Federal District Court's Ordering of Multiple Competency Examinations

Facts of the Case

A grand jury in Utah indicted the appellant, Rigoberto Martinez-Haro, a 42-year-old Spanish-speaking man, charging him with two counts of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Before the trial, the government notified Mr. Martinez-Haro that if he was convicted, he could receive a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years' imprisonment for the first count of the indictment and a mandatory minimum of 10 years' imprisonment for the second count. Mr. Martinez-Haro's counsel informed the court that he had “some questions about whether [Martinez-Haro] had a mental breakdown.” Counsel requested a competency evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2011), and the district court ordered the examination to be conducted by Beverley O'Connor, PhD. Dr. O'Connor reviewed records and conducted an interview in the presence of an interpreter. During the interview, Mr. Martinez-Haro revealed that he had a fifth-grade education, had diabetes, and had experienced physical abuse in childhood. He said he wanted a particular plea agreement and would keep getting a new attorney until he got that agreement. He had the unrealistic opinion that the government should deport him to Mexico in return for his promise that he would not return to the United States. Dr. O'Connor opined that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial, but qualified her opinion. She expressed concern that he had a low IQ and had difficulty with reasoning and comprehension. She noted his history of head trauma and was unclear whether he may have some early-onset dementia. She recommended neuropsychological testing with a Spanish-speaking interpreter to more thoroughly evaluate his cognitive deficits. She reported that if the examination could be accomplished, it would give the court more complete information on which to base its opinion regarding competency. She offered to review the results of further testing and was willing to reconsider her opinion after conducting the review. Because of her expressed clinical uncertainties, the government filed a motion seeking a second competency examination. The court ordered Mr. Martinez-Haro to be committed to a suitable bureau of prisons facility for the purpose of this examination. He objected and appealed to the Tenth Circuit.

Ruling and Reasoning

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court. The court first analyzed the jurisdictional question of whether this case met criteria for appeal before final judgment in the district court. In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), the U.S. Supreme Court set forth criteria that an order must meet to be appealable before a final judgment. Under this “collateral order doctrine,” circumstances for an immediate review of a court order include that the issue would be unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. The Tenth Circuit had previously held that a district court order committing a defendant for the purposes of a competency examination met the Cohen criteria and was therefore immediately appealable. The court stated that Mr. Martinez-Haro's liberty interest in not being confined for a competency evaluation was wholly separate from the merits of his criminal case.

The appeals court then turned to the analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b), which states that the court can order that a competency examination be performed by an appropriate psychiatrist or psychologist. Furthermore, the statute notes that “if the court finds it appropriate,” a competency examination can be conducted “by more than one such examiner.” Mr. Martinez-Haro contended that “a” psychiatric evaluation meant that there could only be one examination (although multiple examiners could be used during that examination), but that more than one examination could not be allowed. The court did not find this argument persuasive.

The Tenth Circuit reviews a district court's interpretation of statutes de novo and uses an abuse-of-discretion standard for decisions to order competency evaluations. In the analysis of the statutory language, the court stated that if the language of the statute were clear and unambiguous, it would end the inquiry and provide an opinion based on the “plain language of the statute.” The court opined that the statute ordered district courts to order competency hearings as need be and that nothing in the language prohibited the court from ordering a second evaluation. Furthermore, nothing in the statute restricts the court from ordering multiple hearings to adjudicate the question of competency.

The appeals court then turned to the question of whether the district court abused its discretion by ordering a second competency evaluation. The court expressed concern that in a situation in which the government was “shopping” for a psychologist or psychiatrist to find a defendant competent after an initial finding of incompetency, a second court-ordered government evaluation could be questioned. However, that was not the case with Mr. Martinez-Haro. The Tenth Circuit noted that the psychologist who examined him requested further testing and said that she would be willing to reconsider her opinion after reviewing the results of further testing. Therefore, the court of appeals could not say that the district court abused its discretion in taking steps to ensure that it had sufficient information to evaluate Mr. Martinez-Haro's competency. In fact, the court of appeals thought it prudent for the district court to order another evaluation.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded its opinion by discussing two types of cases that support the appropriateness of multiple competency hearings. It reviewed several cases in which multiple competency evaluations involved both defense- and government-requested evaluations in the same case. It then characterized a second group of cases in which the question of the court's abuse of discretion was considered because the court failed to order a second evaluation.