The Functional Equivalent of Life Without Parole for Juvenile Nonhomicide Offenders Constitutes as Cruel and Unusual Punishment
In the case of People v. Contreras, 4 Cal.5th 349 (2018), the Supreme Court of California considered the constitutionality of sentences imposed on juvenile nonhomicide offenders. The Superior Court of San Diego County had convicted two individuals, both of whom were juveniles at the time of offenses, of kidnapping and several sexual offenses. The defendants were subsequently sentenced to 58 years to life and 50 years to life, respectively. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed their convictions but reversed their sentences in the context of Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), holding their sentences did not give a realistic chance for release as they precluded possibility of parole until near the end of their expected lifetimes. Review was granted on the basis of consideration of whether the sentences imposed on these juvenile nonhomicide offenders violated the Eighth Amendment, to which the Supreme Court of California narrowly affirmed the Court of Appeals judgment and remanded resentencing.
Facts of the Case
On September 3, 2011 a 16-year-old female and her 15-year-old female friend attended a family birthday party in San Diego County, California. Around dusk, the females took a walk to a local greenbelt, where they sat to talk. Shortly thereafter, Leonel Contreras (LC) and William Rodriguez (WR), both 16 years old, walked past the girls and proceeded to tackle them to the ground from behind. The girls were forced to a vegetated area up an embankment that was not visible from the street.
WR and LC proceeded to forcibly rape, sodomize, and force oral copulation repeatedly on both girls. Throughout these acts, LC was noted to utilize a knife to threaten both girls. When finished, the boys threatened both girls harm if they told anyone what happened. The girls proceeded to walk to the party, ultimately admitting they'd been raped on inquiry.
The case was tried jointly before two juries in 2012, and WR and LC were charged as adults. WR was convicted of two counts of forcible rape, two counts of kidnapping, four counts of forcible oral copulation, and two counts of sodomy by use of force, additionally having committed the sexual assault crimes during a kidnapping against multiple victims. The other jury convicted LC of seven counts of forcible rape, conspiracy to commit kidnapping and forcible rape, rape by a foreign object, two counts of kidnapping, eight counts of forcible oral copulation, and two counts of sodomy by use of force all with use of a knife, additionally having committed the sexual assault crimes during a kidnapping against multiple victims with a knife.
At the sentencing hearings, WR, noted to have no criminal history and a “very difficult upbringing,” was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life. Under California Penal Code, section 667.61, subdivision (i) (2011), the court noted it was required to sentence an additional 25 years to life but reasoned doing so would violate Graham and People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291 (Cal. 2012), and similarly was unable to impose statutory maximum sentences as they would fall outside of the defendant's natural life expectancies. LC, noted to have no arrests and one prior misdemeanor for vandalism, was felt to be the “shot caller” of the two, with the judge expressing skepticism about LC's ability to rehabilitate, and he was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life in addition to two four-year terms in the setting of knife enhancement during the crimes. Both were sentenced within purview of the statutory “One Strike” law.
The defendants appealed the court's judgment and sentencing, and the Court of Appeals affirmed their convictions but reversed their sentences. The Court granted review in light of the holdings of People v. Franklin 202 Cal.Rptr. 3d 496 (2016), in which the defendant appealed his sentence to 50 years to life for first-degree murder, claiming it violated precedent that juvenile homicide offenders may not be sentenced to the functional equivalent of life without parole (LWOP). However, as he was entitled to a youth offender parole hearing during his 25th year of incarceration, his sentence was deemed neither LWOP nor the functional equivalent. As Franklin does not resolve cases where defendants are ineligible for youth offender parole hearings by the One Strike Law, the California Supreme court granted certiorari to evaluate prior supreme court precedents and whether the defendant's sentences violated the Eighth Amendment.
