Inmate's Eighth Amendment Right to Protection Was Not Violated When Prison Official Reasonably Responded to Threat
In Mosley v. Zachery, 966 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2020), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether a prison official's decision to not immediately place an inmate in protective custody, after being informed that another prisoner had threatened violence, violated the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the prison official, finding that, although the official had subjective knowledge of the risk of harm to the inmate, the prison official reasonably responded to the risk. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, ruling that the prison officials' response to the threat was reasonable, even if the harm was not ultimately averted.
Facts of the Case
Tommy Mosley and Shaun Taylor were inmates at Georgia's Autry State Prison. During a 2014 search of Mr. Taylor's cell, a corrections officer found what appeared to be a cell phone, which Mr. Taylor refused to surrender. Mr. Taylor requested Mr. Mosley (not present at the search) to provide a statement indicating Mr. Taylor possessed a radio, not a cell phone. Mr. Mosley agreed but instead wrote that he did not see Mr. Taylor with a cell phone or radio. Mr. Mosley did not inform Mr. Taylor about his statement.
Two weeks later, prison official Lieutenant Towanda Zachery presided over Mr. Taylor's disciplinary hearing, wherein Mr. Mosley's statement was read. Lt. Zachery found Mr. Taylor not guilty of possessing a cell phone, but guilty of failing to follow instructions and obstructing the search. Lt. Zachery noted that Mr. Taylor “did not appear angry or upset” following the determination (Mosley, p 1268). He did not make threats toward other inmates, including Mr. Mosley.
After the hearing, Mr. Taylor entered Mr. Mosley's cell on the “honors dorm” (good behavior unit). He quoted Mr. Mosley's statement, accused him of snitching, and threatened to kill Mr. Mosley. Mr. Mosley asked Mr. Taylor to leave his cell, and Mr. Taylor complied.
Later that morning, Mr. Mosley informed Lt. Zachery that Mr. Taylor had threatened his life and asked for protection. Lt. Zachery said she “would look into” moving Mr. Taylor, noting that officials were already considering transferring Mr. Taylor from the honors dorm due to disagreements with his counselor. Mr. Mosley was instructed to return to his cell for count time.
Within “moments” of Mr. Mosley reporting the threat to Lt. Zachery, Mr. Taylor pulled Mr. Mosley into his cell and superficially assaulted him.
Mr. Mosley sued Lt. Zachery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996), alleging that Lt. Zachery violated his Eighth Amendment right to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, by being deliberately indifferent to Mr. Mosley's risk of harm.
Lt. Zachery argued that there was no evidence to support Mr. Mosley's claim of deliberate indifference and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment, concluding that, although the evidence demonstrated Lt. Zachery had “subjective knowledge of a risk of harm” to Mr. Mosley, she “responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm was not averted” (Mosely, p 1270). Mr. Mosley appealed.
Ruling and Reasoning
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, noting that the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the Eighth Amendment to require that prison officials “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates” in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), p 832. In Farmer, the Supreme Court delineated two requirements that must be met for a claim of failure to prevent harm: the inmate is required to demonstrate that he is incarcerated in conditions creating a “substantial risk of serious harm” and the official must have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” (Farmer, p 834). In these cases, the state of mind must be “one of deliberate indifference to inmate mental health and safety” (Farmer, p 834).
Citing Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090 (11th Cir. 2014), the Eleventh Circuit noted that, to survive summary judgment of a failure-to-protect claim alleging deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence of: “(1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant['s] deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation” (Caldwell, p 1099). The district court in Mosley had granted summary judgment on the second element of deliberate indifference.
Deliberate indifference involves subjective and objective components. A prisoner must demonstrate that the prison official actually (subjectively) knew of the substantial risk of serious harm, and that the official failed to respond in an objectively reasonable way (referencing Bowen v. Warden, Baldwin State Prison, 826 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2016)). Prison officials with subjective knowledge of substantial risk of serious harm “may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if harm was not ultimately averted” (Farmer, p 844). These determinations must be based on the facts the prison official knew at the time of the official's response to the risk of harm.
