Sentencing Adjustment Following an Unsuccessful Insanity Defense

Facts of the Case

On August 10, 2011, Mr. Herriman planted a bomb near a gas pipeline in Okemah, Oklahoma. Without prompting, he later contacted the police and reported his involvement. He provided police with specific information relating to the bomb's components and manufacture. The government charged him with attempting to destroy or damage property by means of an explosive and with illegally making a destructive device.

Mr. Herriman had an extensive history of psychiatric illness and treatment that reached back to his youth. He was raised within a complicated family environment with a significant family history of mental illness. He experienced symptoms related to trauma, psychosis, and mood instability. During certain periods of his life, he required psychiatric hospitalization. Around the time of the offense, he was taking antipsychotic medication prescribed by a psychiatrist in an outpatient setting.

Mr. Herriman was reportedly experiencing worsening social and emotional stressors leading up to the period when he planted the bomb. The anniversary of his mother's death by suicide was approaching and he had been having intensifying psychotic hallucinations of menacing figures threatening to turn him over to his abusers from childhood.

A competency evaluation was ordered during the preliminary hearings due to concerns about Mr. Herriman's ability to understand his legal proceedings and to participate in his defense. At the subsequent hearing, he was deemed to be competent to face his charges. Despite previously taking responsibility for planting the bomb, he proceeded to trial, asserting an insanity defense. It was the defense's position that due to his psychotic thinking, he was unable to understand and differentiate the wrongfulness of his behavior.

During the trial, the government presented evidence that Mr. Herriman had engaged in manufacturing and planting the bomb. The defense did little to contest these assertions. It acknowledged his role in contacting the authorities and admitting his involvement in the offense. The defense, instead, detailed Mr. Herriman's extensive history of psychiatric disturbance and treatment.

The government and the defense factually disagreed about Mr. Herriman's mental state and its effects on him at the time of the offense. The government argued that he was not influenced by psychotic thinking during the commission of the offense. They asserted that he understood the nature of his actions as demonstrated by his carefully crafting and placing the explosive near the gas pipeline. The government also argued that he understood the wrongfulness of his act by detailing his involvement to police soon after planting the bomb. The defense countered that he had experienced command hallucinations ordering him to manufacture and plant the bomb. The defense contended that his delusional mental state undermined his ability to understand the nature and wrongfulness of his actions. The jury, however, agreed with the government's interpretation of the facts.

Mr. Herriman acknowledged that he confessed to the offense but simultaneously contended that he could not be held responsible due to mental illness. His insanity defense was rejected by the jury, and he was convicted of the charges against him.

Mr. Herriman requested a downward adjustment in his sentence. The defense argued that he was eligible for downward departure because he initially accepted responsibility by contacting the police after planting the bomb, relieving the government of expending the effort to investigate the crime. The presentence investigation report, however, maintained that he did not accept responsibility for the crime, because he asserted innocence through an insanity defense. The defense posited that he was being held to an impossible standard, as he could not plead guilty when his psychiatric disturbance cast doubt regarding his intent.

Mr. Herriman's objection was overruled by the trial court, and he was sentenced to a prison term of 63 months. He appealed.

Ruling and Reasoning

The court of appeals clarified that in rare situations, a defendant may clearly demonstrate an acceptance of responsibility for his criminal conduct even though he exercises his constitutional right to a trial. This may occur, for example, where a defendant goes to trial to assert and preserve issues that do not relate to factual guilt (e.g., to make a constitutional challenge to a statute or a challenge to the applicability of a statute to his conduct) [Herriman, pp 1255–6].

Mr. Herriman contended that his case was one of these rare situations. The appeals court disagreed.

The court acknowledged that it had previously upheld a trial court's decision to impose a lesser sentence in an acceptance-of-responsibility case that was taken to trial (United States v. Gauvin, 173 F.3d 798 (10th Cir. 1999)). In that case, Mr. Gauvin had become assaultive while intoxicated. He admitted to the assaultive act but challenged whether his “state of mind met the legal criteria for intent” (Harriman, p 1256). The appeals court differentiated Mr. Gauvin's case from Mr. Herriman's in that Mr. Herriman challenged “the factual element of intent” (Herriman, p 1257) because the matter was contested by both sides during the trial.