Legal Rights for Members of the Armed Forces

Facts of the Case

In October 1998, Kurtis Armann, a private in the U.S. Army, attempted to shoot and kill Private Toni Bell. Dressed all in black and armed with a makeshift rifle equipped with a scope, Private Armann waited for Private Bell near the gate where she stood guard. Although he aimed to shoot Private Bell in the head, the bullet struck her neck. Pvt. Armann was charged with attempted premeditated murder with a firearm, conspiracy to commit premeditated murder, violating a lawful general regulation by wrongfully possessing a firearm with a silencer, and wrongfully using marijuana, as delineated in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.). He was detained at the Mannheim Confinement Facility in Germany.

In a pretrial hearing, the Military Judge ordered a Sanity Board to evaluate Pvt. Armann's mental health, over the objection of his counsel, who stated that the judge had “no basis to question Private Armann's ability to assist in his defense or…appreciate the ongoing proceedings.” After reviewing Pvt. Armann's outpatient records, other medical records, and documents relating to the charges, the Sanity Board opined that he had “sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature of the proceedings and to conduct his own defense, or cooperate intelligently in his own defense.” They also addressed the matter of criminal responsibility, stating that at the time of the alleged offense, Pvt. Armann was not experiencing a “severe mental disease or defect.”

On March 19, 1999, Pvt. Armann pleaded guilty to all four charges in military court. Before accepting his plea, the Military Judge attempted to ensure its voluntariness. The judge inquired into Pvt. Armann's understanding of the allegations against him and advised him that he was waiving certain legal rights by pleading guilty. After accepting the plea, the judge held a sentencing hearing, where he issued Pvt. Armann a dishonorable discharge and sentenced him to 38 years in prison, reduced to 35 years as part of a plea agreement. On the days before and of his guilty plea (March 18 and 19, respectively), Pvt. Armann had migraine headaches, and medical logs indicated that he received Seconal, Fiorinal, Fioricet, Compazine, Midrin, Phenergan, and Elavil. The trial judge accepting the plea did not inquire about whether Pvt. Armann had been taking medications, and his attorney did not raise the potential issue of competency on that day.

On July 19, 2000, Mr. Armann's counsel filed an appeal with the Army Court of Criminal Appeals (ACCA), arguing that Mr. Armann's conviction for possession of a firearm be set aside. Counsel alleged that the Military Judge erroneously attached a particular exhibit, did not accept into evidence the relevant military regulations, and gave Mr. Armann a disproportionately long sentence in light of his personal history. Mr. Armann personally raised two additional issues: that he was not criminally responsible for his alleged crimes and that he should not have been sentenced separately for the charges of attempted murder and conspiracy. On April 24, 2001, the ACCA stated that after taking into account the entire record as well as the issues raised by Mr. Armann, they affirmed the ruling of the court-martial.

On May 22, 2001, Mr. Armann filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), and on October 11, 2001, submitted a supplement in support of that petition. In his supplement, he argued the same points made in his appeal to the ACCA, but also asserted that on the day of his court-martial and sentencing hearings, he had been heavily medicated and was not competent to stand trial. In addition to his petition for review, Mr. Armann filed a petition for a new trial, stating that new evidence had come out about Accutane, a medication he had taken in the past. Mr. Armann also filed motions to attach 18 different exhibits to his petition for a new trial. On January 7, 2002, the CAAF granted his motion to attach one of these exhibits, which included his arguments in regard to his competency to stand trial. On July 24, 2002, the CAAF granted his petition for review, in which they affirmed the decision of the ACCA, but denied his petition for a new trial. The CAAF did not issue an explanation of their ruling.

On April 22, 2004, Mr. Armann filed a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, arguing that he was not competent on the day he pleaded guilty and was sentenced. On December 29, 2005, Mr. Armann filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing, alleging that the medications given to him by the Mannheim officials on the day of his plea and sentencing rendered him incompetent to stand trial. On March 14, 2006, the Magistrate Judge, to whom the district court had assigned the case, granted Mr. Armann's motion for an evidentiary hearing. After determining that not all of the CAAF documents had been provided for the Magistrate Judge's review, the district court remanded the case to the Magistrate Judge, and once again, the Magistrate Judge granted the motion. The government appealed the decision to the Third Circuit, who reversed the district court's ruling.

Ruling and Reasoning

In deciding what scope of review a federal district court should apply when analyzing a service member's habeas corpus petition, the Third Circuit cited Burns v. Wilson as the relevant case law. In Burns v. Wilson, the Supreme Court held that the standard for such review is “full and fair consideration,” which they intended to mean “no more than hearing the petitioner out.” The Third Circuit explained that regardless of the rationale in favor of applying a different standard, “it is solely the prerogative of the Supreme Court to depart from its precedents” (Armann, p 291). Since the Supreme Court has not abandoned the Burns decision, the Third Circuit opines that it is the definitive standard in this case. The decision in Burns v. Wilson showed a greater deference to the decisions made in military courts than those of civil courts, and thus only an overt constitutional violation would justify the federal court granting review.

After deciding the appropriate standard for review, the Third Circuit considered Mr. Armann's assertion that the military courts did not consider his competency claim. The Third Circuit cited their ruling in U.S. ex. Re. Thompson v. Parker, 399 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1968), where they held that the Court of Military Appeals’ one-sentence denial of a petition for review, which was accompanied by an extensive brief by the appellant regarding the alleged constitutional violation, satisfied the requirement for full and fair consideration set forth in Burns. The Third Circuit pointed out that, although the government failed to address the incompetency claim in detail, it did not ignore it.

Discussion

This case reiterates that decisions made in military courts are subject to a narrower scope of review, affording them greater deference than civil courts. As a result, Mr. Armann's claim of incompetency would be subject to review in federal court only if the military courts manifestly refused to consider the claim. Per Burns, the Third Circuit asserted that “Military law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment” (Burns, p 140).

Still, this level of deference could leave significant competency issues in Mr. Armann's case unexamined. The potential that the medications received by him on the day of his plea affected the voluntariness of his plea seems significant. Yet, the Third Circuit only mentions it in passing. Although many of the issues he raises in his various appeals seem to lack merit (e.g., the “likely” psychotomimetic effects of Accutane, which he asserts caused him to be insane at the time of his unlawful behavior), the possibility that he may have been oversedated when he pleaded guilty seems a live issue indeed.