Police Officer Immunity in Cases of Suicide

Facts of the Case

On September 19, 2015, Jack Huelsman experienced a mental health crisis. According to his family, the 64-year-old man, who had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, was experiencing paranoid delusions and making concerning statements about killing himself. His wife, Cheryl Huelsman, a nurse, called their daughter and instructed her to call 911. Clermont County Deputies Eric Gregory and Meredith Walsh responded to the call. They were aware of Mr. Huelsman’s current state of mental health and that there may be guns in the home. Upon arrival, Deputy Gregory called off the paramedics who had also responded. He spoke with both Mrs. Huelsman, who expressed fear that her husband would attempt suicide, and Mr. Huelsman, whom Deputy Gregory considered to be lucid. Deputy Gregory called the county’s Mobile Crisis Unit, a team of social workers specially trained to respond to mental health crises. Mrs. Huelsman pleaded with Deputy Gregory not to leave Mr. Huelsman unattended, but the Deputy left him inside the home, alone, for about nine minutes. During this time, Mr. Huelsman shot and killed himself.

The Hueslmans filed suit against the deputies claiming deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; denial of benefits of public services under the ADA; and wrongful death, intentional infliction of serious emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress under Ohio law. The deputies filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming they were entitled to qualified immunity and statutory immunity. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that the deputies were entitled to qualified immunity and statutory immunity. The court also rejected the Huelsmans’ ADA claims. The Huelsmans appealed.

Ruling and Reasoning

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling regarding the Huelsmans’ § 1983 and ADA claims but vacated and remanded the district court’s ruling on the Huelsmans’ state law claims.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Huelsmans claimed that Mr. Huelsman’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated under the state-created danger exception. The deputies claimed qualified immunity. The court noted that a plaintiff may bring a due process claim under the state-created danger exception if they show: the state’s affirmative act created or increased the plaintiff’s risk of private acts of violence; there was a special risk to the plaintiff greater than the general public’s risk because of the state’s action; and the requisite culpability to establish a substantive due process violation was demonstrated by deliberate indifference by the government entity. The court also noted that for a plaintiff’s claim to prevail over an official’s qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show that the official violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the incident.

The court stated that it had not previously applied the state-created danger exception to cases of suicide and therefore concluded that this was not a clearly established right at the time of Mr. Huelsman’s death. Consistent with their precedent, the court determined that a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim under the state-created danger exception did not apply to this case.

With regard to the Huelsmans’ ADA claim, the court determined that Deputy Gregory’s calling the mobile crisis unit was a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, and therefore the Huelsmans’ ADA claim did not stand.

Regarding the Huelsmans’ claims under state law, the district court had granted summary judgment on the basis of statutory immunity claimed by the deputies. The appeals court, however, made a distinction between qualified immunity for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and statutory immunity for state claims. The appeals court noted that to bring a successful claim against federal qualified immunity, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the official acted with deliberate indifference. Citing the Supreme Court’s opinion in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), the court said that for an official’s conduct to amount to deliberate indifference, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference” (Wilson, p 861, citing Farmer at 827). In other words, the official must act or fail to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.

The court construed Ohio state law, where the official must have acted “with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner” (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2744.03(A)(6)(b) (2002)) to negate statutory immunity. The court stated that the district court erred in conflating the federal standard of deliberate indifference with the Ohio standard of recklessness. The court explained that wanton misconduct is roughly equivalent to deliberate indifference but that recklessness, as stated in the Ohio Statute, is distinguished from wantonness in that it does not require actual knowledge of a risk. Further, the court noted that a plaintiff must show that the official acted in a reckless or wanton manner, not both. Accordingly, the deputies did not need actual knowledge of the risk of Mr. Huelsman’s suicide to have acted recklessly.

The court recognized that there were numerous disputes of fact in the case, including the information provided to the deputies from dispatch, Mrs. Huelsman’s statements about not leaving her husband alone, the Huelsmans’ statements about the number of guns in the house, Mr. Huelsman’s statements about his health, Deputy Walsh’s decision to leave the scene, and Deputy Gregory’s decision to call off EMS, among others. The court found that in light of these disputes, the grant of summary judgment by the district court was inappropriate, since based on these facts a reasonable juror could conclude that the risk of Mr. Huelsman's suicide was obvious and that the deputies acted recklessly as a result.

Concurrence

Judge Stranch stated that the appeals court’s decision rested on the finding that the applicable law was not clearly established. But, she noted that the state-created danger exception itself was clearly established and that it should have been left to the jury whether Deputy Gregory, in leaving him alone in the house, violated Mr. Huelsman’s constitutional rights by increasing the risk of suicide.

Dissent

Judge Bush concurred with the majority regarding the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and ADA claims but dissented regarding the state law claims. He stated he would affirm summary judgment for the state-law immunity because there is a high standard for establishing recklessness. Judge Bush noted that there were many undisputed facts that showed that the deputies exercised care toward Mr. Huelsman and, therefore, no reasonable juror could find the deputies’ actions reckless. He accused the majority of engaging in hindsight bias.

Discussion

This case underscores that standards for immunity against civil lawsuits for state officials can vary across jurisdictions. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals described that under the federal standard of deliberate indifference, to be found liable, the police must have had actual knowledge of the risk of suicide. But, the court held that under Ohio state law, police could be found liable for a suicide if they failed to act when the suicide risk was obvious.

As this case illustrates, although they are not mental health professionals, police officers who respond to mental health crisis calls may be held accountable for their actions toward an individual in crisis. Police are often the first officials to respond to a crisis call and may be required to take measures when an individual is at risk of self-harm. Predicting an individual’s suicide risk is notoriously difficult, even for psychiatrists. Although there are increasingly available mental health trainings for police to help them assess risk of suicide, this case brings into question the challenges officers face in these situations and the role of mental health professionals in crisis situations.