Analyzing the facts de novo, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Lt. Zachery responded reasonably to Mr. Mosley's risk of harm. Lt. Zachery said she would investigate Mr. Taylor's threat and consider transferring Mr. Taylor. Mr. Taylor did not appear angry following the disciplinary hearing. Mr. Mosley's written statement addressed possession of a cellphone, for which Mr. Taylor was acquitted. Mr. Taylor was convicted of charges not addressed in Mr. Mosley's statement. Mr. Taylor was housed in the honors dorm for inmates with “minimal” behavioral concerns. Lt. Zachery's consideration of transferring Mr. Taylor was related to disagreements with his prison counselor, not behavioral concerns.
Furthermore, Lt. Zachery instructed Mr. Mosley to return to his cell for count time, which involved close monitoring of inmates, a process which was highly regulated and therefore likely to address any risk. Mr. Mosley reported only a threat, without harm, and was not assaulted until four hours after the hearing. Mr. Taylor attacked Mr. Mosley only “moments” after Lt. Zachery was informed of the threat.
The Eleventh Circuit referenced two prior cases in which the court determined that a prison official had not reasonably responded to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner. In Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001), the court decided in favor of plaintiffs who sued the sheriff of Butler County, alleging that the sheriff's “deliberate indifference to the unreasonably dangerous conditions at the Jail deprived [them] of their Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights” (Marsh, p 1024). The court outlined that Lt. Zachery, unlike the sheriff in Marsh, did not do “absolutely nothing” in response to the threat. Lt. Zachery informed Mr. Mosley that she would investigate the threat and consider moving Mr. Taylor and sent Mr. Mosley to his cell for count time where prisoners would be closely monitored.
In Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2003), an inmate was killed by another inmate with a history of violent outbursts. Despite surveillance cameras in the cell block, the officers were not monitoring inmates during this period, instead taking consecutive breaks and playing computer games. In contrast to Cottone, Lt. Zachery placed Mr. Mosley in the highly monitored environment of count time. Furthermore, at the time of the assault, she was not on a break or playing computer games. She agreed to investigate the threat and look into moving Mr. Taylor and had Mr. Mosley supervised via count time.
The court determined that Lt. Zachery's response was reasonable, even if the harm was not averted. Summary judgment for Lt. Zachery was affirmed.
Discussion
This case addressed whether a prison official, in response to subjective knowledge of a threat of violence by another inmate, failed to protect the inmate from violence by not immediately placing him in protective custody, thereby violating the Eighth Amendment. In these cases, the standard of deliberate indifference is used, which requires subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm, and failure to respond in an objectively reasonable way to the risk of harm. Successful deliberate indifference claims require some further reasons, beyond an inmate's informing a prison official of a threat, that a prison official could have concluded that a particular threat evidenced a substantial threat, rather than a mere possibility, of serious harm.
It is important to consider the context in making these determinations, which must be based on the facts the prison official knew at the time of the official's response to the risk of harm. A negative outcome does not automatically constitute deliberate indifference. A prison official who considers the information available and takes objectively reasonable steps to address this risk of harm is not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In this case, the defendant took reasonable steps to protect the inmate from violence, although the harm was not ultimately averted.
Prisons are environments in which persons who have committed crimes, some violent in nature, are housed together in close proximity. The risk of violence and threats of violence in response to conflict is increased. Because of limited resources in the prison setting, not every inmate can be placed in protective custody in response to a threat of violence. The prison official must carefully consider the information available in determining how to respond to the threat. The response options are not simply protective custody or not. There are additional options to protect an inmate, such as separating inmates or increasing supervision. If a prison official's response is objectively reasonable, the official is not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the Eighth Amendment, even if the harm is not ultimately avoided.
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