Competency to Waive Right to Counsel

Lia N. Rohlehr; Debra A. Pinals

Mental Condition Can Keep a Defendant from Making a Knowing and Voluntary Waiver of Counsel

In Holland v. Florida, 775 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2014), a Florida court convicted Albert Holland of murder and sentenced him to death for the fatal shooting of police officer Scott Winters. The trial court denied Mr. Holland's repeated requests to represent himself. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court determined that, because of his serious mental disabilities, Mr. Holland did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel and thus upheld the trial court. Subsequently, the federal district court issued a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that Mr. Holland's right to represent himself was violated. The 11th Circuit agreed with the Florida Supreme Court and reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief.

Facts of Case

In October 1979, a fellow inmate in a federal prison knocked Albert Holland unconscious, leaving him with a serious brain injury. In the early 1980s, Mr. Holland was facing charges of robbery in Washington, D.C. His attorney described him as disheveled, incoherent, and unable to interact meaningfully with counsel. The court found him not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) of the robbery, based on testimony from a doctor that Mr. Holland had a mental defect or disease that interfered totally with his ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his behavior to the requirements of law.

Mr. Holland was sent to St. Elizabeths Hospital, Washington, D.C., and doctors diagnosed “schizophrenia, undifferentiated type, and Organic Amnestic Syndrome.” However, there was uncertainty surrounding whether Mr. Holland's symptoms were due to schizophrenia or more from “organic psychosis” tied to his brain injury. Mr. Holland escaped from St. Elizabeths and was subsequently charged with a new robbery. He was found NGRI a second time and sent to St. Elizabeths. He escaped from the hospital yet again in May 1986.

Four years later, Mr. Holland attacked and brutally beat a woman in Florida. Police searched for the assailant and a K-9 patrol officer found Mr. Holland. According to witnesses, after a struggle, Mr. Holland grabbed the officer's gun and fatally shot him in the groin and stomach. Mr. Holland was first tried, convicted, and sentenced to death in 1991. During that trial, his disruptive behavior led to his removal from the courtroom. On direct appeal, the Florida Supreme Court reversed his conviction because admission of testimony about his psychiatric examination violated his right to counsel and his right against self-incrimination.

Before the retrial on remand, Mr. Holland began exhibiting suspicion about his attorney. He believed that the attorney was using jail authorities and Mr. Holland's father to spy on him and tape him during visitation hours. Mr. Holland's counsel filed a motion alleging that Mr. Holland was incompetent to stand trial. The trial court authorized three mental health experts to examine him for competence to stand trial, and he was deemed competent, although the court acknowledged that the concerns that he expressed raised questions about his mental status.

During further pretrial hearings, Mr. Holland repeatedly requested permission to represent himself and dispense with counsel. The trial court conducted a Faretta inquiry, which follows the ruling in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), which held that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to refuse counsel and represent themselves in state criminal proceedings when such refusal is made voluntarily and intelligently. Mr. Holland exhibited little familiarity with the legal process and said he had no training. He offered that he would not violate any rules, but admitted that he did not know the rules he could violate. At this point, the trial court ruled that “Mr. Holland does not have any specific legal training, is not familiar with the rules of evidence, nor trial procedures, is not familiar with how a trial is conducted, even though he's sat through them in the past” (Holland, p 1301). Based on these findings, the court denied his motion to represent himself, finding that he was incapable of doing so. He repeatedly sought to represent himself, and several Faretta inquiries were made, each resulting in a denial of his motions.

The jury eventually convicted Mr. Holland of first-degree murder, armed robbery, attempted sexual battery, and attempted first-degree murder. Before the penalty phase began, he asked for new attorneys. This request was denied. He then refused to speak with counsel or the court and instead read a book during court proceedings outside the presence of the jury. The jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of eight to four, and the trial court sentenced him to death. He appealed on the grounds that his constitutional right to represent himself had been violated.

The Florida Supreme Court determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Mr. Holland to represent himself, because “it is clear that the trial court applied the Johnston factors in denying Mr. Holland the right to represent himself” (Holland, p 1304), referring to Johnston v. State, 497 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1986), which held that in determining whether a defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel, a trial court should inquire into, among other things, the defendant's age, mental status, and lack of knowledge and experience in criminal proceedings. According to the Florida Supreme Court, “[t]he record contains numerous instances of Mr. Holland's unstable mental condition” and “it is clear from Mr. Holland's responses to the trial court's inquiries that Mr. Holland lacked sufficient knowledge of criminal proceedings” (Holland, p 1304). Subsequently, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted a writ of habeas corpus finding that the Florida Supreme Court's decision was inconsistent with the finding in Faretta.

Ruling and Reasoning

The 11th Circuit Court held that the district court erred in ordering habeas relief on Mr. Holland's Faretta claim, because the Florida Supreme Court reasonably concluded that his mental condition kept him from making a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. Of note, this case originated before Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), but the circuit court reviewed these claims anew in light of the points addressed in Indiana v. Edwards, to determine whether the decision violated a current understanding of Mr. Holland's constitutional rights as articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Florida Supreme Court found that Mr. Holland failed to demonstrate that the denial of his self-representation claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Faretta v. California. The court emphasized that when a defendant seeks to waive the right to counsel, a determination that he is competent to stand trial is not enough. The waiver must be intelligent and voluntary. In addition, a defendant should understand the potential dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. The trial court decision also relied on Johnston v. State. Thus, the court ruling indicates that even though Indiana v. Edwards was decided well after Mr. Holland's claim, no fault could be found in the Florida Supreme Court's ruling that resulted in a finding also supported by the more current Edwards case. Therefore, the grant of the writ of habeas corpus was reversed and remanded with instructions for the district court to reinstate Mr. Holland's conviction and sentence.

Discussion

Previous case law has addressed various competencies, as well as the role that mental health plays in legal decisions regarding these competencies. Although the ruling in Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), established that the elements of decision-making at trial fall under one standard for competency to stand trial and Faretta v. California established that defendants have a right to represent themselves, Indiana v. Edwards established that when a defendant seeks to waive his right to counsel, a determination that he is competent to stand trial is not enough. This case supported the views that mental state affects different competencies to different degrees. Although Mr. Holland was deemed competent to stand trial, his mental state precluded him from representing himself and dispensing with defense counsel. It is important to note that a defendant does not need extensive knowledge of the legal system to represent himself. Furthermore, although no formal standard for competence to represent oneself was decided on by the U.S. Supreme Court, a defendant likely does need sufficient presence of mind to represent himself, which can be hampered by symptoms of mental illness. A judge would determine whether the symptoms rose to a level that warranted a finding of incompetence to proceed pro se. The Edwards Supreme Court decision demonstrated the risk that allowing a defendant with mental illness to represent himself could lead to an unfair and humiliating spectacle of a trial. In this case, the court then offered a protection for defendants with serious mental symptoms by insisting that Mr. Holland have representation. Mental health professionals must be aware of what competencies are required when conducting various types of forensic evaluations. They must also understand, and effectively convey to the court, how specific symptoms of mental illness might affect each particular type of competency.