Determining Intellectual Disability for Capital Defendants

Facts of the Case

Danny Hill was convicted of aggravated murder and associated charges in 1986 in Ohio at a bench trial. At sentencing, three defense experts testified that Mr. Hill had an intelligence quotient (IQ) ranging from 55 to 68; was raised in a poor environment; and was a follower. Weighing aggravating versus mitigating factors, the three-judge panel sentenced Mr. Hill to death.

Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Atkins, Moore v. Texas, 137 S.Ct 1039 (2017), and Hall v. Florida, 134 S.Ct. 1986 (2014), that execution of intellectually disabled persons constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Despite raising intellectual disability as a mitigating factor at sentencing, Mr. Hill was not afforded the constitutional protections later established in Atkins.

In 2002, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the state trial court to assess Mr. Hill's functioning in light of Atkins. In Atkins, Moore, and Hall, the Supreme Court relied on two diagnostic manuals: Intellectual Disability: Definition Classification and Systems of Supports, published by the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, and Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, published by the American Psychiatric Association. Both require three findings before diagnosing intellectual disability: significant deficits in intellectual functioning indicated by an IQ “approximately two standard deviations or more below the mean,” or roughly 70; significant adaptive skill deficits such as “the inability to learn basic skills and adjust behavior to changing circumstances” in certain specified skill sets; and the deficits arose while the individual was still a minor.

Mr. Hill underwent several evaluations for his 1986 trial, revealing diminished mental capacity, an IQ ranging from 55 to 68, and “primitive” moral development. He had demonstrated an “inability to learn basic skills and adjust [his] behavior to changing circumstances” since a very young age. Mr. Hill was noted to be a “slow-learning child” requiring concrete work without “talking about abstract ideas,” per a school psychologist. At fifteen, Mr. Hill could barely read or write. Prison staff believed Mr. Hill was illiterate and noted that he could not remember his commissary balance, overdrew his account, and could not perform even basic cleaning tasks without close supervision. Mr. Hill had neglected his hygiene since a young age, and in prison he required reminders to shower.

After the 2002 remand, three experts examined Mr. Hill. One expert concluded that Mr. Hill met all three diagnostic criteria, while two others concluded that Mr. Hill was not intellectually disabled. The state trial court denied Mr. Hill's petition for relief under Atkins, finding that Mr. Hill did not exhibit significant adaptive skill deficits, and that any deficits he had were not manifest before age eighteen. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed, while the Supreme Court of Ohio denied certiorari. Mr. Hill sought habeas relief and petitioned the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, which denied the petition. Mr. Hill then appealed to the Sixth Circuit.

Ruling and Reasoning

Unanimously, the Sixth Circuit found that the state court had unreasonably determined that Mr. Hill was not intellectually disabled under the adaptive skill deficit and age-of-onset prongs of the Atkins standard, reversed the judgment of the district court, and remanded with instructions to issue the writ of habeas corpus regarding Mr. Hill's capital sentence.

The Sixth Circuit found that the state court departed from Atkins requirements when it “disregarded well-established clinical standards for assessing adaptive deficits by focusing on Hill's adaptive strengths instead of his adaptive deficits …, the trial court ignored clear and convincing evidence that Hill exhibited substantial deficits in both his intellectual and adaptive abilities since long before he turned 18” (Hill, p 489).

In Moore, the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals concluded that Mr. Moore did not exhibit sufficient deficits due to various adaptive skills he did have. The Supreme Court rejected this approach by admonishing courts not to overemphasize perceived strengths, but instead should follow “prevailing clinical standards,” which focus on deficits. Contrary to Atkins and similar to Texas in Moore, the Ohio courts overemphasized Mr. Hill's strengths in the controlled death-row environment.

In Hill, the state court determined that Mr. Hill's adaptive skills were “inconsistent with a mentally retarded individual” by focusing extensively on Mr. Hill's interview with a reporter, demeanor interacting with law enforcement/legal system, and circumstances surrounding the offense (Hill, p 493). “Those supposed adaptive strengths convinced the state trial court that Hill could not be intellectually disabled because he had ‘remarkable’ communication and vocabulary skills and was self-directed” (Hill, p 493). The Sixth Circuit found that, despite these strengths, Mr. Hill had significant limitations in at least two areas of adaptive functioning, functional academics and hygiene/self-care, since childhood. Collateral records indicated limitations in social skills and self-direction. The court noted the deficits detailed in expert testimony at trial (see above), the testimony of a psychologist who noted Mr. Hill's inability to interpret social situations and create relationships, and school records demonstrating his difficulty making friends. He was repeatedly noted in school and criminal records to be easily led, impulsive with little thought toward consequences, highly suggestible, and exploitable.

Further, the Ohio courts overly relied on Mr. Hill's behavior in prison. The Sixth Circuit stated that Atkins drew from the consensus of the medical community, which prohibited the assessment of adaptive skills in atypical environments like prison. Instead, defendants should be evaluated against standards in a typical community-based environment, not against those of other prisoners or, more specifically, those on death row. The state court failed to mention documentation by prison officials recognizing Mr. Hill to be “slow,” illiterate, and have “very limited writing ability” (Hill, p 499). Additional examples of Mr. Hill's deficits in prison included his need for careful supervision completing tasks, errors tracking his prison account balance, and that he performed his job as a porter only because cleaning supplies were sorted by color not requiring him to read instructions. In sum, the court of appeals found that the state of Ohio unreasonably applied the Atkins standard, and that correct application of this standard supports Mr. Hill's clear deficits in at least two adaptive skillsets.

Additionally, Mr. Hill entered a Miranda claim arguing that certain statements he made should have been suppressed at trial. The Sixth Circuit was unconvinced that Mr. Hill had knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda Rights. However, the standard of appellate review (enunciated in Colorado v. Connelly 479 U.S. 157 (1986) and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132 (1996)) was whether the state courts' decision involved an unreasonable application of established federal law. The Sixth Circuit thus affirmed the district courts' denial of this claim.

Mr. Hill also argued that the trial court's failure to inquire about his trial competency denied him a fair trial under the due process clause. The court of appeals found that there was no indication that Mr. Hill did not understand the nature of the proceedings against him or that he could not consult with defense counsel. Mr. Hill put forth no authority for the proposition that illiteracy or other signs of limited intellect should have prompted the trial court to hold a competency hearing sua sponte. As such, the Sixth Circuit also affirmed the district court's denial of this claim.