Concurrent Motions for Competency to Waive Counsel and Competency to Stand Trial

Facts of the Case

In 1985, Billy Ray Waldon was accused of murder, rape, robbery, and other offenses related to events occurring over a two-week period in San Diego, California. Mr. Waldon asserted that he had been framed by federal agents who wanted to intercept his efforts to advance Cherokee autonomy and spread “Poliespo,” a new language he created.

Prior to the trial, Mr. Waldon petitioned to dismiss his lawyers and represent himself under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Judge Zumwalt, who was presiding at the time, initially denied this motion based on expert testimony by the court's expert, Dr. Kalish, that Mr. Waldon had a delusional thought disorder that impaired his rational perception of his circumstances, his ability to appreciate the risks and consequences of self-representation, and his ability to formulate and present a defense in an appropriate manner. Dr. Kalish also opined that he was unsure if Mr. Waldon rationally understood the court proceedings or if he had the ability to assist counsel. This opinion prompted Judge Zumwalt to suspend the pro se hearings and order an evaluation of Mr. Waldon's competence to stand trial.

During Mr. Waldon's competence to stand trial hearings, which were heard before a different judge, Dr. Kalish testified that Mr. Waldon had a mood disorder, paranoia, and a thought disorder that caused him to be unable to relate to his attorney, think clearly, or focus on the pertinent matters. Two prosecution experts disputed the significance of Mr. Waldon's psychiatric history and opined that Mr. Waldon was feigning mental illness. The jury found Mr. Waldon to be competent to stand trial. Defense counsel filed a petition for writ of mandate in challenge of this competency verdict, which was denied by the court of appeal. In response to this denial, the defense counsel petitioned for California Supreme Court review, based on assertions of several errors and requesting a new competency trial. The California Supreme Court granted this review and ordered the court of appeals to address these claims.

In February 1988, in the midst of proceedings regarding Mr. Waldon's competence to stand trial, Judge Zumwalt resumed hearings as to Mr. Waldon's motion to represent himself. Judge Zumwalt appointed an advisory attorney to assist Mr. Waldon. In March 1988, Judge Zumwalt ultimately denied Mr. Waldon's request to represent himself, on the basis of multiple experts who opined that Mr. Waldon had a mental disease that impaired his ability to waive counsel knowingly and intelligently. Among some of the reasons presented were that he was deeply disturbed, paranoid, and unable to “rationally perceive” his situation, which impaired his understanding of the consequences of waiving counsel and his ability to mount a rational defense.

Mr. Waldon's representation for his competence hearings and his criminal trial changed numerous times, sometimes at the request of his attorneys and sometimes at Mr. Waldon's request, who continued to request to waive counsel. In June 1989, Mr. Waldon filed another Faretta motion, this time requesting that he be appointed two counsels required to “follow the directions of the defendant,” and, if this were denied, that Mr. Waldon be named “lead counsel” with an appointed “second chair counsel” who would follow his directions and assist (Waldon, p 1067). Judge Langford, to whom this Faretta motion was initially assigned, declined the first request but agreed to proceed with the Faretta hearings, although he noted that it was problematic to address Mr. Waldon's ability to self-represent while there were unresolved motions regarding his competence to stand trial.

The Faretta motions were then assigned to Judge Boyle. Judge Boyle acknowledged the ongoing competence hearings but agreed to proceed with the Faretta hearings anyway. When the prosecutor alerted the new judge to the “voluminous” prior materials on competence proceedings and the first Faretta motion, Mr. Waldon requested, via his advisory attorney, “that the court limit its review to the pending motion,” as review of prior materials could “possibly be prejudicial” (Waldon, p 1068). Judge Boyle agreed and did not review materials from the previous Faretta motion.

During the second Faretta hearings, Mr. Waldon again called lay witnesses and two expert witnesses. Neither expert had reviewed background material about Mr. Waldon or his case. Both experts testified that they believed he was competent to waive counsel, although one expert noted that Mr. Waldon had not shared many pertinent details with her, and so her opinion was based on limited information. Judge Boyle granted Mr. Waldon's request to waive counsel, after advising Mr. Waldon of some of the disadvantages of pro se representation.

At trial, Mr. Waldon represented himself. He was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to death. On an automatic appeal to the California Supreme Court, Mr. Waldon argued that the second judge had erred in finding him competent to represent himself. The Attorney General responded that Mr. Waldon waived his claim by inviting error when he petitioned that the second Faretta hearing be based on an intentionally abridged fund of evidence.

Ruling and Reasoning

The court reviewed the standard for competence to waive counsel, as established in Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993): the defendant must be competent to stand trial, and the defendant must make the waiver knowingly and voluntarily. If a defendant's mental ability to waive this right is questioned, a court should conduct a full review of the defendant's competence which should include an evaluation of relevant psychiatric evidence. The court opined that Judge Boyle's decision to not review information from the first Faretta hearing, which included relevant mental health testimony, was an abuse of discretion. Additionally, they found that this error was not harmless; it amounted to a “total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial” (Waldon, p 1073).

The court considered the state's argument that Mr. Waldon invited error by asking the judge to ignore material evidence from the first Faretta motion. The doctrine of invited error prohibits a defendant from seeking relief on appeal for a trial court's error if that error was purposefully and tactically caused (i.e., invited) by the defendant. But, the court noted that Mr. Waldon did not invite error, because his efforts to overturn the prior Faretta denial occurred while his competency to stand trial was still in question. “When the ‘evidence indicates that the defendant may be [mentally ill] it should be assumed that he is unable to act in his own best interests’” (Waldon, p 1070, citing People v. Lightsey, 279 P.3d 1072 (Cal. 2012). p 1096).