Psychiatric Evaluation to Assess Competency for Self-Representation

Facts of the Case

Paul Rivera was arrested in January 2012 after a traffic stop in Pennsylvania when approximately 170 grams of cocaine and 7.5 grams of heroin were seized. During his 14-month incarceration in Pennsylvania, the Federal Bureau of Investigation began investigating Mr. Rivera and the activities of a criminal organization known as “Together Forever” (TF), which he co-founded in the 1980s. TF engaged in drug trafficking, forced prostitution, and gang violence. On March 11, 2013, a federal grand jury indicted and charged Mr. Rivera and a co-defendant with narcotics trafficking, sex trafficking, money laundering, witness tampering, and murder.

During the federal proceedings, Mr. Rivera cycled through seven attorneys before requesting to proceed pro se. The district court disqualified Mr. Rivera’s first attorney, Steve Zissou, over a nonwaivable conflict of interest. Mr. Zissou objected, predicting that this would make it “extremely difficult for successor counsel” because Mr. Rivera was a “very difficult and sophisticated client … extremely distrusting of courts and lawyers … and likely suffering from some form of undiagnosed psychological instability” (Garrett, p 116).

Within two weeks of the district court appointing new counsel, Mr. Rivera replaced him with a privately retained attorney. After just over one month, the attorney withdrew because of a conflict, and the court appointed Martin Goldberg. Approximately four months later, the court appointed new counsel again after Mr. Rivera and Mr. Goldberg expressed concerns about their relationship. Mr. Goldberg explained that part of the problem stemmed from Mr. Rivera being “enamored” with prior counsel, Mr. Zissou.

In October 2013, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment with additional charges, including murder in aid of racketeering, a death-penalty-eligible offense. The court appointed an additional attorney, David Stern, to assist with the capital charge. After the government dropped the death penalty, the court determined that Mr. Rivera required only one lawyer, and he proceeded with Mr. Stern. Mr. Rivera requested to replace him after one month. The court granted this request in July 2014, appointing Donald DuBoulay and warning Mr. Rivera that he would be the last counsel appointed for him.

In April 2015, Mr. Rivera requested to proceed pro se because of disagreement with Mr. DuBoulay’s legal strategy. Subsequently, the district court held a hearing pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). During the hearing, the judge inquired about Mr. Rivera’s clarity of mind and understanding of his charges. She informed him that his prior pro se submissions contained harmful evidentiary submissions. The judge repeatedly articulated the risks of Mr. Rivera’s self-representation, including that he faced a mandatory life sentence and might inadvertently trigger admission of his proffer statement, during which he admitted his involvement in the murder. Mr. Rivera “insisted that he understood the risks and stated that he was familiarizing himself with the Federal Rules of Evidence” (Garrett, p 117). The judge noted that in two years of presiding over the case, Mr. Rivera did not display problems with his conduct. She granted his pro se request, and Mr. DuBoulay continued as standby counsel.

Mr. Rivera’s co-defendant subsequently moved to separate their cases, asserting that Mr. Rivera had “mental illness and was acting wacky” (Garrett, p 117). The prosecutor also expressed concern that Mr. Rivera’s decisions were not entirely rational. The judge disagreed with both, stating that she did not doubt that Mr. Rivera’s choice to proceed pro se was made “knowingly and voluntarily and rationally, with full understanding of the risks” (Garrett, p 117).

At his trial, Mr. Rivera insisted on wearing his prison uniform. Despite the court’s prior warnings, during his opening statement, he proclaimed being factually innocent of the murder, thereby prompting the admission of his incriminating proffer statement to the government. His co-defendant’s counsel described Mr. Rivera’s cross-examinations as “painful” and “cringe-worthy.” While cross-examining a cooperating witness, Mr. Rivera requested that Mr. DuBoulay take over, which the court permitted. On June 25, 2015, the jury found Mr. Rivera guilty on all counts. Mr. Rivera received a mandatory life sentence for murder in aid of racketeering, a consecutive 20-year sentence for the gun charge, and concurrent sentences for the remaining counts.

Mr. Rivera appealed. He argued that the district court committed reversible error and denied his right to a fair trial by allowing him to proceed pro se without further psychiatric evaluation of his competence for self-representation. Specifically, Mr. Rivera argued that he had a prolonged addiction to heroin and cocaine and showed signs of mental illness throughout the record. He contended that the district court’s decision “violated the principles” set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008). He argued that under Edwards, the court had an affirmative duty to obtain a competency evaluation before allowing him to proceed pro se.

Ruling and Reasoning

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that “where a defendant has been found competent to stand trial, Edwards does not require a court to conduct a further competency hearing or order psychiatric evaluations before permitting a defendant to proceed pro se” (Garrett, p 120).

The court noted that, in Faretta, the U.S. Supreme Court identified the importance of the constitutional right to self-representation and that when invoking this right, a defendant relinquishes several traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. Further, the court noted that defendants must “knowingly and intelligently” relinquish these benefits when electing to represent themselves. The court noted that the district court must ensure that the defendant is “aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open’” (Faretta, p 835, citing Adams v. U.S. ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942), p 279).

The court noted that in Edwards, the U.S. Supreme Court carved out a narrow exception to the right to self-representation: when a person is competent to proceed but is not competent to conduct trial proceedings because of severe mental illness. The court rejected Mr. Rivera’s argument that the district court had an affirmative duty to obtain a psychiatric evaluation to eliminate him from that category of defendants to whom this exception applies.

The court elaborated that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not ordering a psychiatric evaluation sua sponte before determining that Mr. Rivera knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. The court listed all the measures taken by the district court judge to ensure she had no doubts that Mr. Rivera understood his decision. The court also noted that the district court judge reported having no problems with Mr. Rivera’s conduct during the two years of proceedings. The court explained that although Mr. Rivera subsequently insisted that deciding to represent himself was irrational and self-destructive, this argument did not undermine the district court’s findings that he knowingly waived his right to counsel or suggest that he had a severe mental illness which rendered him not competent to conduct trial proceedings by himself. The court also cited Faretta, stating that defendants’ choice to represent themselves must be honored, “although [Mr. Rivera] may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment” (Faretta, p 834). The court, thus, concluded that the district court did not err by allowing Mr. Rivera to represent himself.