Right to Waive Competency to Stand Trial

Facts of the Case

Mr. Morin was arrested on March 31, 2001, and charged with murder in the death of Janice Houle. Within days of his arrest, he exhibited paranoia, auditory hallucinations, and delusional thinking and was prescribed an antipsychotic medication. He filed a motion of intent to present the insanity defense and was transferred by the court to a Federal Medical Center for psychiatric evaluation.

Medical Center physicians examined Mr. Moran and diagnosed various forms of psychosis, anxiety disorder, and polysubstance dependence. He hired his own psychiatrist, Dr. Lawrence Widman, who enlisted the help of Dr. Todd Stull in evaluating and treating him. Dr. Stull weaned Mr. Morin off his antipsychotic medication to evaluate his condition more accurately. During the period his medications were reduced, Mr. Morin assisted another inmate in committing suicide, and within two weeks of the termination of all medication, he assaulted another inmate. Drs. Widman and Stull concluded that he had paranoid schizophrenia; anxiety disorder; and alcohol, marijuana, methamphetamine, and inhalant dependence. Dr. Stull prescribed a different antipsychotic medication, which Mr. Morin began to take on January 17, 2002.

In March 2002, Mr. Morin’s lawyer informally requested a hearing to establish that Mr. Morin, while medicated, was competent to waive his right to be competent at the time of trial, to present Mr. Morin in an unmedicated, psychotic state at trial. The court, however, responded that Mr. Morin had already demonstrated himself “to be disruptive and potentially dangerous” while not medicated, that he was taking the medication voluntarily and was free to stop, at which time the court would consider “the issue of whether or not a trial can be held.”

On July 19, 2002, Mr. Morin filed a formal motion to waive competency stating that he (1) intended to testify at trial; (2) desired to refuse medication so that his “mental processes [would] not be altered by the medication” during trial; and (3) desired to waive the competency requirement for trial. The government opposed the motion and moved for permission to medicate Mr. Morin forcibly in the event that he discontinued his medication. The detention center indicated that, because of safety and security concerns, they would refuse to house him, a federal pretrial detainee, if he stopped taking his medication.

On August 9, 2002, while the court was still considering these motions, Dr. Widman instructed detention center officials to “wean Morin off his meds” in preparation for the September 9, 2002 trial date, but the detention center staff indicated that they would continue to provide Mr. Morin with his medications until they were instructed to do otherwise by the government. On August 15, 2002, the court denied Mr. Morin’s motion to waive competency and the government’s motion to medicate the defendant forcibly. Detention center staff discontinued his medication on August 16, 2002, three weeks prior to the trial date.

At trial, the defense initially informed the jury that Mr. Morin had limited recollection about the night of the homicide. However, after hearing the government’s witness, Mr. Morin recalled detail and testified. He testified that although he was present at the time of Ms. Houle’s homicide, someone else was responsible for the killing. The jury found Mr. Morin guilty, and he was sentenced to life in prison.

Mr. Morin filed a motion for a new trial arguing that the one-week delay in discontinuing his medication a month before trial had prejudiced his defense. The district court denied his motion, and he appealed.

On appeal, Mr. Morin argued that had the court ordered the detention center to discontinue the medication when Dr. Widman had requested, the “window of clarity” (that period during the trial in which Mr. Morin recollected and testified to events surrounding the murder) would have occurred prior to trial instead of during his testimony. Mr. Morin further argued that a timely court order would have allowed him to assist his attorney more ably in his defense prior to trial and would have allowed the jury to see him in his unmedicated, psychotic state, thereby reinforcing his insanity defense. Mr. Morin also argued that the court violated his constitutionally protected right to waive competency.

Ruling and Reasoning

The court of appeals avoided establishing precedent concerning the right to waive competency by holding that the issue of entitlement to waive competency could not be reached because Mr. Morin’s competency at trial was never challenged.

The court acknowledged that the refusal by detention center staff members to stop providing Mr. Morin with medication, as well as their indication that they would refuse to house him if he stopped taking the medication, created a situation in which he might have felt pressure to continue his medication. But the court opined, “That does not equate to court-sanctioned involuntary administration.” The court added that Riggins and Sell, “both outline standards for permitting court-ordered forcible medication, simply do not apply to this case” (emphasis in original).

The court ruled Mr. Morin’s claim that he was “entitled to the district court’s cooperation in producing a strategically timed, and medically unrecognized, ‘window of clarity’ one week before trial so that he could appear in his natural, psychotic state on the witness stand inventive but at least borderline frivolous.” The court also found that Mr. Morin was under no obligation to take his medication, that the ruling for discontinuing medication reached the detention center within seven days of Dr. Widman’s order and more than three weeks from the start of trial, and that there had been no indication from Mr. Morin or the psychiatrists that four weeks off of medication was of constitutional importance. The court of appeals noted that it was only after the trial that Dr. Widman and Mr. Morin’s lawyer “discussed the possibility that an extra week (off medications) would have produced the desired ‘window of clarity’ and courtroom insanity at preferred times. It is patently absurd to suggest that the district court should somehow have predicted the interplay of medical science and trial strategy.”

Discussion

In his concurring opinion in Riggins, Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority that the question of whether a defendant may waive his right to be competent at trial was not the question at issue, but added that, in his view, a general rule permitting waiver would not withstand scrutiny under the Due Process Clause, given the holdings in Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), and Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975). As Justice Kennedy suggested, a decision on the right to waive competence to stand trial requires an analysis of the benefit of demonstrating an impaired state to the jury against the cost of impaired capacity and decreased participation in the defense. Although the district court did not allow Mr. Morin to waive competency, for the court of appeals the issue was moot because his competency was never officially challenged, and the opportunity to waive “the requirement” (of competency) never arrived. The appellate court, however, acknowledged that the issue of the right to waive competence had merit.

Both the decision of the trial court and affirmation of the appellate court, however, sidestepped the question of an advanced directive. If the defendant is at first incompetent to raise waiving competency, then the defendant must be restored to competence before a knowing and informed waiver is possible. There are good reasons for a defendant to want to know if the court will allow the trial to proceed before risking the return of psychotic symptoms. On the other hand, the decision by the district court implied that the court does not want to use a waiver unless the issue is certain. The defendant wants to address the problem before it occurs; the court wants the problem present before it rules.

Morin highlights the procedural and logistical difficulties of presenting what might be called the waiver-of-competency insanity defense. At the outset, the defense is placed in the confusing and somewhat ironic position of seeking the defendant’s incompetence to proceed at trial. In pursuing incompetence through the discontinuation of medication, there is a risk that the court may become sidetracked with Harper-like concerns of dangerousness (Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 230 (1990)) or become concerned with procedural due process issues, as discussed in Pate and Drope. Under those circumstances, the court may allow forced medications which have the potential side effect of creating a negative prejudicial demeanor in the defendant that is unconvincing to a jury considering an insanity defense. In addition, the effect of medication on symptoms does not occur within a precise titration. A defense strategy to stop medication to influence a jury is a gamble that the right symptoms will appear at the right time and make a favorable impression. As the court of appeals acknowledged, it is not easy to time the discontinuation of medication correctly, both to allow for effective assistance of counsel and to create an appearance and demeanor at trial that a jury considering the insanity defense will find most persuasive. Defense attorneys should also consider the difficulties inherent in possibly having to work with an incapacitated, uncooperative, or unruly defendant, who could easily undermine the defense at trial.