Not Guilty by Reason of Somnambulism

Facts of the Case

On June 5, 2003, Tavaris Smith's wife died of a single gunshot wound to the head while asleep in bed. Mr. Smith claimed that he had a sleep disorder and had shot his wife during an episode of sleepwalking.

On August 15, 2005, a jury found Mr. Smith guilty of malice murder. On August 29, 2005, Mr. Smith filed a motion for a new trial. On March 20, 2007, he filed an amended motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. On August 15, 2007, Mr. Smith filed an appeal. The appeal was argued before the Supreme Court of Georgia on February 11, 2008, and the case was decided on June 30, 2008.

Before the trial, Mr. Smith made it known to the court that he was preparing evidence as well as expert testimony that would show that he had a physiological sleep disorder that resulted in sleepwalking and states of confusional arousal. Mr. Smith claimed that he shot his wife while sleepwalking and therefore had neither the awareness of his actions nor the intent to kill.

Notably, Mr. Smith did not assert an insanity defense under the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (OCGA) § 17-7-130.1. The trial court, despite his objections, appointed an expert witness under that statute to examine him and assigned to him a claim of not guilty by reason of insanity. OCGA § 17-7-130.1 requires that the “court shall appoint at least one psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine the defendant and to testify at the trial” when the defendant claims an insanity defense.

Despite further objections to the imposition of the insanity defense, during the trial the jury was instructed: …when a defendant interposes the defense of insanity, the court must appoint an expert to examine the defendant and to testify at trial; that insanity is defined as the lack of mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong at the time of the crime; and that the court had classified Mr. Smith's defense as an insanity defense” (Smith, p 156).

The court also instructed the jury that the burden of proving insanity at the time of the crime by a preponderance of the evidence rested on the defense. Mr. Smith's psychiatric expert testified that he was not legally insane. The court-appointed expert also testified that Mr. Smith did not appear to have any psychiatric pathology. Both experts testified that he may have had a sleep disorder including confusional arousal. Mr. Smith was found guilty of malice murder.

Mr. Smith's appeal was based on the contention that the trial court erred when it only would allow him to present a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity.

Ruling and Reasoning

The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the judgment of the trial court and unanimously held that “the trial court erred in classifying Mr. Smith's defense as an insanity defense, in informing the jury that it was classifying Mr. Smith's defense as an insanity defense and in instructing the jury on the defense of insanity during its charge” (Smith, p 156).

The Georgia Supreme Court observed that the evidence of record was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Smith was guilty of malice murder, but the trial court's imposition of the insanity defense was a significant hindrance to his chosen defense—that he did not commit the act voluntarily and with criminal intent.

The court noted that the Model Penal Code § 2.01(2)(b) states that a person is not guilty of an offense if it is committed involuntarily. Bodily movements during unconsciousness or sleep are specifically deemed involuntary acts. The court also reviewed the holdings of other courts that have taken cases involving unconsciousness disorders, including sleep disorders, and observed that most of these courts have issued holdings that these disorders comprise a defense distinct from insanity. The holdings also indicated that defendants who committed criminal acts as a result of these disorders were not criminally responsible secondary to a lack of volition and criminal intent.

The supreme court further supported the distinction between insanity defenses and defenses of unconsciousness when it cited a review article by Mike Horn in the Boston College Law Review (A rude awakening: what to do with the sleepwalking defense? B C L Rev 46:149, 2004). Mr. Horn's review noted that few courts continue to categorize criminal acts committed while sleepwalking as an insanity defense. Much of the distinction relies on the facts that those found criminally insane have a permanent or semipermanent mental defect, whereas those with sleep disorders do not. In addition, the therapeutic commitment provided for the criminally insane would provide little to no benefit to a sleepwalking defendant.

Discussion

With this ruling, the Supreme Court of Georgia makes it clear that it considers criminal acts committed while sleepwalking or during an episode of unconsciousness or semiconsciousness due to a sleep disorder to be a defense distinct from the insanity defense. Most courts that have considered the question have held that the insanity defense is an improper fit for what is best classified as a defense of unconsciousness. Sleepwalking and other sleep disorders do not fit the definition of legal insanity, and affected defendants are therefore at a great disadvantage when required to provide evidence of lack of culpability by means of an insanity defense.