Extreme Emotional Disturbance

Facts of the Case

Ralph Baze resided in Powell County, Kentucky, in a mountain hollow known as Little Hardwick’s Creek. He had been convicted twice of felonies and was wanted in Ohio for felonious assault of a police officer, jumping bail, receiving stolen property, and flagrant nonsupport. On January 15, 1992, authorities from the Lucas County Sheriff’s Office in Toledo, Ohio, notified the Powell County authorities that they wished to extradite Mr. Baze on the felony counts. When Deputy Sheriff Briscoe arrived at Mr. Baze’s cabin to arrest him, Mr. Baze escaped through a trapdoor in the bedroom floor, retrieved his SKS assault rifle from behind the cabin, and fled uphill into the woods. Deputy Briscoe left Mr. Baze’s property to recruit additional officers to assist in the arrest. He came back, followed by Sheriff Bennett.

Gunfire ensued. Later, Mr. Baze testified that Deputy Briscoe had shot him first, striking Mr. Baze in the leg. Mr. Baze shot back at the officers. Sheriff Bennett opened the back passenger door of the police cruiser, crossing directly into Mr. Baze’s line of fire. Mr. Baze shot him three times in the back. Mr. Baze then started to walk down the hill toward Deputy Briscoe, who continued to shoot at Mr. Baze over the hood of the cruiser until he ran out of ammunition. Mr. Baze was too close to give him time to reload. Deputy Briscoe attempted to escape. After going about 10 feet, he was shot in the back by Mr. Baze, who then approached the injured officer and shot him in the head at point-blank range.

Mr. Baze then collected the weapons and ammunition and fled on foot to adjoining Estill County. He surrendered without incident at 8 p.m. that day. Mr. Baze was tried in Rowan County, convicted, and sentenced to death in February 1994 for shooting the officers. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the sentence on direct appeal in November 1997. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in April 1998. Mr. Baze filed a motion to vacate his sentence under Kentucky’s postconviction review procedure. The state trial court denied the motion, a decision that the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed in April 2000.

Mr. Baze then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky in April 2001. The district court denied a motion for an evidentiary hearing on September 23, 2002, and denied a motion to alter or amend the judgment on December 23, 2002.

The district court, however, acting “in an abundance of caution” issued a certificate of appealability on all the issues that Baze had raised. Among these issues was Mr. Baze’s claim that the trial court had denied his due process rights by interfering with his defense. Mr. Baze had wanted to present evidence of a feud with his wife’s family as part of a defense of extreme emotional disturbance. He claimed that previously his wife’s relatives had harassed him by filing false reports with the police, which made him paranoid. Mr. Baze argued that because of his paranoia, he believed that at the time of the index offense, the officers’ attempt to arrest him on an outstanding Ohio warrant was just another dirty trick set up by his relatives, and that he therefore had to defend himself. The trial judge ruled that the feud was not relevant to the killings because the officers were not involved in the family altercation and therefore limited the evidence of the intrafamilial conflict.

Ruling and Reasoning

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky appropriately denied the defendant’s petition for habeas corpus relief on his claim (among others) that he acted “under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance.”

The court acknowledged that a fair opportunity to present a defense is a constitutional right, citing Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986). Presenting relevant evidence is integral to that right, as held in Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988). However, this right is not unconditional. The defendant “must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence” (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)). Only if “an evidentiary ruling is so egregious that it results in a denial of fundamental fairness [does] it violate due process and thus warrant habeas corpus relief” (quoting Bugh v. Mitchell, 329 F.3d 496, 512 (6th Cir. 2003)).

Under Kentucky law, to qualify for an EED the defendant must show “some definitive, non-speculative evidence” that the onset of EED resulted from a “triggering event.” At trial, Mr. Baze had to point to a “triggering event,” prompting a reaction that was so “enraged,” “inflamed,” or “disturbed” as to be uncontrollable, before he could present a defense under that theory. Mr. Baze may have been distraught at the ongoing feud with his wife’s family, but he could not point to a dramatic, isolated event in that conflict that could have caused him to lose temporary control of his sense of right and wrong, thereby qualifying him for mitigation under an EED theory. Therefore, limiting his ability to present evidence on this issue neither undermined the fundamental fairness of Mr. Baze’s trial nor deprived him of any “weighty interest,” and accordingly he could not establish any grounds for habeas relief on this question.

Dissent

The dissent argued that the Kentucky EED law measures whether the source of the defendant’s alleged EED “is reasonable under the circumstances as he believed them to be,” as held in McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d (Ky. 1986). The dissent argued that although “we (or most people, for that matter) would have perceived certain events differently does not mean that Baze’s defense fails as a matter of law.” Taking that in consideration, Mr. Baze would qualify for an EED defense, and denying it would constitute a violation of his constitutional right to present a complete defense.

Discussion

An “extreme emotional disturbance” is a “temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one’s judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from the impelling force of the EED rather than from evil or malicious purposes.” Evidence of mere anger or hurt is not sufficient. To qualify for an EED instruction under Kentucky law, the defendant must show “some definitive, non-speculative evidence” that the onset of the EED was caused by a “triggering event” that must have a “sudden” onset that may extend over a length of time, and its effects must be “uninterrupted.”

Although the dissent argued that in an EED defense, it is the jury’s role to measure the defendant’s emotions as the defendant himself reasonably experienced them, the Constitution leaves judges “wide latitude” to exclude evidence that is only “marginally relevant,” and states have broad authority to promulgate rules that exclude evidence so long as they are not “arbitrary” or “disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.” Forensic examiners would be advised to examine the standard for extreme emotional disturbance for the jurisdictions in which they are working to provide relevant opinions that will assist triers-of-fact.