Parent of an Emancipated Adult with Mental Illness Does Not Have a Duty to Control or Supervise That Adult

Facts of the Case

Donald London (Donald; hereafter first names are used to avoid confusion, although the usual Journal style would be to refer to these persons as Mr. or Ms.), a 42-year-old male diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, was living alone in his grandmother's farmhouse in Kimball, South Dakota after she fell ill and was being treated in Sioux Falls. Prior to that, he had been living in another state for many years. Donald’s mother, Bonnie, lived in Pierre but was staying in Sioux Falls while her mother received treatment. When psychotic, Donald became detached from reality and believed his deceased wife was alive and being held captive by various law enforcement or intelligence agencies. As a prior felon, he was prohibited from possessing firearms.

Donald had contact with police officers in early January 2015. On January 5, he had an altercation in a bar, and police later found him walking on the side of the road after his car broke down. He was released to the care of his father Michael London (Michael). On January 6, he had contact with police after he continued to have mental problems. Donald held a rifle at one point in the interaction but surrendered peacefully. Firearms were secured in a gun safe to which Michael had the key. Police did not pursue a mental health hold after Donald agreed to have Michael take him for an evaluation. Donald was evaluated in Mitchell, South Dakota, but was not admitted for inpatient treatment. He was advised to stop drinking and stop his antipsychotic medications until he could be seen six days later. Donald and Michael returned to the farmhouse. Bonnie said she would be able to come to Kimball and help with his care the following day.

On January 7, Donald became increasingly erratic. Michael called law enforcement believing Donald was coming to retrieve the firearms, which had been moved to Michael’s home. Donald made threats against an officer who had pointed a firearm at him the previous day, and the chief of police. After returning to the farmhouse, Donald spoke by phone with the county sheriff about these threats. The sheriff made preparations with multiple law enforcement agencies to confront Donald at the farmhouse. Bonnie arrived at the farmhouse and saw that Donald was calm and assumed things were de-escalating. Michael left for a medical appoinment but noticed law enforcement vehicles near by and returned to the farmhouse. Bonnie left to investigate but was detained by law enforcement.

Sergeant John Koenig fanned out with other officers and found Donald outside the house with a rifle. He announced himself and commanded Donald to drop the weapon and to get on his knees. Donald dropped the rifle but instead returned to the farmhouse, where he got in his pickup and drove out to the yard to reclaim the rifle, after which he drove back to the house. Donald took a position behind his truck as cover. Michael was angered, feeling betrayed by the sheriff, and yelled out to Donald, “Shoot those sons of bitches!” Donald began firing at two officers and a round struck Sgt. Koenig in his shoulder. Donald surrendered seventeen hours later. Donald and Michael were charged, but Michael died before the completion of criminal proceedings. Donald pled guilty but mentally ill to three counts of aggravated assault against a law enforcement officer. This plea allows juries and judges to find a defendant guilty of an offense while acknowledging the presence of a mental illness. He was sentenced to 30 years in the state penitentiary plus 45 years suspended.

The Koenigs sued after the criminal proceedings alleging that Bonnie breached a legal duty by falsely telling Donald that Officers of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) were coming to the farmhouse, thus agitating him. They also argued that Bonnie assumed a duty to supervise Donald’s conduct and had effectively entrusted him with weapons. Bonnie denied making any statement to Donald that ATF agents were coming to the farmhouse.

Bonnie moved for summary judgment, and the court granted the motion agreeing with her claim that she did not owe a legal duty to the Koenigs as she lacked sufficient control over her emancipated adult son and because his act of shooting the sergeant was not foreseeable. The court also found that she did not assume a duty to supervise Donald and she did not have control over the firearms she was alleged to have entrusted to Donald.

The Koenigs raised two concerns on appeal. The first was that the circuit court erred in determining that Bonnie did not owe a duty to control Donald or prevent his misconduct. The second was that the court erred when it determined that Bonnie did not undertake a gratuitous duty to supervise.

Ruling and Reasoning

The court first recognized that in general, while there are some exceptions to the rule, individuals do not have a duty to prevent third-party misconduct unless there exists “a special relationship” and if the criminal acts were foreseeable. The court determined that Bonnie was not under “a special relationship” duty to control Donald’s actions. The court agreed with the finding of the circuit court summarizing, “Donald was a 42-year-old emancipated adult at the time of the shooting. He lived by himself out of the state and had not resided with Bonnie since high school. Donald was not the subject of a guardianship, and there were no restrictions on his movement or conduct” (Koenig, p 653). Furthermore, the court found nothing special in the relationship. “As his mother, Bonnie was involved and supportive” of his “effort to address his mental health. But this relationship appears to be no more special or remarkable than would the case of any parent concerned for the health of an adult child” (Koenig, p 653–654). The court determined that Bonnie was not liable for Sergeant Koenig’s injuries.

The court next determined if Bonnie’s actions increased the risk of harm. The Koenigs had argued that Bonnie’s alleged statements regarding the ATF created a foreseeable risk of harm to others, which she had a duty to prevent. The court, however, concluded that “Bonnie’s purported comments about the ATF did not create a foreseeable high risk that Donald would act criminally to harm Sergeant Koenig” (Koenig, p 658).

Finally, the court reviewed the question of Bonnie’s actions creating a gratuitous duty to supervise. After restating the relevant rule, the court noted that there was no support in law for a person being held responsible for an adult child, who was previously living independently without assistance. They found no authority for this and described the Koenigs’ argument as a “but-for causation,” and not a persuasive argument that Bonnie was “voluntarily assuming a duty to supervise another adult” (Koenig, p 659).

Discussion

The duty to protect others from the harm of third parties is an area of negligence law with some controversy. In the tort of negligence, one must prove a legal duty existed, the behavior of an actor breached that legal duty, the actor behaved in a way that was the actual and proximate cause of a harm, and the harm constituted a legally recoverable damage. The question of duty is always a question of law. One owes duties to others based on the relationship between the parties. There are also a general duty not to incite others to foreseeable tortious or criminal acts and a duty to protect others if one created a peril. One may also assume a duty by intervening in a situation where actions may prevent a harm if executed in a nonnegligent manner.

The Koenig case contributes to the complex litigation involving duties to third parties and third-party liability. A duty to third parties, as in the Tarasoff progeny of cases, exists based on the relationship between the relevant parties. In general one is responsible only for foreseeable consequences of one’s actions or omissions. Had the court decided differently, this case would have had perilous consequences for the families of people who are mentally ill. One can easily imagine facts where parents of an individual with serious mental illness who is dependent on them might be found to have a duty to protect others. For purposes of a forensic evaluation, determining the level of disability and dependence, and discussing the nature of the care relationship, may be useful in elucidating details and assisting the court in the determination of the nature of a legal duty based on relationships. This case presented the possibility that the court might use the power of hindsight to expand the duties of the parents of adult children with mental illness. The court, however, took a conservative approach consistent with existing precedent in South Dakota, and did not create a new duty for parents.