Knowledge Required to Convict in Bail Jumping

Facts of the Case

Zachary Bergstrom was charged with possession of a controlled substance in September 2017 and was released on bail with conditions, including appearing at all court dates. He subsequently missed three court dates.

On November 3, 2017, Mr. Bergstrom appeared for a pretrial conference and a subsequent pretrial conference was set for January 12, 2018. Mr. Bergstrom failed to appear in court on the January date. During his bail jumping trial, he explained that he was hospitalized on the January court date, but that he had contacted both his lawyer and a bond company after his hospital discharge. A bond surrender was effectuated, and Mr. Bergstrom returned to jail and remained in custody until April 10, 2018, when he was released for a 14-day evaluation period to determine if he should be entered into the drug court. Written conditions of his release required him to present on April 11, 2018 and April 18, 2018 to drug court. When he failed to appear on April 18, 2018, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest.

Per testimony from Mr. Bergstrom, he presented to drug court late on that date and was told that the court would attempt to reschedule. His testimony was corroborated by a judicial assistant's email. Mr. Bergstrom then failed to appear at a May 4, 2018, pretrial conference, which was noted in a February scheduling order. Again, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. Mr. Bergstrom testified that he “was not aware” of this pretrial date because he was homeless, without a phone, and experiencing substance use, which made it difficult to remain in contact with his attorneys and parole officer. When he was arrested on unrelated charges, the state added three counts of bail jumping to his charge because of the failures to appear outlined above.

During the jury trial, the state produced scheduling orders and release orders signed by Mr. Bergstrom, which indicated that he was required to appear for all court dates and failure to do so could result in a warrant for his arrest. The release order also indicated that court times might change. Mr. Bergstrom was acquitted of the underlying charge at his jury trial, but he was found guilty of all three bail jumping charges under Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.76.170 (2001), which was in effect at the time of his missed court appearances.

Mr. Bergstrom appealed, arguing that the jury instructions omitted an essential element of the crime and the state's evidence that he knew of the required court dates was equivocal. Both sides argued about the knowledge requirement under the statute. The court of appeals agreed with Mr. Bergstrom that the jury instructions to convict him were insufficient because they did not require the state to prove that the defendant was aware of the required court appearances on the dates in question and, therefore, improperly relieved the state of its burden. But the appeals court ruled that the error was nonetheless harmless because there was sufficient evidence that Mr. Bergstrom actually received notice of the three court dates. The state appealed to the extent that the appellate court's ruling changed the requirements for jury instructions on bail jumping elements for all future cases. Mr. Bergstrom renewed his challenges.

Ruling and Reasoning

The Washington Supreme Court ruled that Mr. Bergstrom sufficiently knew of his pending court dates and upheld his conviction. The court first reviewed the meaning of the bail jumping statute. The court acknowledged that, since a 2001 statute amendment, the court of appeals and state supreme court had issued conflicting rulings regarding key elements of bail jumping. The court reviewed the plain language of the bail jumping statute, finding that the legislature intended to require proof that a defendant had received notice to appear in court at a later date. The court rejected the lower court's interpretation because it could lead to consequences that contradicted legislative intent. The state supreme court indicated that the legislature had intended to broaden the knowledge requirement in its 2001 statutory amendment.

The court then reviewed the sufficiency of the jury instructions and found that the conviction instructions properly instructed the jury on the essential elements of bail jumping. Although the court had found error in the lower court's interpretation of the statute, since the jury instructions in Mr. Bergstrom's case were sufficient, the court did not need to address harmless error as applied to Mr. Bergstrom's missed court appearance on May 4.

The court specifically looked at Mr. Bergstrom's failure to appear on April 18, 2018. The court discussed the judiciary's role as being fair and impartial and recognized that people may have difficulty accessing the courts. The court accepted that Mr. Bergstrom experienced homelessness and substance use, which was noted by the lower court to have contributed to his offense. The court also recognized that a 2020 amendment to the bail jumping statute provided an avenue to quash such charges, but Mr. Bergstrom did not have the benefit of the amendment based on the timing of his offenses. The court, although expressing sympathy with Mr. Bergstrom's situation, said that his struggles “do not undercut the State's evidence that Mr. Bergstrom knew of each of the three court dates” (Bergstrom, p 849). The court reversed, in part, on the statutory interpretation and affirmed the sufficiency of the conviction.