Limitations of Right against Self-Incrimination in Statements Made to Psychiatrists

Facts of the Case

On June 30, 2001, Adam Rosen stabbed and killed his wife, Hollie Rosen, in their home in Pennsylvania. He called the police initially claiming that his wife had been stabbed by two masked intruders. Shortly thereafter he confessed that he had “blacked out” in the middle of a heated argument with her and, after regaining consciousness, found her wounded on the floor. Mr. Rosen was arrested and charged with first-degree murder.

Mr. Rosen underwent two trials. During his first trial, in 2002, he presented a diminished capacity defense and retained an expert witness psychiatrist, Dr. Paul Fink. Mr. Rosen also underwent evaluation by the Commonwealth's expert, Dr. Timothy Michals. At trial, the jury heard testimony from Dr. Fink, who opined that Mr. Rosen could not have formed the specific intent to kill due to his bipolar disorder with psychotic features and stress from his failing marriage. Dr. Michals, however, testified that Mr. Rosen did not have a mental disorder affecting his ability to form intent, pointing to discrepancies in statements Mr. Rosen made to his psychiatric examiners and to the police. The jury convicted Mr. Rosen of first-degree murder.

After claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Rosen was granted a new trial. At his second trial, in 2008, he abandoned his diminished capacity defense and planned to testify that he did not premeditate or have the deliberate, willful intent to kill his wife. Although Mr. Rosen had planned to proceed without the use of a mental health expert, the Commonwealth sought to admit evidence from Mr. Rosen's first trial, including his statements to Dr. Michals about killing his wife and previously attempting to rape her. Mr. Rosen claimed Dr. Michals failed to adequately administer Miranda warnings prior to examining him. The trial court ruled that, although these statements could not be used as substantive evidence in Mr. Rosen's case-in-chief, they could be used to impeach him should he choose to testify. Mr. Rosen then elected not to testify during the bench trial, where he was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.

Mr. Rosen appealed, asserting among other things that the trial court erred in allowing for admission of psychiatric evidence from his first trial in a subsequent trial where no mental health defense was presented. The appellate court affirmed; the Pennsylvania Supreme Court likewise affirmed. In 2015, Mr. Rosen filed a habeas petition, arguing that the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by ruling that his statements to Dr. Michals could be used to impeach him during his second trial. A federal district court denied his petition, and the Third Circuit affirmed the denial.

Ruling and Reasoning

In denying Mr. Rosen's habeas petition, the district court explained that Mr. Rosen failed to show that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled contrary to, or through unreasonable application of, federal law in concluding that there was no Fifth Amendment violation. The Third Circuit, in reviewing this denial, agreed, citing that Mr. Rosen had failed to meet his burden under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which requires deference to established state law as a threshold for federal scrutiny. Their reasoning was that Mr. Rosen misapplied key Supreme Court decisions, including Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987), and Kansas v. Cheever, 571 U.S. 87 (2013), as well as the Third Circuit decision in Gibbs v. Frank, 387 F.3d 268 (3d Cir. 2004), in asserting that his self-incrimination rights had been violated.

In Estelle, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, without a valid waiver, the statements of a defendant made during a compelled psychiatric evaluation cannot be used as evidence against him during the penalty phase if the defendant had not initiated a mental health defense. In Estelle, the examining psychiatrist, without informing the examinee, derived information about the defendant's antisocial tendencies during a competency evaluation; this information was later used against the defendant during death penalty proceedings in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. Subsequently, in Buchanan, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a defendant who voluntarily requests psychiatric evaluation or presents a mental health defense waives his Fifth Amendment privilege against introduction of the psychiatric evidence in court. Even when a defendant undergoes compelled psychiatric examination, the Court ruled in Cheever, the results from the examination can be used to rebut the defendant's mental health defense, ostensibly preserving the adversarial process of fair trial by presenting the court with more than one psychiatric opinion. In Gibbs, the Third Circuit granted habeas relief to Mr. Gibbs, who argued that his Fifth Amendment privilege was violated when incriminating statements he made to a psychiatrist after giving a general Fifth Amendment waiver were then used in the case-in-chief during his second trial, in which he did not raise a mental health defense.

The Third Circuit reasoned that, in contrast to Estelle and in line with Buchanan, Mr. Rosen voluntarily raised a mental health defense, triggering a waiver of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Moreover, in contrast to Cheever and to Gibbs, Mr. Rosen's psychiatric testimony would have been introduced to impeach him and not to rebut a mental health defense or to prove the truth of the matter at hand, respectively.