Competence to Stand Trial

Facts of the Case

Mr. Batista was arrested September 19, 2002, for being involved in the sale of 450 grams of crack cocaine. He acted as the middleman in a sale between a police informant and the seller. He pleaded guilty to “possessing only 150 grams of crack cocaine.” After Mr. Batista had pleaded guilty, his lawyer requested that her client be evaluated to determine whether he was competent to stand trial. He was evaluated at least five times over the next two years. Dr. Barber saw Mr. Batista and opined that he was not competent to stand trial. Later, Dr. Ryan evaluated Mr. Batista and agreed with Barber, but commented that the apparent lack of competence might be the result of malingering. Dr. Ryan suspected malingering, because Mr. Batista did so poorly on an administered memory test that even someone with severe brain damage would have scored better.

The court subsequently asked Dr. Simring to evaluate Mr. Batista. He found that Mr. Batista was “simulating mental illness” and concluded that Mr. Batista was “faking or exaggerating … to avoid going to trial.” Dr. Ryan re-evaluated Mr. Batista and determined that he was “probably malingering.” She stated that, during the evaluation, Mr. Batista had said that he was at home and had opened an imaginary refrigerator and offered her a drink. Dr. Morgan was the final clinician to evaluate Mr. Batista. Morgan (a neuropsychologist) concluded, after examining Mr. Batista, that he was malingering and concluded that there was “significant, incontrovertible and overwhelming evidence regarding the presence of suboptimal effort and malingering in [sic] the part of the examinee” (Batista, 483 F.3d, p 194).

Mr. Batista was sentenced on June 2, 2005. He had expected a reduction in his sentence due to his guilty plea. The prosecution asked for an obstruction-of-justice enhancement of his sentence because of his feigning mental illness. The district court denied his request for a reduction due to acceptance of responsibility and granted the prosecution's request for an enhancement due to obstruction of justice. Mr. Batista appealed on four grounds. First, he claimed that the district court should not have given him an enhanced sentence due to obstruction of justice. Second, he complained that he did not receive a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Third, he opined that there should have been a downward departure for decreased mental capacity. Fourth, he stated that the court failed to apply a “safety valve” in sentencing.

Ruling and Reasoning

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on all points that the district court had been correct in its decisions.

Mr. Batista argued that by feigning mental illness he was “exploring a potential defense or mitigation.” The district court disagreed and concluded that he had knowingly feigned mental illness. The court found that he had even told his co-conspirators that he was planning to fake mental illness. The appellate court found that the district court had “ample evidence” that Mr. Batista was faking. The evidence included the testimony of the doctors and the testimony of Agent Steven Sutley. Sutley had been told by one of Mr. Batista's co-conspirators that Mr. Batista was planning to feign mental illness. His malingering had caused a substantial expenditure of the government's resources and the court's time.

The Due Process Clause protects a defendant from standing trial if he is not competent. Sentencing enhancements are not meant to interfere with constitutional rights. In a Fifth Circuit Court case, United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (5th Cir. 1993), the court held that … while a criminal defendant possesses a constitutional right to a competency hearing if a bona-fide doubt exists as to his competency, he surely does not have the right to create a doubt as to his competency or to increase the chances that he will be found incompetent by feigning mental illness [Dunnigan, 507 U.S., p 96].

The appellate court also found that the district court did not give the enhancement simply because Mr. Batista was found competent, but rather it was imposed because there was sufficient evidence of his having feigned mental illness.

Discussion

The Third Circuit Court of Appeal's strong endorsement of the district court's decision shows that the courts are tiring of defendants who abuse their mental health protections by feigning mental illness. This move could have important ramifications for forensic psychiatrists. First, will clinicians become agents of the court, expected to gather evidence of an enforceable wrong? Second, might there be consequences for those clinicians whom the court deems to have failed to identify malingering in a defendant?

It is important to have the role of the psychiatrist well defined in a legal evaluation. In U.S. v. Batista, the competency evaluations themselves were used as evidence that ultimately led to an increased sentence. The reason for an evaluation of competency to stand trial is to protect those who are mentally ill from being forced to participate in a legal proceeding while unable to do so. The psychiatrists involved in such evaluations are gathering information to be used for the purpose of determining whether a defendant has the ability to understand the nature of the proceedings and to assist counsel in a rational manner. If psychiatrists are gathering information that could be used as evidence for an enhanced sentence, this possibility should be made explicit to the defendant before the evaluation. The evaluator may, for example, have to advise the defendant that evidence of feigning a mental illness will be reported to the parties receiving the doctor's conclusions. A further question is whether the evaluator should advise the defendant that such information could be used against the defendant. This could have the effect of deterring defendants from feigning mental illness. However, it could frighten defendants and keep them from participating in the evaluation. The impact of this change may not be positive.

What about those psychiatrists who are thought to have failed to identify someone who is found by the court to be feigning incompetence? If the courts begin punishing those individuals who are determined to be feigning mental illness, then could a psychiatrist be held responsible for not discovering and reporting the subterfuge? If courts choose to hold psychiatrists responsible in this manner, could the psychiatrist receive consequences such as expulsion from court panels, medical board sanctions, fines, malpractice suits, or criminal penalties because the perceived error in judgment was found to contribute to obstruction of justice?

U.S. v. Batista has made the evaluation of competency to stand trial a source of potential criminal exposure, at least in the Third Circuit. Psychiatrists should be aware of how they must change their informed consent to reflect this, and how the information they gather can be used for purposes other than determining competence. They should also be concerned about the possible consequences of failing to discover that a defendant is feigning mental illness.