Sexual Abuse Evaluator Testimony on Sexual Assault of a Child in the Absence of Physical Evidence

Facts of the Case

C.S. alleged that her stepfather, Mr. Maconeghy, had repeatedly raped and otherwise sexually abused her for several months when she was 11 years old. Testifying for the prosecution was a pediatrician who had evaluated C.S. to determine whether she had suffered the alleged sexual abuse. As part of his evaluation, the pediatrician observed a forensic interview with C.S., collected and reviewed historical information, and conducted a physical examination. Although the physical examination did not indicate abuse, the pediatrician offered his medical opinion that sexual abuse had indeed occurred based on the history provided to him. The day after the pediatrician testified, the appellee's attorney attempted to have some of these statements stricken from the record, but his objection was denied by the court. The defendant was subsequently convicted of rape by forcible compulsion, rape of a child, and various other sexual crimes.

Upon appeal, the superior court vacated the judgment of sentence and remanded the case for a new trial. The Commonwealth appealed the superior court's holding and the state supreme court granted appeal on the question of whether the pediatrician's expert opinion on the occurrence of sexual abuse in the absence of physical evidence encroached upon the jury's function as arbiter of witness credibility.

Ruling and Reasoning

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the decision of the superior court. It held that testimony from an expert concerning the occurrence of sexual abuse of a child, on the basis of witness accounts and in the absence of physical evidence of abuse, impermissibly invades the province of the jury to determine witness credibility.

The court cited a body of rulings from other jurisdictions, including Connecticut, Michigan, New Mexico, and South Dakota, as persuasive to its holding. Specifically, in these jurisdictions, experts were restricted from providing testimony on the question of child sexual abuse in the absence of physical evidence. In all such cases, the courts described such testimony as an endorsement of the complainant's credibility, and ruled it an invasion of the province of the jury. Further, these courts found no material difference between direct (i.e., express opinions explicitly describing the witness as credible) and indirect (i.e., concluding that sexual abuse occurred based entirely on complainant and other witness accounts) endorsements.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also recognized the risk that expert testimony would influence jurors when providing opinions on the matter of witness credibility. It noted that this risk may be particularly salient in child sexual abuse cases, for which the stakes are high, the consequences are great, and the nature of the offense is especially difficult. The court noted the importance of placing limitations on expert testimony to strike a balance between allowing useful, objective expert opinions and screening potentially biasing sentiments to the jury beyond the scope of the referral question. The state supreme court acknowledged that most states have devised different responses to this question and noted that Pennsylvania had taken a relatively restrictive approach (e.g., Pennsylvania does not allow expert testimony on general characteristics of sexual assault victims). The court reasoned it would be inconsistent with its previous holdings to allow expert opinions regarding victim credibility, which has great potential to influence jurors.

The state supreme court briefly addressed the Commonwealth's argument that Pennsylvania case law, as well as the Judicial Code, distinguishes between medical professionals and behavioral experts. However, the court rejected this argument, stating, “the credentials of medical professionals do not insulate them from the prohibition against invading the province of jurors” (Maconeghy, p 714). In addition, because this case did not involve the presence of physical evidence, the court did not address whether or which restrictions would apply to circumstances in which physical evidence is present.

Dissent 1

Justice Debra Todd said the majority failed to distinguish between expert testimony that addressed the “subject of witness credibility,” which the court had found inadmissible, and expert opinions on topics “founded on assessments of witness credibility, which are not ipso facto inadmissible” (Maconeghy, p 716). She cited testimony from the pediatrician demonstrating that physical evidence of child sexual abuse is rare, that pediatricians commonly rely on nonphysical evidence, and that he did not identify any specific individual as the perpetrator of the abuse. In addition, she noted that the medical expert's testimony merely credited the veracity of the victim but did not explicitly speak to credibility per se. Justice Todd cited previous holdings in which the state supreme court recognized medical expert testimony based upon the veracity of witness statements as a proper methodology so long as it is “generally accepted” and “reasonably relied upon” by other professionals within that field. Finally, Justice Todd expressed concerns that the majority ruling will preclude relevant expert testimony in a variety of subjects, including child abuse cases, which is particularly troubling, given misconceptions on the part of the public.

Dissent 2

Justice Sallie Mundy echoed Justice Todd's statements that the majority's holding would improperly limit expert testimony by preventing experts from articulating the basis for their medical opinions. She also disagreed with the state supreme court's hearing the case, for procedural reasons unrelated to the matters discussed above.