Sex Offender Registration When Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity

Facts of the Case

Glenn Cook was a 56-year-old who had “severe chronic mental illness involving at times paranoia, delusional and disordered thought processes, and mood instability” (Cook, p 388). He had a history of psychiatric treatment dating back to his teenage years. In 1986, the Orleans Parish District Court found Mr. Cook NGRI of attempted aggravated rape. He was subsequently committed to inpatient psychiatric care, where he remained until his release to a group home in 1999. In 2002, he relapsed and was recommitted to inpatient psychiatric care. He returned to a community group home in 2004, where treatment notes indicated his adherence to treatment recommendations and group home rules. He nevertheless required additional inpatient psychiatric care in 2009 and again in 2015. In 2016, he was discharged to a structured group home, where again records indicated treatment adherence and appropriate behavior.

In 2016, Mr. Cook petitioned the Orleans Parish District Court for relief of the requirement to register as a sex offender. The district court granted his request. Subsequently, the state attorney general requested that the district court reverse its decision, arguing that the Orleans Parish District Court was the incorrect venue for seeking such relief. The attorney general argued that the applicable state statute, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:544.1 (2013), stipulated that such requests be submitted to 19th Judicial District Court for centralized review, rather than to the original district court.

The Orleans Parish District Court held a hearing to address the attorney general's request. The district court concluded that La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:544.1 (2013) did not apply in the case of Mr. Cook, because he was not convicted of a sex offense, but rather adjudicated NGRI. The district court thereby denied the attorney general's request. In response, the attorney general petitioned the Louisiana Supreme Court for a supervisory writ to overrule the district court's decision.

Ruling and Reasoning

The Louisiana Supreme Court's majority ruled that the district court erred in its conclusion that the state's registration statute did not apply to Mr. Cook. The district court's decision was thereby vacated and the supervisory writ granted.

The court agreed with Mr. Cook that a conviction is distinct from an NGRI ruling. However, the court further determined that state statute did not distinguish between NGRI and conviction for the purposes of sex offender registration requirements. The court supported this argument by citing a separate statute, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:541.7 (2013): Conviction or other disposition adverse to the subject means any disposition of charges, except a decision not to prosecute, a dismissal, or an acquittal, except when the acquittal is due to a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity and the person was committed. The court noted that a “disposition adverse to the subject” explicitly includes individuals adjudicated NGRI and committed. The majority further said that “while La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:541.7 could be better drafted, we cannot say its meaning is unclear” (Cook, p 391). The court concluded that a plain-language interpretation of the statute's language was broad enough to include NGRI as grounds for registration.

Commenting on the ramifications of this interpretation, the court argued that a defendant found NGRI and returned to the public might subsequently relapse. Therefore, such an individual poses “no less a risk” than someone convicted of a similar crime. The court emphasized that the legislative intent of Louisiana's sex offender registration and notification statute is for promotion of public safety and not punishment of those registered. Therefore, the court concluded, that registration requirements could be reasonably applied to Mr. Cook, because he may still pose a risk to the public despite a finding of NGRI.

In summary, the court held that an NGRI ruling is no different than a conviction where sex offender registration and notification requirements are concerned. The district court had therefore erred in excusing Mr. Cook from registration requirements.

Dissent

Judge Weimer dissented on multiple grounds. First, he said that, for the purposes of registration requirements, the term “conviction” was not defined in statute clearly to include those found NGRI. Therefore, the majority's reasoning that the statute applied to those found NGRI was inappropriately speculative and not an interpretation of the actual language of the statute.

Second, Judge Weimer commented that the majority's conclusions regarding those found NGRI were too broad. Specifically, there was no allowance for individualized assessment to determine whether such individuals have the capacity to comply with registration requirements. He noted that unconditional application of registration requirements to those found NGRI might lead to a cycle of repeated failures to register and that the resulting legal process would be onerous and detrimental to those with serious and persistent mental illness.