Consideration of the Insanity Defense for a Client With a Mental Health History

Facts of the Case

On March 18, 2005, Francis Lang was asked to leave a Boston bar. When Mr. Lang refused to leave, he was approached by the victim and 2 others. A physical altercation ensued in which Mr. Lang stabbed the victim multiple times. The victim was pronounced dead the following morning.

In 2006, Mr. Lang was convicted of murder in the first degree in accordance with the theory of extreme atrocity and cruelty. Defense counsel argued that Mr. Lang's actions, in accordance with witness testimony, were in self-defense and that mitigating circumstances rendered the killing no more than voluntary manslaughter. The trial judge had instructed the jury on first-degree murder, second-degree murder, manslaughter, heat of passion with reasonable provocation, heat of passion induced by sudden combat, self- defense, and alcohol intoxication's effect on intent.

In 2009, Mr. Lang moved for a new trial on several grounds. First, he claimed his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a public trial were violated when his sister was asked to leave the courtroom during the first day of jury empanelment. Second, he claimed the trial judge's jury instruction was in error regarding extreme atrocity and cruelty, as evidenced by elements of malice.

Mr. Lang's third assertion for mistrial, of most interest to forensic mental health professionals, was that his trial counsel had failed to investigate his psychiatric history, rendering him unable to make an informed decision on whether to pursue a criminal-responsibility defense. Mr. Lang had been released from federal prison 22 days before the stabbing. In 2001, he had been evaluated for competency to stand trial and was found to have bipolar disorder. Mental health professionals had described his behavior as impulsive and noted that he was not able to control it. His trial counsel was alerted to his psychiatric history but did not pursue the records, as he had not shown interest in a mental health defense. The defense team, including Mr. Lang himself, found the self-defense strategy the most viable, given it was supported by at least one witness. Further, it was a firmly held belief that the defense of lack of criminal responsibility is rarely successful.

In support of his motion for a new trial, Mr. Lang was evaluated by a neuropsychologist, who supported the motion for a new trial asserting that Mr. Lang was not criminally responsible for the killing because he “did not appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and could not conform his conduct to the requirements of the law” (Lang, p 271). He further described Mr. Lang as having multiple mental disorders. The Commonwealth's expert, a forensic psychologist, also met with Mr. Lang and reviewed his records. She opined that Mr. Lang was criminally responsible based on the fact that there was no evidence of symptoms of mental illness before the crime or in the 7 months after his arrest. She further noted that although Mr. Lang had not taken his prescribed medications in the 22 days between his release from prison and the stabbing, it may take weeks and sometimes years for the return of symptoms, thereby invalidating this defense.

Ruling and Reasoning

All 5 justices unanimously affirmed the conviction and denied the motion for new trial. The judges agreed on the reasoning for rejecting Mr. Lang's claim of ineffective counsel in regard to his right to a public trial and his claim that the trial judge erroneously instructed the jury. However, although the judges agreed on dismissing Mr. Lang's third claim of ineffective counsel in not investigating his mental health history, they disagreed on the reasoning for dismissal.

Judges Hines and Duffly, in the first concurring opinion, held that defense counsel's decision to defend the case solely on the grounds of self-defense was sound. The trial counsel was aware of the defendant's mental health history but chose a self-defense case as there was witness testimony to support it. He was of the view that the criminal-responsibility defense was rarely successful and that a self-defense case was likely to be more viable based on the facts of the case. Judge Hines opined “I do not believe that counsel is obligated to pursue a full scale mental evaluation in every case where the facts or the defendant's background suggest only a hint of mental issue” (Lang, p 271). Judges Hines and Duffly denied the motion for a new trial on the grounds that the defense counsel's decision to pursue self-defense over other defenses was not manifestly unreasonable.

Judge Lenk offered a divergent concurring opinion in denying Mr. Lang's motion for a mistrial. Judges Gants and Cordy concurred with this opinion. Judge Lenk outlined the test for a defendant's right to postconviction relief as to whether there was an error in the course of the trial and whether the error may have influenced the jury's decision-making. Judge Lenk disagreed with the “manifestly unreasonable” standard put forth by Judge Hines. Judge Lenk opined that such a standard makes sense only if the defense counsel is fully informed when electing the defense strategy. Because the defense counsel did not investigate the extent of Mr. Lang's mental health history, Judge Lenk asserted that he could not have made a fully informed decision to use one defense over the other and that electing a defense without investigating alternative strategies was manifestly unreasonable. However, in this case, Mr. Lang asserted that he would not have used a criminal-responsibility defense in the jury trial, nor would he if he were to be granted a new trial in the future. Therefore, although Judge Lenk considered the defense counsel's failure to investigate Mr. Lang's mental health history unreasonable and erroneous, this failure did not meet the standard for granting a mistrial, as Mr. Lang would not have used a criminal-responsibility defense, and thus such an investigation could not have influenced the decision of the jury.