Defense Counsel's Failure to Seek a Hearing on Defendant's Fitness to Stand Trial Constitutes Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Warrants Granting of Habeas Relief
Melvin Newman was convicted in state court of first-degree murder. Although there was a considerable pretrial clinical record documenting mental disabilities, his defense attorney did not seek a fitness-to-stand-trial hearing. Mr. Newman appealed his conviction claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. Failing in the state appellate courts, he petitioned the federal district court for habeas relief, which was granted. The state appealed to the circuit court of appeals, which affirmed the district court in Newman v. Harrington, 726 F.3d 921 (7th Cir. 2013). The issue before the circuit court was whether the pretrial evidence of Mr. Newman's disabilities was so compelling in demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel that it overcame the substantial deference given to state court rulings in federal habeas review. Also addressed was the question of whether a long-delayed postconviction psychological assessment was relevant evidence concerning Mr. Newman's pretrial mental status.
Facts of the Case
In July 2001, Mr. Newman, then 16 years old, was arrested for killing Andrew Dent in Chicago. Mr. Newman's mother hired defense attorney Michael Johnson, and on their first meeting, Mr. Johnson was given many records demonstrating that Mr. Newman had mental and cognitive deficits. Those records included a school psychology report showing that Mr. Newman's IQ was 62 and that he read at the first-grade level, and a Social Security Administration report showed a diagnosis of intellectual disability. Tried as an adult in 2002, he was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 47 years in state prison. Mr. Newman appealed to the Illinois Court of Appeals.
His appeal claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, citing his defense attorney's failure to seek a fitness-to-stand-trial hearing and failure to conduct an investigation based on his medical and educational records related to his competency to stand trial. His state appeal petition contained numerous clinical and educational records and psychological assessments. Central among them was a 2005 evaluation report from psychologist Antoinette Kavanaugh, PhD, who conducted two clinical interviews with him totaling five hours, administered psychological tests, reviewed his academic and psychological records, and interviewed his mother, as well as several educational specialists who had worked directly with him at various times in his life.
Dr. Kavanaugh found Mr. Newman to be burdened with many cognitive deficits. His full-scale IQ was 54, he was “moderately to mildly [intellectually disabled],” his “cognitive deficits [were] readily apparent,” and this “should have been apparent to anyone who attempted to have a conversation with [him] and posed questions to him that required more than a yes or no answer” (Newman, p 923). Dr. Kavanaugh opined that Mr. Newman was not fit to stand trial at the time of this 2005 evaluation and would not have been fit to stand trial at the time of his 2002 trial. Included in the appeal petition was his mother's affidavit that she had provided to Mr. Johnson “a stack of medical records, psychological evaluations, and school evaluations, all regarding [Mr.] Newman's disability” (Newman, p 924).
Despite this record and without an evidentiary hearing, the state appeals court affirmed his conviction. The state court concluded that Mr. Newman “failed to demonstrate that a bona fide doubt as to his fitness to stand trial existed at the time of trial” (People v. Newman, No. 1-06-1977, slp op. at 10 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 4, 2007)). Most notable was the court's dismissal of Dr. Kavanaugh's report, concluding that it was “irrelevant in terms of considering whether [Mr. Newman] was unfit at the time of trial because the evidence must be considered in light of the facts known at the time of trial” (People v. Newman, No. 1–06-1977, slip op. at 11 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept 4, 2007)). The state appeals court applied Strickland's two-prong test for assessing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel: a showing of objectively inadequate representation and clear prejudice to the petitioner as a result of that inadequate representation (Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). The appeals court concluded that Mr. Newman was fit to stand trial in 2002 and thus suffered no prejudice. Therefore it had no reason to consider Strickland's first prong, the adequacy of his trial counsel.
Mr. Newman filed a federal habeas petition in the district court. In 2011 the district court held an evidentiary hearing where Dr. Kavanaugh, and the state's expert, psychiatrist Stafford Henry, MD, testified. Dr. Kavanaugh reported on her extensive evaluation conducted in 2005 and gave her opinion that both then and in 2002, Mr. Newman was unfit to stand trial and would not have been able to assist his counsel in his own defense or understand the nature of the proceedings. At variance to other witnesses, Dr. Henry opined that Mr. Newman was malingering; that there was no evidence of a cognitive deficit; that Mr. Newman understood the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him; that he was able to assist in his own defense in 2002; and that he was fit to stand trial. Dr. Henry's opinions were based on an interview conducted with Mr. Newman in 2010, which, as the circuit court would later note, was eight years after the trial, as opposed to three years after the trial in Dr. Kavanaugh's evaluation. Attorney Johnson testified that in 2002 he had no reason to investigate his client's cognitive abilities or his fitness to stand trial.
