Mental Health Pretrial Diversion

Facts of the Case

In March 2016, Eric Frahs was throwing rocks at vehicles in front of a store he later entered, where he attempted to steal beverages and then punched the store owner. He was subsequently charged with two counts of second-degree robbery and one count of throwing a substance at a motor vehicle with intent to cause injury.

At trial, Mr. Frahs introduced testimony regarding his mental health; he testified that he experienced hallucinations and delusions for years and had been hospitalized several times. He testified that he thought he saw an angel fly by on a horse and talk to him prior to his entering the store. A forensic psychologist testified that Mr. Frahs had a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder and opined that his behavior at the time of the offense was related to his mental illness. Despite this, Mr. Frahs was convicted on the two charges of second-degree robbery and throwing a substance at a vehicle without intent to cause injury, and he was sentenced to nine years of incarceration.

While Mr. Frahs' appeal was pending, California enacted Penal Code § 1001.36 (2018), a statute that allows for pretrial diversion of individuals with certain mental illnesses. The California Court of Appeal (People v. Frahs, 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d 483 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018)) ruled that the statute applied retroactively to cases that fit the criteria, if the judgments were not final. The court ordered a conditional remand for Mr. Frahs.

Ruling and Reasoning

The Supreme Court of California affirmed the judgment of the lower court, ruling the statute could be applied retroactively and Mr. Frahs was entitled to an eligibility hearing to determine whether such diversion was appropriate. The court noted the purposes of the statute included diverting individuals with mental disorders to treatment to reduce their involvement in the criminal justice system; to allow local courts discretion and flexibility in diversion; and to provide treatment and support for individuals with mental illness. The statute allows for trial courts to use their discretion in granting pretrial diversion if the following are met: (1) the defendant suffers from a qualifying mental disorder; (2) the disorder played a significant role in the commission of the charged offense; (3) the defendant's symptoms will respond to mental health treatment; (4) the defendant consents to diversion and waives his or her speedy trial right; (5) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment; and (6) the defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community (Frahs, p 847).

The court relied on its prior decision in In re Estrada, 408 P.2d. 948 (Cal. 1965), which held that amendatory statutes (e.g., statutes that reduce punishment) are intended to apply retroactively. The court interpreted the legislative intent in enacting such statutes was for the reduced penalty to apply to every case “to which it constitutionally could apply” (Frahs, p 848, citing Estrada, p 951), including cases in which judgments were not final. More recently, the court ruled in People v. Superior Court (Lara), 410 P.3d. 22 (Cal. 2018) that the Estrada rule applied to an amendatory statute that “ameliorated the punishment for a class of persons” (Frahs, p 849, citing Lara, p 27; emphasis in original). In Lara, the court ruled a statute prohibiting prosecutors from charging juveniles in adult court and giving juvenile courts the discretion to transfer juveniles to adult courts could be applied retroactively because it could potentially reduce punishment.

Relying upon both Estrada and Lara, the court reasoned that the new statute could offer a “potentially ameliorative benefit for a class of individuals—namely, criminal defendants who suffer from a qualifying mental disorder” (Frahs, p 850). The diversion program would allow for individuals with mental illness to receive treatment and, if completed successfully, have their criminal charges dismissed instead of serving a sentence in prison. Accordingly, the court ruled the statute was ameliorative in nature. Further, they concluded that the California legislature did not include any language indicating it intended the statute to be applied only proactively. Although the statute contained language indicating the diversion could be applied “at any point in the judicial process … until adjudication” (Cal. Penal Code § 1001.36 (c) (2018)) and referencing the program as “pretrial,” the court reasoned this language only conveyed how the legislature intended the statute to be enacted during the ordinary trial process. The court rejected the arguments raised by the state that the legislature's intent was for it to be applied only prospectively.

The court then considered the remedy for Mr. Frahs in particular. In Lara, the court endorsed a limited remand procedure in which appellate courts could conditionally reverse a conviction and sentence and order the trial court to conduct a new hearing, which, in Lara, was a juvenile transfer hearing. In Frahs, the California Court of Appeal followed such a procedure, conditionally reversing Mr. Frahs' conviction and sentence and instructing the trial court to determine whether Mr. Frahs met eligibility for the diversion program, noting the record indicated Mr. Frahs appeared to have a mental disorder and a psychologist had testified that his actions at the time of the offense were related to symptoms of his mental disorder. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the appeals court and conditionally reversed Mr. Frahs' conviction and sentence. The court remanded the case to the appeals court with instructions to remand it to the trial court to conduct an eligibility hearing considering the relevant factors named by statute.