Closed Commitment Proceedings Versus Open Administration of Justice

Facts of the Case

The respondent, D.F.F., was involuntarily committed for 90 days of psychiatric treatment on January 10, 2007, following commitment proceedings. In accordance with the Mental Proceedings Rule (MPR) 1.3 (1974) pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code 71.05 (1973), the proceedings were automatically closed to the public and would have been open only if D.F.F. had filed a written request to make them public. D.F.F. appealed her commitment on the grounds that MPR 1.3 violated her rights to an open hearing guaranteed by the Washington Constitution. The Washington Court of Appeals found the MPR 1.3 requirement for complete and automatic closure of commitment proceedings to be unconstitutional on its face and subsequently vacated the commitment order and remanded the case for retrial (In re Det. of D.F.F., 183 P.3d 302 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008)). The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court of Washington.

Ruling and Reasoning

The supreme court ruled on two issues sequentially. In a split decision (four to three, with two additional judges concurring with the majority decision but not the reasoning), the majority first held that D.F.F. had standing to challenge the rule that automatically closed her commitment hearing to the public and refuted the state's position that, since D.F.F. was a party in the proceedings and not a member of the general public, her rights were not violated. In the ruling, the court cited State v. Momah, 217 P.3d 321 (Wash. 2009), noting that “the requirement of a public trial is primarily for the benefit of the accused” (D.F.F., p 360) and that “[i]t is fundamental to the operation and legitimacy of the courts and protection of all other rights and liberties” (D.F.F., p 361).

The court then considered de novo the constitutionality of the automatic closure of commitment proceedings and affirmed the appellate court decision that MPR 1.3 violates article I, § 10 of the Washington constitution. The court held that exceptions to the right to the open administration of justice are valid only “under the most unusual circumstances” (D.F.F., p 360) that satisfy the five conditions outlined in Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 640 P.2d 716 (Wash. 1982) that require closure based on a compelling interest with a serious and imminent threat to the accused's right to a fair trial; availability of open objection to the closure at the time of the hearing; employment of the least restrictive means of curtailing open access; weighing by the court of the competing interests of the accused and the public with regard to open access; and limiting the application and duration of the closure to serve the purpose narrowly (referencing Momah and citing State v. Bone-Club, 906 P.2d 325 (Wash. 1995) and Seattle Times Co.).

The majority held that in creating automatic closure of commitment hearings, MPR 1.3 did not meet the necessary requirements; therefore, closure of proceedings created a structural error requiring a new commitment proceeding.

Two justices concurred with the holding that remanding D.F.F.'s case for a new commitment hearing was the appropriate remedy. They opined that the case law cited by the majority related to a criminal defendant's right to public trial was irrelevant in civil commitment proceedings; consequently, structural error analysis is not appropriate in evaluating the case at hand.

Dissent

The dissenting three justices agreed with the majority that MPR 1.3 violates Article I, § 10 of the Washington Constitution; however, they disagreed with the majority concerning the proper remedy of the case. Specifically, the dissent disagreed with the need for a new trial for D.F.F., arguing instead that releasing the trial transcripts represented a proper remedy, given that the harm fell primarily on the public, not on D.F.F.

The dissent opined that MPR 1.3 did not violate D.F.F.'s individual constitutional rights (which were satisfied by D.F.F.'s ability to request open proceedings, under the regulations), but rather, violated the constitutional rights of the public. The minority opinion asserted that “public interest in open courts lies not in the outcome but rather in the transparency of commitment hearings” and “a member of the general public has no legally cognizable interest in the outcome of a suit to which she is not a party and therefore no grounds to seek reversal and a new trial” (D.F.F., p 365). Thus, the dissent disagreed with the remedy of remand for a new commitment proceeding for D.F.F. The dissent also found the ruling problematic from a practical standpoint, noting that the “holding will allow civil litigants who suffer no harm from closure [of proceedings]—and indeed, who may have benefited from closure—to seek new trials nevertheless by asserting the rights of the public at large” (D.F.F., p 367).