Neuroscience has grown exponentially over the past two decades as a key interdisciplinary field informing behavioral science. Neurolaw has followed suit, as clinicians, lawyers, and philosophers attempt to incorporate the developing understanding of the neural substrates of behavior into current ideas about mind and criminal responsibility. The importance of these advancements was underscored in 2013, when the federal government announced funding for the BRAIN (Brain Research through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies) Initiative.1 Philosophers have spent millennia conjecturing about the human mind, and neuroscience is now poised to expand our understanding of mind and brain. The implications of advances in neuroscience on our conception of criminal law and responsibility are the subject of A Primer on Criminal Law and Neuroscience, edited by Adina L. Roskies and Stephen J. Morse. This volume serves as a much-needed overview for nonscientists who are using neuroscience ideas in the courtroom. It is a product of a multiyear Law and Neuroscience Project funded by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.
The editors make it clear that, although applications of neuroscience to jurisprudence are on the horizon, the integration of philosophy, law, and science is embryonic. Roskies, Associate Professor of Philosophy, who holds doctorates in neuroscience and philosophy, and Morse, Professor of Psychology and Law in Psychiatry, maintain a balanced approach, free of unrealistic claims. As Morse documents in the introduction, since we do not know the cause-and-effect relationships between brain and behavior, a reasonable entry point for neuroscience has been in mitigation of sentences in criminal cases. The proof of his argument is found in the Supreme Court decisions from 2005 to 2012 regarding sentencing of adolescent offenders (Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama). Morse's circumspect comment on the Court's views included, “[T]he citations appear to provide some legitimacy for using neuroscientific evidence in cases involving criminal responsibility, and perhaps more generally” (p xvii).
We appreciate the authors' reflections on how neuroscience, in particular structural and functional imaging, could be used to divert attention from more relevant concerns. Brain imaging is sexy science and may be meretricious in the court room. Even the best trained clinicians can be distracted by imaging findings that appear to speak for themselves. In Chapter 6, Morse and William T. Newsome use both philosophical and legal arguments to introduce potential ways that advances in neuroscience could refine our understanding of criminal responsibility, culpability, and competence. In this carefully constructed chapter, the authors present legal background and correlate it with respect to neuroscientific questions. It is essential reading for forensic psychiatrists. The authors articulate a key message of the text: association is not causation and causation is not an excuse. Further, they make and support the point that causation alone is not legally or morally mitigating.
Overall, the book is elegantly constructed, with each chapter broken into usable sections that make for both a good read over coffee and an easy reference for casework or court preparation. Chapters 1 through 3 are devoted to neuroscience and neuroimaging basics. While nonreductionistic about mind-body relationships, the authors acknowledge the primacy of our understanding of functional neuroanatomy. This section clarifies limitations about structure-function relationships and individual differences in functional anatomy and articulates ongoing challenges in developing a more nuanced understanding of human brain function. Roskies gives a clear assessment of the limitations of imaging techniques, laying a foundation for appropriate skepticism when reading the functional imaging neuroscience literature. Complex ideas and data analysis are presented in a readable and lucid manner, providing a fresh understanding of how imaging and other techniques derive information on brain functioning. These early chapters are useful for all readers as a prelude to understanding the legal perspective on basic science.
Other contributions add to the book's value as a reference, with a thorough explanation of rules governing the admissibility of scientific evidence and a series of chapters later in the volume that detail implications of neuroscience in specific legal questions, including juvenile justice and criminal law. As a final commentary for the reader, Roskies and Morse look to the future of neuroscience and the law and review possible circumstances in which neuroscience may be used for criminal defenses. As they tie together threads from other chapters, they balance optimism and skepticism about applications to come.
The Primer serves equally well as an overview of neuroscience for the legal expert and a resource on pertinent law for the psychiatric or neuroscience expert witness. It occupies a niche between clinical neuropsychiatry2 and applied neuroimaging.3 Although, as the editors observe, applications of neuroscience are not yet widely accepted in legal proceedings, clinicians anticipating testimony in this area can use this book now.
Footnotes
Disclosures of financial or other potential conflicts of interest: None.
- © 2014 American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law
