Miranda Rights May Be Voluntarily Waived When the Accused Refuses Verbal Explanation of Rights by Law Enforcement
In State v. Parker, 459 P.3d 793 (Kan. 2020), the Kansas Supreme Court heard a direct appeal from the district court regarding admissibility of statements made after the defendant, Willie Parker, read his Miranda rights but refused to sign the waiver and refused to have law enforcement read his rights aloud to him. Mr. Parker argued that the district court should have suppressed the statements because the investigators did not take sufficient steps to ensure his understanding of his rights. Although Mr. Parker showed signs of mental illness, the court ruled that there was no reversible error in the district court's decision not to suppress the statements.
Facts of the Case
Mr. Parker was employed by Michel Ziade as a patient transport driver. On July 28, 2015, Mr. Parker and Mr. Ziade had a verbal argument in a parking garage regarding work hours and accountability. They insulted each other, used profanity, and ultimately engaged in a fist fight. Witnesses said that Mr. Parker hit Mr. Ziade. A co-worker broke up the fight. Within about 60 seconds, Mr. Parker went to his van and got a pistol. Mr. Parker pursued Mr. Ziade on foot and shot Mr. Ziade as he left the parking garage. Mr. Parker then returned to his van, took a bag, and walked down an alley. Mr. Ziade died from his injuries within minutes.
Mr. Parker was charged with premeditated first-degree murder. He was arrested nine days after the offense when he surrendered after police used tear gas to force him out of a church building where he had barricaded himself. During a detective interrogation beginning an hour after arrest, Mr. Parker admitted to killing Mr. Ziade. Mr. Parker's motion to suppress his inculpatory statements was later denied by the district court. Mr. Parker had an inpatient evaluation for competency to stand trial. Despite possible signs of mental illness, Mr. Parker was adjudicated to be competent.
Mr. Parker had a jury trial in June 2017. The jury was instructed to consider charges of premeditated first-degree murder and the lesser charge of second-degree murder. Mr. Parker was found guilty of first-degree murder.
Mr. Parker appealed to the Kansas Supreme Court. He claimed that his statements made during interrogation should have been suppressed because the detectives did not ensure he understood his Miranda rights. Additionally, Mr. Parker alleged that the court erred in denying a voluntary manslaughter jury instruction.
Ruling and Reasoning
The Kansas Supreme Court ruled that no reversible error occurred and affirmed the district court's decision that Mr. Parker had made an effective waiver of his Miranda rights, and that he was not entitled to a voluntary manslaughter jury instruction.
The Kansas Supreme Court cited several cases to guide their decision. Per State v. Kirtdoll, 136 P.3d 417 (Kan. 2006), a voluntary Miranda waiver can be deduced based on the totality of circumstances. In State v. Mattox, 390 P.3d 514 (Kan. 2017), an appellate court determined whether a defendant's Miranda rights were knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived based on the totality of the circumstances. Numerous cases from other jurisdictions have held that Miranda rights waivers do not require an accused's Miranda rights to be read out loud. Further, the court noted that there is no specific protocol required to determine if accused persons understand their rights.
In the current case, the detectives provided Mr. Parker with a statement of his Miranda rights, which he read. The detectives offered to read the statement aloud, but Mr. Parker declined and said it was condescending. The court examined “the circumstances and the words” used by Mr. Parker and the detectives to determine if Mr. Parker understood his Miranda waiver (Parker, p 796). Per State v. Davis, 394 P.3d 817(Kan. 2017), the following factors are to be considered when determining if a confession is made voluntarily: mental condition of the accused; circumstances of the interrogation; ability of the accused to communicate with people in the outside world; background, age, and intellect of the accused; officer fairness in interrogation; and the accused's English-language fluency. In the current case, the court found it notable that the district court considered each of these factors and resolved in favor of the state.
Although Mr. Parker claimed that the detectives did not ensure he understood his Miranda rights, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the district court's findings that Mr. Parker waived his Miranda rights voluntarily. Mr. Parker reviewed the Miranda rights statement for 62 seconds, refused to sign the form, and then participated in the interview. Later in the interview, when discussing Mr. Parker's earlier refusal to sign his Miranda waiver, Mr. Parker said “I understand everything I read” (Parker, p 799). Mr. Parker did not claim he did not understand his rights, only that “the police should have done more to ensure that he understood” (Parker, p 799). Per State v. Boyle, 486 P.2d 849 (Kan. 1971), refusal to sign a waiver of rights is not the same as a desire to not be questioned, and voluntary responses after Miranda warning can be an appropriate waiver of rights.
The Kansas Supreme Court cited United States v. Collins, 4 F.3d 95 (5th Cir. 1994), a case with similar circumstances to the current case. Mr. Collins appeared to read and understand his Miranda rights, but he did not sign the form. That case cited North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979), which noted that a Miranda waiver can be inferred from the person's actions and statements. In the current case, Mr. Parker's responses showed that he knew the roles of the detectives and the charge against him. He understood the interrogation process, that detectives were attempting to obtain inculpatory evidence, and that he did not have to give affirmative answers. Mr. Parker was described as playing a “cat-and-mouse game” with detectives (Parker, p 799). These facts led the court to rule that Mr. Parker effectively waived his Miranda rights and that his statements were admissible.
The Kansas Supreme Court also ruled on the district court's denial of Mr. Parker's request for a jury instruction of voluntary manslaughter based on sudden quarrel or heat of passion. The Kansas Supreme Court found no error in the district court's ruling, as the facts of the case showed “so little evidence of heat of passion” and “so much evidence of calculated decision-making” (Parker, p 801).
Discussion
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court held that an accused deprived of freedom by law enforcement must be informed of the right to counsel and to remain silent, and that statements can be used in court. The purpose is to protect one's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The accused must waive Miranda rights knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Miranda rights evaluations are uncommonly referred to forensic mental health examiners, even when there are notable Miranda concerns (Rogers R, Otal T, Drogin EY, et al.: Effectiveness of the Miranda acquiescence questionnaire for investigating impaired Miranda reasoning. J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 48:226–36, 2020).
Subsequent case law has expounded on effective Miranda rights waivers. In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that coercive police activity was necessary to conclude that a confession was made involuntarily. In that case, the defendant's psychosis, which interfered with his ability to make rational choices, did not make his confession involuntary. In Garner v. Mitchell, 557 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2009), the court said that effective waiver of Miranda rights was assessed based on the totality of the circumstances and did not require that the accused understood every potential consequence. In Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010), the court held that silence during an interrogation did not negate the validity of a Miranda waiver. That court cited another case, Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994), which found that Miranda rights must be invoked unambiguously.
In the current case of State v. Parker, the Kansas Supreme Court essentially addressed the concept of substance versus process of an accused person waiving Miranda rights. In this case, the process was disrupted because Mr. Parker refused the offer for his rights to be read aloud and he refused to sign the waiver. The substance, however, was evident based on his actions, namely that Mr. Parker knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. This case is consistent with case law citing totality of the circumstances as the standard for determining competence to waive Miranda rights.
- © 2020 American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law
