Competency to Proceed Pro Se

Facts of the Case

In July 2009, Samuel Turner, a convicted felon, was charged in federal court with being a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition. A pretrial services report revealed that he had a history of schizophrenia. Three days before trial, he informed the court that he would represent himself. The district court inquired whether the defense attorney doubted Mr. Turner's mental capacity. The defense attorney replied that, despite Mr. Turner's history of schizophrenia, “…he understands…when we talk about his case, he asks relevant questions, has relevant concerns” (Turner, p 717).

Mr. Turner told the court that he wished to proceed pro se because “I feel I can defend myself” (Turner, p 717). He stated that his defense attorney “doesn't feel that I have a good defense” (Turner, p 717). Mr. Turner was strongly encouraged to continue with counsel, which he rejected because he did not believe that his attorney would present an adequate defense. After further discussion, the court ruled that he could proceed pro se: “Finding that you are competent, this is an informed decision that you are making…” (Turner, p 718). The court declined to appoint standby counsel.

During jury selection, Mr. Turner asked religiously themed questions of potential jurors. These included “whether they believed that Jesus forgives sins,” “whether Matthew was a saint,” and “whether the blood of Jesus washes away sin” (Turner, pp 718–9). He used his peremptory strikes to remove three jurors based on their response to his religious questions about forgiveness.

At trial, Mr. Turner appropriately requested witness separation. His opening statement was very brief and centered on an irrelevant, religion-based defense. He reasonably cross-examined five of six prosecution witnesses and asked questions relevant to his case. He raised reasonable objections. He did not testify on his own behalf, and failed to call defense witnesses or to present evidence. He used his closing argument to deliver a religious speech based on forgiveness and mercy. The jury deliberated for 20 minutes and delivered a guilty verdict.

Mr. Turner appeared pro se for sentencing. His presentence report verified a history of schizophrenia (with religious delusions) that had resulted in hospitalizations and was sufficiently severe to qualify for Social Security benefits. He had been found competent to stand trial in a previous case.

At sentencing, no parties raised the question of Mr. Turner's competency to stand trial. He was sentenced to the minimum 180 months of incarceration and he appealed.

Ruling and Reasoning

Mr. Turner appealed on three grounds. First, he challenged the district court's determination that his waiver of counsel was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Second, he asserted that the district court should have required a higher level of competency to proceed pro se than to stand trial. Third, he stated that his bizarre behavior at trial should have warranted a sua sponte competency hearing. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's ruling in its entirety and upheld his conviction and sentencing.

Regarding the first question, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged the precedent set in Godinez v. Moran (509 U.S. 389 (1993)), that the trial court must be satisfied that the waiver of counsel is knowing and voluntary, and “the competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent himself” (Godinez, p 399; emphasis in the original).

The Eight Circuit also cited Shafer v. Bowersox, 329 F.3d 637 (8th Cir. 2003), “the Supreme Court has clearly established that the presiding court must inquire into the defendant's understanding of the right and must warn him of the dangers involved to ensure that he has full knowledge of the consequences of proceeding pro se” (Shafer, p 647).

The court of appeals found that Mr. Turner's waiver was knowing and voluntary. Before trial, the court questioned him about his reason for representing himself and told him that self-representation was a bad idea. The court of appeals stated, “A defendant's technical legal knowledge is not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself” (Turner, p 722) and further stated the “neither the Supreme Court nor this court has ever adopted a list of essential points that must be conveyed to a defendant in order for a waiver of counsel to be deemed knowing and voluntary” (Turner, p 722). The Eighth Circuit found that “the district court adequately warned Mr. Turner of the dangers of self-representation, and did not err in finding that he understood them and knowingly waived his right to counsel” (Turner, p 722).

Mr. Turner contended in his second point for appeal that the district court should have required a higher bar to proceed pro se than to stand trial. He quoted Indiana v. Edwards (554 U.S. 164 (2008)): “…ruling that the constitution permits states to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves” (Edwards, p 171). He argued that his questions during voir dire, along with his opening and closing statements, were hyper-religious and inappropriate. He believed that his behavior at trial, coupled with his history of mental illness, was sufficient evidence of his lack of competency to proceed pro se, even though he was polite and not disruptive during the trial.

The Eighth Circuit concluded that the finding of competency by the district court was essentially a finding of Mr. Turner's competency to proceed pro se, because that was the specific area examined by the judge in finding that he had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Moreover, Edwards does not require that a trial judge conduct an inquiry into the competency of every defendant who requests to proceed pro se or hold a hearing before to making a competency determination. Further, it was noted that no parties, including Mr. Turner, raised the question of competency at any time, including those with the opportunity to observe and interact with him over an extended period. Therefore, the trial court had not erred when proceeding to trial without a competency hearing.

In his third point for appeal, Mr. Turner asserted that the district court had erred by not ordering, sua sponte, a competency hearing after his bizarre behavior in court. The court acknowledged Vogt v. United States, 88 F.3d 587 (8th Cir. 1996), which stated that the court “shall order” a competency hearing upon its own motion if “there is reasonable cause to believe” that a defendant is not competent (Vogt, p 590). A court “may order” a psychological evaluation before such a hearing. The court of appeals noted, “Not every manifestation of mental illness demonstrates incompetency to stand trial. Neither low intelligence, mental deficiency, nor bizarre, volatile, and irrational behavior compels a finding of incompetency” (Turner, p 725).

The Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order a sua sponte competency hearing. His unusual behavior was acknowledged. However, “such behavior does not invariably compel a finding of incompetency” (Turner, pp 725–6). The Eighth Circuit used such evidence as the fact that Mr. Turner was polite and respectful, that he invoked the rule on witnesses, that he used cross-examination to his benefit, and that he tried to appeal to the jurors' consciences to forgive him.

Mr. Turner further argued that the court should have ordered a competency evaluation before sentencing. The court of appeals noted that he was given the shortest sentence possible and therefore any error committed by the district court would have been harmless.