After the evidentiary hearing, the district court granted Mr. Newman's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. It found that Mr. Newman's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was clearly established and that he was clearly prejudiced by that. It also found that the state courts had made clear errors of law and of fact sufficient to overcome the high deference afforded state courts in federal habeas review. Illinois then appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Ruling and Reasoning
The federal circuit court affirmed the district court's grant of Mr. Newman's habeas corpus petition. The court reviewed the state's evidentiary record as well as the further evidence developed at the district court's evidentiary hearing in 2011 and held that Mr. Newman had prevailed on both prongs of the Strickland test (i.e., that he had been prejudiced by inadequate representation of counsel). The court found clear legal error in the state court's making a finding of no prejudice without first having considered the claim of counsel's deficient performance. In the court's words:
In sum, the state court's denial of Newman's petition was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. The state court did not address Strickland's first prong—deficient performance. Thus, as the state concedes, the district court properly evaluated that prong de novo, and it found that Johnson's performance in failing to investigate Newman's fitness and seek a fitness hearing was constitutionally deficient [Newman, p 932].
The court also found clear error in the state court's conclusion that Dr. Kavanaugh's 2005 evaluation and report was irrelevant to the question of Mr. Newman's fitness to stand trial in 2002.
Indeed, the clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that Newman [has an intellectual disability]. By ignoring Kavanaugh's key expert evidence that Newman was moderately to mildly [intellectually disabled], the state appellate court's application of Strickland was unreasonable and its factual determinations as to Newman's mental limitations and fitness were also unreasonable [Newman, p 930].
The court held that defense counsel clearly failed in his duty to investigate his client's fitness to stand trial and to seek a fitness-to-stand-trial hearing.
The court concluded that it was highly probable that if adequate representation had been provided, Mr. Newman would have been found unfit to stand trial. In sum, the court found that the state court had made substantial factual and legal errors and was clearly erroneous in denying Mr. Newman's claim of constitutionally inadequate representation. Thus, habeas relief was warranted and granted.
Discussion
A critical holding in Newman is the federal circuit court's reversal of the state appeals court's finding that the Kavanaugh Report of 2005 was irrelevant to the question of Mr. Newman's fitness to stand trial in 2002. Dr. Kavanaugh had concluded in 2005 that he was unfit in 2002 and was still so in 2005 when she evaluated him. The state appeals court applied the federal standard of review in denying Mr. Newman's claim for habeas relief. That standard is set out in The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA §2254 (d) (1996)) and instructs that initial review of the correctness of a denial must be based only on the record available to the trial court at the time of trial. The state appeals court had concluded that since Dr. Kavanaugh's evaluation was conducted in 2005, it had no relevance concerning Mr. Newman's fitness in 2002. The federal court found this to be clear error and found instead that Dr. Kavanaugh's postdiction opinions were relevant and instructive to what was or should have been apparent to both the defense attorney and the trial judge at the time of the trial, because data that Dr. Kavanaugh reported would have been available at the time of the trial. Thus, the federal circuit court found that Mr. Newman did not have adequate legal representation and that, contrary to state court findings, he was indeed prejudiced by that inadequate representation, and that in turn merited the grant of his habeas relief.
This holding is important because it recognizes the relevance, legitimacy, and admissibility of long-delayed clinical evaluations, not just for fitness to stand trial but also as they bear on other forensic matters, such as competency to execute a will, waiver of Miranda rights, and psychological autopsies. Especially instructive are the reasons that the court gave weight to the evaluation and opinions of Dr. Kavanaugh: that she had done extensive record review, had employed psychological testing, had interviewed various persons who had knowledge of Mr. Newman contemporaneous with the relevant periods in question, had spent much time in interviewing him, and had used testing for malingering.
Footnotes
Disclosures of financial or other potential conflicts of interest: None.
- © 2014 American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law