Mental Illness and Sentencing Length in Supervised Release Revocation

Facts of the Case

In U.S. v. Mackie, 173 Fed. Appx. 427 (6th Cir. 2006), defendant-appellant Felton Mackie pled guilty to charges of bank robbery and was placed on 24 months of supervised release following completion of a 46-month sentence. He subsequently committed several violations of the terms of his release, including state convictions for stealing money and trespassing, leaving the Eastern District of Michigan without permission, failing to report to his probation officer for several months, and failing to notify his probation officer of several arrests. The district court imposed a 24-month prison sentence, well in excess of the federal guideline sentence of 5 to 11 months.

The district court record noted that the violations took place in the context of the defendant's not obtaining treatment for his mental illness, as directed by terms of his supervised release. In imposing sentence exceeding the guidelines, the district court stated that $500 a month was “not enough money to live on. It's not even enough to get the medications. He needs meds and he needs them badly.” The court mentioned the defendant's history of homelessness and inability to follow through on recommended care, noting that when on medications the defendant does well. The court said “I don't like to put people in prison for a mental illness, but he has violated and he is a danger to himself as well as society.” The court concluded by expressing fear that the defendant may be hurt and that his illness creates “a dangerous situation.”

Mackie appealed the sentence, claiming that under the facts in his case, exceeding the guidelines was “unreasonable” (the appellate standard of review for appeal of departures from the sentencing guidelines) and that the sentencing judge did not properly consider the factors stated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) as a basis for sentencing. These factors include consideration of the guidelines, the nature of the offense, the need to deter criminal conduct and protect the public, and the need to provide the defendant with appropriate treatment.

Ruling

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that the district court did “in a general way” consider all the relevant factors in imposing the 24-month sentence and affirmed the sentence.

Reasoning

In their decision, the court of appeals indicated: We agree the circumstances seem tragic that a mentally ill person, who violates the terms of his supervised release, must go to prison to protect himself and the public rather than being able to receive adequate care outside prison walls. However, in this case there seemed to be no practical alternative to provide proper care for Mackie.

The court cited its decision in U.S. v. Johnson, 403 F.3d 813 (6th Cir. 2005), as “strong precedent” for their decision to affirm the district court. In Johnson, the court held that a prison sentence well above guidelines for a drug offender who violated terms of his supervised release was not “plainly unreasonable” (the Sixth Circuit's review standard) nor unreasonable (the general standard of review for sentencing guideline departures). The court concluded the intent to give the “defendant a sentence to help him gain maximum benefit from a drug treatment program was not unreasonable.”

Discussion

This case raises questions regarding the court's use of a defendant's mental illness and the need for treatment of such illness in imposing a criminal sentence. The court of appeals found benign purpose in imposing a sentence substantially greater than that recommended by the sentencing guidelines. Normally, upward departures on sentencing are punitively motivated and are implemented when aggravating circumstances were present in the commission of the offense. However, the federal statute relating to sentencing guidelines, 18 U.S.C. § 3553, includes the “factors” that are to be taken into consideration in sentencing. Included in those factors is the defendant's need for treatment. In the case of sentencing following violations of the terms of a supervised release, the guidelines are merely advisory, and so the sentencing judge is given great discretion in selecting and weighing which factors warrant an upward departure from the guidelines. In the present case, the trial judge and the appeals court found that mental illness and the attendant need for treatment made reasonable the excessive sentence imposed. Therefore, at first glance, the sentence does not appear to be unduly punitive, as the motivation is benevolence, falling under the broad legal doctrine of parens patriae (the state's responsibility to act in the best interests of her most vulnerable citizens). However, a review of the detailed explanation provided by the court for imposing a sentence outside the recommended guidelines reveals language that mirrors that used in civil commitment hearings.

It is troubling to note that although the sentencing was apparently motivated and justified by the same criteria utilized in involuntary civil commitment proceedings, the defendant was not afforded the familiar procedural and due process protections afforded in civil commitments. Therefore, though the court's intent may be distinctly nonpunitive and relies on need for treatment as a basis for a deprivation of liberty, the defendant is not afforded the fundamental constitutional protections associated with civil commitment proceedings. Thus, the criminal sentencing functions as a de facto civil commitment hearing, but one where the defendant has few procedural rights.

For example, the evidentiary burden in a civil commitment is on the state, with a standard of proof of clear and convincing evidence. In the case described, the evidentiary standard rests at the discretion of the judge and is subject only to a “plainly unreasonable” standard of appellate review. It is worrisome to realize that under the guise of a need for mental health treatment, a defendant may be subject to substantial upward departures in postrelease sentencing while not being afforded the usual procedural safeguards that attend a civil commitment proceeding.

The ruling appears to reflect the court's concern with what it perceives to be the inadequate civil system of care for the mentally ill. This raises troubling questions of the creation of a slippery slope for the care and management of the mentally ill within the legal system—namely, the use of discretionary criminal sentencing to accomplish a de facto civil commitment.

The case and decision stand in stark contrast to concerns recently expressed by mental health professionals at the perception of increasing pressures by overwhelmed government systems to utilize jails and prisons as quasi-mental health facilities. The court's decision here seems consistent with other recent court decisions that allow the introduction of a defendant's mental illness to be used as an aggravating condition, as for example in the capital sentencing phase of a trial (for example, People v. Smith, 107 P.3d 229 (Cal. 2005)). Such a use of mental illness could appear to raise 14th amendment equal protection issues.