Diminished Capacity

Facts of the Case

Rogelio Vela entered a Port of Entry security office in Ysidro, California, on March 22, 2007, and handed Customs Officer Patrick Wright a note stating that he was suicidal and in fear for his life because he was being persecuted by his family and the Mafia. Officer Wright attempted to communicate with Mr. Vela through handwritten notes. During the exchange, Mr. Vela drew a knife and stabbed Officer Wright in the chest, causing serious injury.

Mr. Vela was issued a first indictment in federal court that charged him with attempted murder and willfully assaulting a federal officer who was performing his official duties. In a second indictment, the attempted murder charge against Mr. Vela was dropped and the wording of his second charge was modified to charge that Mr. Vela did “‘intentionally' and forcibly assault … with a deadly and dangerous weapon … a person … while … engaged in the performance of his official duties.” As a result, the jury instructions stated that to find him guilty, they would have to find that Mr. Vela stabbed Officer Wright intentionally, rather than willfully.

Mr. Vela had planned to use a diminished-capacity defense at trial. He objected to the wording in the second indictment, because it changed the crime from one of specific intent to one of general intent. Before trial, he filed several motions: that the charge be dismissed because it did not state that willfulness was a required element of intent; that if the charge was not dismissed, the jury be instructed that willful intent was a required element of the crime, and he thus be permitted to enter a diminished-capacity defense; and that the new charge be dismissed because the wording “with a deadly and dangerous weapon” brought aggravating factors into the guilt-finding phase of the trial when the proper place was in the sentencing phase of the trial. This, he contended, was fundamentally unfair and violated his constitutional rights contrary to legal precedent because it was at odds with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

Mr. Vela's pretrial motions were unsuccessful. He was not allowed to pursue a diminished-capacity defense and instead pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). After hearing the evidence, including the testimony of opposing psychiatric experts, one who opined that he was insane and another who opined that he was sane, the jury found him NGRI. He was ordered hospitalized for psychiatric treatment.

Mr. Vela appealed the trial court's decision, claiming that the court erred in not granting his three pretrial motions. The government responded to Mr. Vela's appeal by stating that he had no cause for appealing a finding of NGRI, because it was not a final judgment but a verdict that accepted his own chosen defense. It requested that the appeals court dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Ruling and Reasoning

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that Mr. Vela had a right to appeal his NGRI. The appeals court rejected the government's assertion that his NGRI was not a final judgment, stating that it was in fact the decision that brought his criminal proceedings to an end. Second, the appeals court found that, because he was challenging errors that prevented him from using his preferred legal strategy of diminished capacity thereby forcing him into using an NGRI, the government's assertion that the court accepted his chosen defense was incorrect.

On the merits of the appeal, the court held by a two-to-one majority that Mr. Vela's motions to dismiss the indictment, instruct the jury on willfulness, and permit a diminished-capacity defense were properly denied. Diminished capacity can be entered as a defense only when a person is charged with a specific-intent crime. However, in this case, Mr. Vela was charged with a crime that was clearly defined both by statute and case law as one of general intent. In regard to his argument that the inclusion of “with a dangerous and deadly weapon” rendered the charge fundamentally unfair, the appeals court noted that this inclusion served to define necessary elements of his crime and thus was proper.

Dissent

Judge Smith disagreed with the majority, instead agreeing with the government's contention that Mr. Vela had no basis for an appeal. Judge Smith referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Flanagan v. United States (465 U.S. 259 (1984): “In a criminal case the [final judgment] rule prohibits appellate review until conviction and imposition of sentence” (Vela, p 1159). Judge Smith noted that Mr. Vela's case did not end in conviction but in an acquittal and no sentence, and thus the judge opined that he had no legal standing to appeal the verdict, because he won his case through a defense that he himself chose.

Judge Smith stated that the majority's decision to hear Mr. Vela's appeal set a dangerous precedent. He pointed out that when the defendant's pretrial motions were denied, which rendered him unable to enter a diminished-capacity defense, he had two options: to plead not guilty, and if convicted, appeal on the issue of the denial of his motions, or to change his plea to NGRI, knowing that if he succeeded in getting an acquittal, he would not be able to appeal. Mr. Vela chose to plead NGRI; however, after he was acquitted, instead of accepting the loss of ability to appeal inherent in his chosen strategy, he appealed his verdict. By agreeing to hear his appeal, Judge Smith believed that the majority allowed him to take advantage of the legal system, and wrote, “Now Vela wants to have his cake and eat it too by appealing one failed affirmative defense, while keeping his acquittal verdict as a back up. We ought not act as a guarantor against defendant's strategic trial decisions” (Vela, p 1160).