Mental Health Factors in Immigration Court

Facts of the Case

Mr. Gomez-Sanchez was a citizen of Mexico who had lived in the United States as a lawful permanent resident since 1990. He started to exhibit symptoms of a serious mental illness as an adolescent and was later diagnosed with schizophrenia, for which he received treatment and took medication for the majority of his life. In 2004, Mr. Gomez-Sanchez pleaded guilty to violation of Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(1)(2004), assault with a deadly non-firearm weapon. He had used a weightlifting bell to physically assault a storeowner, who had required “several stitches.” The storeowner described Mr. Gomez-Sanchez as “not all there.”

Mr. Gomez-Sanchez was sentenced to the two-year statutory minimum penalty for this conviction. This sentence was followed by a charge of removability from the United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (A)(iii)(2001)). He filed an application for withholding of removal and relief. He argued that he would face persecution in Mexico due to his mental illness and would receive inadequate treatment in deplorable conditions if he were to be deported. The immigration judge found Mr. Gomez-Sanchez was not eligible for withholding of removal because the nature of his action resulting in his conviction had enough potential lethality to make the crime “particularly serious,” which made him subject to deportation to Mexico.

Mr. Gomez-Sanchez appealed the decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), but its decision held that, as a blanket rule, mental health factors are always irrelevant in serious crime analysis in immigration court. The BIA reasoned that, because there had been opportunities to raise mental health concerns during Mr. Gomez-Sanchez's criminal proceedings, to revisit such concerns during immigration proceedings would “go behind” the criminal judge's decision and “reassess … criminal culpability” rulings that had already been adjudicated. In the BIA's reasoning, a violent act resulting from a mental illness or without intent to injure another person is no less dangerous than any other violent act. Thus, mental health factors and criminal intent are not relevant to determining a crime's seriousness. Mr. Gomez-Sanchez appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Ruling and Reasoning

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the BIA's decision and remanded it back to the BIA for reconsideration consistent with the Ninth Circuit's decision. The court ruled that the BIA incorrectly interpreted the INA in establishing a categorical rule that mental health can never be considered when determining if a conviction meets criteria for a particularly serious crime.

In its reasoning, the court noted that, per the INA, withholding of removal is “mandatory” if, after deportation to the designated country, an individual's “life or freedom” would be threatened because of “the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion” (8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)(2006)). The INA explicitly states this protection is not extended to persons who have been convicted of a “particularly serious crime” and who pose a danger to the people of the United States. The court noted that statutory law does not otherwise define the term “particularly serious crime,” but the INA does define aggravated felonies accompanied by a sentence of five or more years imprisonment as “particularly serious.” The court cited a previous decision that articulated a standard for determining seriousness. This decision held that an offense is particularly serious if the nature of the crime and imposed sentence “justify the presumption that the convicted immigrant is a danger to the community” (Gomez-Sanchez, p 991, quoting Delgado v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1095, 1107 (9th Cir. 2011)). The court described dangerousness as the “essential key” to serious crime analysis. The seriousness of sentences with less than five years of imprisonment must, therefore, be determined on a case-by-case basis.

The Ninth Circuit held that a Chevron deference, as described in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. N.R.D.C., Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), did not apply to the BIA's interpretation of the INA statute. The two-pronged Chevron legal test is applied when determining whether an administrative agency shall be granted deference to its interpretation of a statute it administers. The court explained that deference is granted if the statute's intent is unclear and if the agency's interpretation is reasonable. The court held that, in this instance, Congress had clearly expressed the intent that serious crime analysis required the agency “to conduct case-by-case analysis of convictions falling outside the category established by Congress” (Gomez-Sanchez, p 992, quoting Blandino-Medina v. Holder, 712 F.3d 1338, 1345 (9th Cir. 2013)). Thus, the BIA's decision did not pass the first prong of the Chevron test.

The court went on to analyze the BIA's decision under the second prong of the Chevron test as well. The court held the BIA's interpretation of the INA statute was unreasonable. The court disagreed with the BIA that determination of whether a crime is particularly serious did not require a re-assessment of criminal culpability. The court also rejected the BIA's position that mental health factors relevant to the assessment of whether a crime was particularly serious could have been brought up at multiple points in the criminal proceedings. The court discussed reasons such matters might not be raised during criminal proceedings. Further, it held the BIA had been inconsistent with its earlier decision to allow the introduction of “all reliable information” during serious crime analysis in immigration court proceedings. This was reason to find that the BIA's inconstancy was “arbitrary and capricious,” and thus not eligible for Chevron deference. Finally, the court found the BIA's decision that mental health factors are always irrelevant in serious crime analysis to be inconsistent with the BIA's precedent of recognizing that motivation and intent are relevant to serious crime determination.