Ruling and Reasoning
Justice Liu wrote the majority 4-to-3 opinion. The Court reviewed previous findings from Caballero and Graham. In Caballero, a juvenile's sentence of 110 years to life for three counts of attempted murder was deemed the functional equivalent of LWOP, violating the Eighth Amendment. In Graham, the Court held that juveniles may be punished with long sentences, however no juvenile who commits a nonhomicide offense may be sentenced to LWOP. Although these cases together were interpreted to note that the Eighth Amendment does not allow juveniles who commit nonhomicide crimes to be sentenced to LWOP, neither considers whether a lengthy sentence, equivalent but short of such, would similarly violate the Eighth Amendment.
The Court first considered what constitutes a de facto LWOP sentence. They cited the Attorney General's definition that any term of imprisonment providing a juvenile offender with the opportunity of parole within his or her natural lifetime does not constitute a functional equivalent of LWOP. Utilizing such a definition would require an actuarial approach to sentencing based on an individual's predicted life expectancy. The majority noted information on life expectancy from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention showing significant variations by gender and race as well as confounding variables including incarceration. The majority thus noted this definition leads to “a tangle of legal and empirical difficulties” due to possible disparate sentencing (Contreras, p 449). The court objected to utilization of such approach, citing the risk of creating gender and race discrimination in sentencing.
The Court then considered the holding in Graham, referencing that, while juveniles may be punished with long sentences, they must have “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” (Graham, p 75). This ruling, however, gave no definition regarding the maximum length of incarceration before parole eligibility that would satisfy this holding. In reference to the citation of “some meaningful opportunity” the Court cited a defendant's need for reclaiming's one's value and place in society, belonging and redemption, and reintegration upon release, referencing a qualitative state beyond incarceration not defined by the quantitative measure of years. With lengthy sentences without opportunity for parole until age 58 or 60 in the case of the defendants, it gave little time to sufficiently reach these “rehabilitative ideals.”
Finally, the Court noted that the capacity of juveniles to change depends on both outgrowing the qualities of youth as well as future incentives and opportunities. They argued that lengthy sentences dissuade juveniles from maturing into responsible adults, as they deprive them of not only basic liberties but the hope of restoration. The Court urged to remand sentencing on precedent noting “that the children who commit even heinous crimes are capable of change” (Montgomery, p. 473), and consider the culpability of the juvenile offenders in the setting of a lack of maturity, the presence of negative influences, and the overall impulsive decision-making characteristic of youth.
Dissent
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye wrote the dissent for this opinion. The Chief Justice felt that the defendant's sentences did not violate the Eighth Amendment, citing several disagreements with the Court majority in this case. He first noted that the majority was misconstruing Graham, citing that its holding only invalidates narrowly defined, specific sentences: those that are without a realistic opportunity to obtain release and will essentially guarantee an individual will die in prison. The Chief Justice also felt the majority was utilizing a vague construction of Graham and not specifically defining what constitutes the implied meaningful opportunity for a defendant to reintegrate into society, noting that “profound life experiences may lie ahead of someone released from prison at 66 or 74.” Finally, the Chief Justice noted through a defendant's utilization of certain opportunities, specifically good conduct credits as well as the Elderly Parole Program, which entitles prisoners at age 60 who have served 25 years in prison to a parole hearing, defendants may be released earlier than their original sentenced time.
Justice Kriegler wrote a supporting dissent, similarly noting that should the court deem such a sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment per the majority, there must be further specification on breadth and limitations in application. Both Justices noted the majority gave no guidance on how a court may formulate a sentence that does not violate the Eighth Amendment.
Discussion
In the evaluation of juvenile offenders, clinicians must take into account the concept of the developing brain and its impact on behavior. The juvenile developing brain lacks maturity and often possesses an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, with individuals increasingly vulnerable to negative influences and peer pressure. Juveniles have the tendency to be more impulsive with ill-considered decisions and actions. In context of the developing brain, it is exceedingly difficult to delineate transient immaturity versus irreparable corruption on evaluation, noting that with maturation comes the tendency toward better overall judgment, reduced impulsivity, and increased responsibility. Although past behavior is a key component of a standard psychiatric evaluation, clinicians must recognize the potential for change in juveniles, with the past actions of youth not definitively representative of future patterns of behavior.
- © 2018 American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law