Procedures Governing the Involuntary Commitment of a Minor to a Drug and Alcohol Treatment Program

Facts of the Case

F.C. was a 14-year-old boy in the custody of his grandmother, C.K. She reported difficulty managing F.C. because of his regular drug use, stealing, truancy, and tendency to run away from home. He also had a history of outpatient mental health treatment. In 2007, C.K. filed a petition pursuant to Act 53 of the Pennsylvania Drug and Alcohol Abuse Control Act (1972, amended 1997) to compel F.C. to receive drug and alcohol abuse treatment on an involuntary basis. She also requested assistance in ensuring that F.C. attend the hearing on her petition. Subsequently, Allegheny County sheriffs' deputies took custody of F.C. at his home and transported him to juvenile court. There, he was interviewed by a certified addiction counselor. F.C. told the counselor that for approximately one year he had been smoking marijuana daily and sometimes had used alcohol. The counselor diagnosed cannabis dependence and recommended that F.C. have inpatient therapy. Based on this testimony, the juvenile court granted C.K.'s petition and ordered F.C. to receive treatment. He was taken to an inpatient drug treatment facility with a review scheduled within 45 days.

On appeal, F.C. argued that he had been denied due process and his right to counsel when, based solely on the Act 53 petition, he was detained and assessed in a manner in which he was “compelled to divulge private information without being given notice” and without counsel present. In addition, he argued that he was denied due process because he was restrained in shackles during the juvenile court proceeding and his right to counsel was therefore infringed on because he could not communicate with counsel. The superior court upheld the constitutionality of Act 53, explaining that the procedures underlying the Act were fundamentally fair and provided constitutionally adequate protections for minors, given the important goal of facilitating treatment. The court also denied F.C.'s contention that he was denied due process by virtue of being in visible restraints during his hearing, because the proceedings involved a judge rather than a jury, the hearing was very brief, F.C. was considered a flight risk, and the restraints did not impede his ability to communicate with counsel.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted F.C.'s further appeal on the question of whether Act 53 on its face violates the due process protections provided by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and whether shackling and detaining F.C. during the civil Act 53 hearing violated his due process rights.

Ruling and Reasoning

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed and held that Act 53 provides sufficient protection to pass constitutional muster. The court relied on Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), to guide its inquiry into the constitutionality of Act 53. In Parham, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a parent or a guardian can commit a minor to a mental institution if a physician certifies that the minor should be committed, even if the minor strenuously objects. The Supreme Court specifically rejected claims that commitment of a minor by a parent or guardian without an adversarial hearing is a deprivation of the minor's liberty without due process of law.

In The Interest of F.C. III, the court first pointed out that Act 53 is a civil statute, the purpose of which is not to punish the child but to aid parents and guardians in facilitating substance abuse treatment for their dependent minors. As the Parham Court recognized, issues of civil commitment are essentially medical.

Second, the court recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees persons procedural fairness in matters affecting life, liberty, or property and acknowledged that Act 53 implicated F.C.'s liberty interest. However, the court asserted that due process is a flexible concept with procedural protections dependent on the particular circumstances involved. Moreover, constitutional protections do not necessarily apply equally to children and adults. The court noted that, consistent with Parham, a minor's constitutional rights are generally limited by a state's special interests in guiding children's lives, a state's parens patriae power to care for its citizens, and traditional state deference to parental autonomy in child rearing. Given the presumption that (in the absence of abuse or neglect) parents act in the best interest of their children, the court held that the right of parents to make decisions for the care, custody, and control of their children is paramount. The filing of a petition to initiate the Act 53 process involves a statement of facts and good reason for treatment and is subject to penalty of unsworn falsification to authorities. The filing merely triggers an assessment process and therefore provides sufficient protection to the minor.

The Parham Court further held that an adversarial hearing is not required before commitment for treatment, because a confrontational proceeding would undermine the purpose of the assessment, which is essentially for medical diagnosis. Likewise, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held in this case that the assessment outlined in Act 53, which by statute must be conducted by specific clinicians, satisfies Parham's requirement of a decision made by appropriate medical personnel. Because due process requires only an informal determination regarding the necessity of treatment, there need not be notice of the assessment and no counsel need be present. The substance abuse assessment is civil and therapeutic, and thus its administration need not be challenged by the juvenile's attorney.

In addition, the court found that the protections provided by Act 53 at the hearing to determine the necessity of treatment met the minimum protections required by the Constitution. In this formal hearing, a neutral judge considers testimony regarding the propriety of involuntary treatment, and the minor's counsel is permitted to cross-examine witnesses. If the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child is drug dependent, is incapable of or unwilling to accept voluntary treatment, and will benefit from involuntary treatment, the judge orders the juvenile to treatment for a period not exceeding 45 days. Additional 45-day periods of treatment can be ordered only after a review hearing with the same safeguards noted above. The court underscored that the process is civil and therapeutic and concerns a parent or guardian seeking medical treatment for a child; treatment, if ordered, is brief.

The court concluded that the procedures set forth in Act 53, on their face, strike an appropriate balance between a minor's right to avoid unnecessary confinement for medical treatment; a parent's or guardian's right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her child; the state's interest in using its resources appropriately; and the need to avoid imposing unnecessary procedural obstacles that would discourage children or their families from seeking necessary help.

Finally, the court concluded that F.C.'s due process rights were not violated by virtue of his being shackled, restrained, and detained during the hearing. It noted that the right to appear free from physical restraint in court is not absolute and may be compromised when there is a danger of escape. In addition, there was no jury in the case, and there is no indication that the restraints biased the judge against F.C. Also, the restraints did not hinder him from communicating with his counsel.

Dissent

Justice Saylor dissented, arguing that Act 53 does not provide sufficient procedural protections to satisfy due process. He pointed out that the minor's initial commitment of up to 45 days is not predicated upon a risk of immediate bodily injury or death. Also, the court can order successive 45-day confinement periods indefinitely if it finds that the minor will continue to benefit from inpatient treatment. Although Justice Saylor agreed that a juvenile's constitutional due process rights are not equivalent to those of an adult, he argued that the same standards apply equally when the Due Process Clause is concerned, with avoiding factual error as a basis for liberty deprivations. In addition, unlike the situation in Parham that related to a psychiatric admission, the drug-dependency assessment specified by Act 53 may be initiated by a one-sentence petition by a parent, followed by a relatively short interview by a nonphysician who is not required to conduct a thorough background evaluation based on school and social service records. Justice Saylor cautioned that Act 53 permits such “heavy handed actions” against minors in a “purely civil context,” including arrest and shackling by multiple law enforcement agents followed by transport and evaluation at court, such that due process protections were inadequate.