and two counts of robbery. His trial then continued to the penalty phase. His presentation of mitigating factors during this phase included the testimony of two mental health experts. The state of Florida presented two mental health experts for rebuttal testimony; one was Dr. Garcia. The defense objected, again citing Rule 3.211(e). However, the court allowed Dr. Garcia to testify during the penalty phase. He did so, although he acknowledged that he had evaluated Mr. Caraballo only once, for competence to stand trial. At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury recommended that Mr. Caraballo be sentenced to death, and the court followed their recommendation.

Mr. Caraballo appealed, raising nine issues in total. One involved the admission of Dr. Garcia's testimony in the penalty phase, given that he had only evaluated Mr. Caraballo's competence to proceed. The Florida Supreme Court granted Mr. Caraballo's appeal to examine all questions raised.

Ruling and Reasoning

The Florida Supreme Court held that the trial court's decision to permit Dr. Garcia to testify during the penalty phase was an abuse of discretion. Mr. Caraballo's death sentence was vacated, and the case was remanded to the trial court for a new penalty phase.

The Florida Supreme Court noted that due process required that a defendant be competent to stand trial. The Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 3.210 (1992), requires that proceedings halt and a competency hearing take place if doubts arise as to the defendant's competence to proceed. This rule also allows experts to be appointed to evaluate the defendant. Rule 3.211 specifies how expert evaluations are to be conducted.

Given the import of defendants' competence to stand trial in criminal proceedings, courts may order mandatory competence evaluations. However, defendants are at risk of disclosing detrimental or incriminating information during evaluations. Consequently, Rule 3.211(e) provides some confidentiality protection, specifying that, with limited exceptions, information obtained during a competence evaluation may be used only to determine the defendant's competence or need for treatment. A defendant also has the option of waiving his right to confidentiality and using the report for other purposes. If the defendant chooses this course of action, however, the state is allowed to use all or part of the report as well.

Although trial courts are typically allowed wide discretion with regard to evidence admissibility, the trial court in this case violated Rule 3.211(e) by permitting Dr. Garcia to testify and thus abused its discretion. His testimony in the penalty phase concerned his opinion that Mr. Caraballo malingered psychotic symptoms and cognitive deficits during the competence evaluation. If the jury believed this testimony, they most likely discounted other mental health information presented by the defense. Therefore, the admission of Dr. Garcia's testimony was detrimental to the jury's ability to weigh the relative mitigating and aggravating factors during the penalty phase. It is likely, therefore, that his testimony influenced the jury's recommendation. Because there is a reasonable possibility that the erroneous admission of his testimony affected the outcome of the penalty phase, the error was harmful. The violation of Rule 3.211(e) merited a new penalty phase trial, and the case was remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Dissent

In a dissent, Justice Polston stated that the Florida Supreme Court precedent does not prohibit a trial court from permitting an expert to testify about a competency evaluation during the penalty phase to rebut a mental mitigation argument by the defense. He cited Phillips v. State, 894 So.2d 28, 40–41 (Fla. 2004), in which the Florida Supreme Court ruled that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to make what would have been a meritless objection to the admission of expert testimony during a penalty phase. Justice Polston noted that the instant case differed from Phillips, only in that Dr. Garcia had disclosed the purpose of his evaluation to the jury, but the expert in Phillips testified that he had done a “mental status examination” without using the word competency. Dr. Garcia mentioned the purpose of the evaluation only after defense counsel's questions opened the door, thus inviting an error. Nevertheless, Justice Polston opined that the use of the word competency, as opposed to mental status examination, was a distinction with no practical difference in its potential to create harm.

Discussion

The court reversed the penalty phase because the expert originally hired to do a competence-to-stand-trial evaluation testified about that evaluation during the penalty phase; the admission of this testimony violated Florida's administrative rules governing competence evaluations. The Florida Supreme Court noted a public interest in trying a defendant who is competent; this interest allows a trial court to require that the defendant undergo a mental health evaluation whenever doubts about the defendant's competence to proceed emerge. The court acknowledged that requiring a defendant to participate in an evaluation, then using information learned during the evaluation against the defendant, places the defendant in a difficult position.

In reaching a holding in the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court relied primarily upon the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and therefore interpreted Florida statute. Thus, this ruling on its face has limited reach and establishes little precedent in other states. However, the ruling by the court is likely to be consistent with that of other jurisdictions, should those jurisdictions consider similar issues. Specifically, the court acknowledged that given the mandatory nature of a competence-to-stand-trial evaluation, information disclosed during the evaluation should not later be used to incriminate the defendant. It is likely that other states provide comparable protections to similarly situated defendants, whether by statute or case law. The dissent in this case, however, also demonstrates that courts may make unexpected decisions about admissible use of mental health information in legal proceedings.

Although other jurisdictions may endorse similar principles regarding the use of information derived from competence-to-stand-trial evaluations, they may not provide explicit direction to mental health professionals about what they should disclose to defendants undergoing evaluations. When there is limited legal guidance, professional ethics-based obligations would extend beyond legal obligations.

Evaluators assessing competence to stand trial should notify defendants of the purpose of the evaluation, identify the legal professional who requested the evaluation, and describe the limits of confidentiality. That is, the evaluator should acknowledge the obligation to provide information about the evaluation to the referring party, with the understanding that it may not be possible to predict how referring parties or courts will use the evaluation. The evaluator can direct the defendant to contact his attorney to address any concerns or questions.